
External Evaluation of International Justice Mission's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia, 2004-2014

Prepared for

**International Justice Mission
Washington, DC**

December 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Acronyms

Acknowledgements

About the Consultant

Executive Summary.....	i
1. Introduction	1
1.1. International Justice Mission Overview	1
1.2. Prevalence of Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia	1
1.3. The Legal Framework and Trafficking Laws	3
1.3. International Justice Mission in Cambodia	4
2. Evaluation Approach	6
2.1. Evaluation Purpose and Scope	6
2.2. Evaluation Objectives	6
2.3. Evaluation Methods and Processes.....	7
2.3.1. Desk Review	7
2.3.2. Consultations with IJM HQ and FO Staff.....	8
2.3.3. Sample of Key Stakeholders and IJM Staff	8
2.3.4. Interviews with Key Stakeholders and IJM Staff.....	10
2.3.5. Focus Group Discussions with Faith-Based Communities	11
2.3.6. Interviews with Beneficiaries.....	12
2.3.7. Evaluation of IJM's AHTJP Police and Service Provider Trainings.....	12
2.3.8. Consultations on Preliminary Findings and Conclusions	12
2.4. Confidentiality	13
2.5. External Evaluation Team.....	13
2.6. Data Management and Analysis.....	14
3. Evaluation Findings.....	15
3.1. IJM's Program Goal and Outcomes	15
3.2. Relevance of IJM's Program and Goal.....	19
3.3. IJM Program Aligns with NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking.....	20
3.4. Key Stakeholders' Collaboration with IJM.....	21
3.5. Key Stakeholders Trained/Assisted by IJM.....	24
3.6. Building the Capacities of Police to Suppress CSEC.....	25
3.7. Improvement to the Courts' Handling of CSEC Cases	33
3.8. Confidence in the Public Justice System	39

3.9. Establishing Quality Crisis Aftercare for CSEC Survivors	41
3.10. Improvement in Victim Outcomes	44
3.11. Confidence in Coordination of Aftercare for CSEC Survivors	46
3.12. Mobilization of Faith-Based Communities	47
3.13. IJM's Effectiveness at Program Implementation	48
3.14. Reduction in Prevalence of CSEC in Target Areas	49
3.15. IJM's Ability to Adapt to Changes in the Situation of CSEC in Cambodia.....	53
3.15. Best Practices and Lessons Learned	54
4. Conclusions and Recommendations	58
4.1. Conclusions.....	58
4.2. Recommendation	61
 Annex A.....	 63
Annex B.....	64
Annex C.....	76

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAPTIP	The Australia Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons
AHTJPP	Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Police
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CSE	Commercial Sexual Exploitation
CSEC	Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CTMS	Casework Tracking Management System
DoSVY	Department of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation
DC	District of Columbia
FO	Field Office
HQ	Headquarters
IGO	International Governmental Organization
IJM	International Justice Mission
ILO	International Labour Organization
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organization
IPEC	International Program for the Elimination of Child Labour
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoSVY	Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NC	National Committee to Suppress Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor and Sexual Exploitation
NGO	Nongovernment Organization
NPA	National Plan of Action
TIP	Trafficking in Persons
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN-ACT	United Nations Action for Cooperation Against Trafficking in Persons
UNIAP	UN Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
VoT	Victim of Trafficking
UIA	Undercover Investigative Authority
USA	United States of America

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The evaluator wishes to extend special thanks to all those who shared their time and expertise to make this external evaluation of the IJM Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children possible. This includes IJM staff, key stakeholders in government agencies and international and nongovernmental organizations, and adult CSEC survivors that were beneficiaries of IJM's Program. The information shared by these individuals and groups during the course of meetings, interviews, and focus groups contributed to greater understanding of the important role the IJM Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children has played in Cambodia.

About the Consultant

Dr. Robin N. Haarr has been working for more than 15 years with UN organizations and government entities to conduct assessment, mapping, and evaluation research and to develop data-driven policy and programme recommendations. She also has expertise in conducting capacity building trainings related to research and policy and program development. She has worked extensively on child protection and social welfare systems of alternative care institutions/shelters; violence against children and women; human trafficking and exploitation; victim support services and protections; access to justice and justice system responses; and women's and child rights. She has worked on these issues with UN Women, United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Development Programme, International Labour Organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation of Europe, Swiss Cooperation Office, and the US Department of State/US Embassies in countries throughout Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, the Pacific, and in Africa. Her dedication and leadership to address women and children's issues has led to important legislative and policy changes, program development, and resources allocation that benefits children, women, families, and communities. Contact: robinhaarr@yahoo.com

Executive Summary

International Justice Mission Overview

International Justice Mission (IJM) is a global organization with headquarters (HQ) in Washington, DC, USA that works to protect the poor from various forms of violence throughout the developing world. IJM employs a global team of attorneys, investigators, social workers, and community activists who work in nearly 20 communities throughout Africa, Latin America, and Asia. To accomplish their mission, IJM partners with local authorities to rescue victims of violence, bring criminals to justice, restore survivors, and strengthen justice systems.

International Justice Mission in Cambodia

In 2000, IJM began documenting and investigating cases of CSEC in Cambodia. Initial assessments conducted by IJM staff revealed the prevalence of CSEC was quite high and children easily accessible, and it was openly available in certain areas of Svay Pak, Toul Kork, and along Street 63 in Phnom Penh. In 2002, IJM began talks with the Royal Cambodia Government about the CSEC problem; and in 2004, IJM officially opened its Cambodia Field Office in Phnom Penh and began implementing its Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia (hereinafter referred to as “Program”). Over the past decade (2004-2014) IJM’s Cambodia Field Office has focused the Program in three target areas - Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville.

IJM’s aim is to build political will and capacity to protect the poor from the targeted form of violence, and to train, resource, and mobilize government and community partners to do the same. IJM’s unique model is called *Justice System Transformation (JST)*. IJM provides direct services by working in partnership with government leaders and public justice system entities to improve the capacities of the public justice system to effectively respond to CSEC, but also to address gaps and barriers that exist in the public justice system in an effort to change the system as a whole. IJM’s Program focused on using *Collaborative Casework* to identify and investigate suspected cases of CSEC, provide collected evidence to local authorities, advocate for the arrest and prosecution of sex traffickers, and facilitate the rescue and referral of child sex trafficking victims to agencies that provide assistance for recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. IJM coupled their *Collaborative Casework* with a *System Reform Approach* which included capacity building of government partners and public justice system entities to change and strengthen the public justice system to handle and respond to CSEC. In IJM’s system reform phase, IJM continues collaborative casework and adds an intense focus on strengthening the criminal justice system.

This approach has enabled IJM to identify places in the public justice system where laws are not being enforced in CSEC cases, knowledge gaps and patterns of dysfunction exist, incidents of corruption occur, and gaps exist in the legal frameworks to effectively address CSEC; each of which keeps the public justice system from functioning and performing effectively in cases of CSEC.

Evaluation Purpose and Scope

In 2015, IJM concluded its Program and called for an external summative evaluation. In keeping with the Terms of Reference (TOR), the purpose of this external evaluation was to provide an independent, in-depth evaluation of the Program in terms of relevance, effectiveness and impact during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014, and to assess the potential for sustainability of IJM’s work and results achieved in Cambodia. In accordance, the evaluation scope is summative and focused on the Program’s approach, results achieved, lessons learned, challenges encountered, and adjustments made in each of the three project areas of Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014.

Evaluation Approach

To ensure the evaluation approach was as thorough and reliable as possible, different data collection methods and tools were employed. The evaluation methods and tools were in keeping with the TOR for this consultancy. These included (each of these are described in more detailed in the sections that follow):

- Desk review of research on CSEC in Cambodia and IJM Program documents and reports
- Consultations with IJM HQ staff in Washington, DC, USA and Field Office staff in Phnom Penh, Cambodia
- Sample of and interviews with key stakeholders and IJM staff
- Focus group discussions with faith-based communities
- Interviews with adult survivors of CSEC
- Assessment of IJM police and social service trainings
- Consultation on preliminary findings and conclusions with IJM HQ and FO staff

The evaluation team used a participatory approach that recognizes key stakeholders and beneficiaries as important and active participants that contribute to the production of knowledge and understanding. Triangulation was also a part of the evaluation approach to ensure not only the credibility of information and data collected, but also to allow diverse perspectives and experiences to be captured and to come to the forefront and reveal the full influence or impact and range or reach IJM's Program activities in Cambodia.

Sample of Key Stakeholders and IJM Staff

An important component of this evaluation approach was to interview key stakeholders who have a working knowledge of IJM's Program in Cambodia. IJM Cambodia provided a list of 148 representatives from various Cambodian governmental agencies, local and international NGOs, IOs, international governmental agencies (IGOs), and foreign Embassies in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville that had been identified as key stakeholders in the Program. Given the field work for this evaluation was carried out over a three-week period from June 22 to July 10, 2015, the external evaluators were unable to interview all 148 persons and representatives from each of the governmental agencies, local and international NGOs, IOs, IGOs, and foreign Embassies; therefore, the external evaluators worked in collaboration with IJM Cambodia staff to prioritize and identify which persons and representatives from each should be interviewed. A stratified purposive sampling approach was used to ensure a sample of representatives from as many of the various groupings of agencies/organizations as possible. IJM staff in IJM HQ and the Field Office were also interviewed.

A total of 54 key stakeholders and IJM staff were sampled via stratified and snowball sampling, and interviewed using the standardized data collection tools. In terms of organization type, the sample was fairly equally distributed to include 37.0% of respondents in the Royal Cambodian Government, 38.9% in NGO/IO/Other, and 24.1% in IJM. In regard to focus of work, the sample of respondents included aftercare service providers (46.3%), police and/or those engaged in investigation activities (38.9%), legal advocacy and/or the courts (9.3%), and community outreach (1.9%, i.e., working with faith-based communities). In terms of location, 70.4% of the sample was from Phnom Penh, 16.7% from Siem Reap, 9.3% from Sihanoukville, and 3.7% were from outside Cambodia.

Evaluation Findings

IJM's Program Goal and Outcomes

The overall goal of IJM's Program was to reduce the prevalence of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, and Siem Reap, and to improve outcomes for victims. In Cambodia, IJM implemented its *Justice System Transformation Programming Model* through collaborative casework and targeted justice system reform initiatives in the law enforcement and aftercare sectors. Two key outcomes included: 1) increased performance of the Cambodia's National Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Police (AHTJP Police) to identify and rescue victims, arrest suspects, and treat victims appropriately; and 2) increased performance of the Department of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (DoSVY)¹ and the private aftercare network to refer victims and provide quality aftercare services.

¹ The Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY) is one of the few government supported national networks providing social welfare services across Cambodia. DoSVY is MoSVY's local community-based direct service provider branch; however, local DoSVY staff face capacity challenges in training, authority, and funding to carry out their work.

Relevance of IJM's Program and Goal

IJM's Program to reduce the prevalence of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville and Siem Reap, and to improve outcome for victims in Cambodia was relevant at the time of the program's inception in 2004, and remained relevant over the ten years of program implementation (2004-2014). IJM has been among the leading NGOs working to combat CSEC in Cambodia; although not the only NGO working in this space. Moreover, IJM's *Justice System Transformation* approach through the combination of Collaborative Casework and targeted justice System Reform initiatives have proven relevant and successful to contributing to a reduction in the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia, and capacity building of public justice actors, including police and courts, to suppress CSEC through investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of CSEC cases.

IJM Program Aligns with NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking

IJM's Program has been appropriately and clearly aligned with relevant national plans and strategies of Cambodia for countering trafficking in persons, including the Cambodian National Plan of Action (NPA) to Suppress Human Trafficking for 2011-2013 and 2015. In particular, IJM's focus on building the capacities of government agencies to be able to identify victims of sex trafficking, provide victims with protection and support services, and to improve prosecutions in sex trafficking cases has been aligned with national plans and strategies. In addition, IJM through their working relationships with AHTJP and the National Committee was able to have an influence on the NPA for 2015; in particular, IJM was able to ensure that undercover investigative authority (UIA) was included as Outcome 1.3.7, "Develop undercover investigation guidelines, including audio-visual recording, in compliance with national law," in the NPA for 2014-2018.

Building the Capacities of Police to Suppress CSEC

In the early 2000s, Cambodian law enforcement anti-trafficking efforts were marked by inadequate training on basic investigative techniques, poor knowledge of the law, mistreatment of suspected traffickers and victims, severe lack of resources, widespread corruption and abuse of powers, and a lack of interest from the government's side to take the matter seriously. These factors resulted in an environment in which successful anti-trafficking operations leading to the rescue of victims and arrest of suspected traffickers were the exception.

Since 2004, IJM's Program has built the capacities of police, particularly the AHTJP, to aggressively pursue reported cases of CSEC. Findings from this evaluation revealed IJM's Program has made significant and meaningful contributions to building the capacities of police to combat human trafficking and sexual exploitation, CSEC in particular, including:

- Production and delivery of professional and high quality training for police, particularly the AHTJP;
- Technical expertise/assistance to police in the area of operations and enforcement, including to conduct raids and close the open brothels where CSEC was occurring;
- Improvements in police knowledge, awareness, and skills and abilities to identify trafficking in persons, in general, and CSEC, in particular;
- IJM's efforts to strengthen AHTJP's and collaboration with other public justice agencies in CSEC cases has contributed to a reduction in CSEC; and
- Improvements made to AHTJP's response to CSEC that can be sustained over time.

IJM has developed and delivered 17 different training modules to AHTJP and other provincial police in the three target areas and surrounding areas. From 2003 to 2013, IJM used the 17 different training modules to conduct 90 different trainings. Most were one-week trainings and the majority were conducted between 2004 and 2011. While most of these trainings involved police officials, some were joint trainings with officials from DoSVY, representatives from NGOs, and Deputy Governors of Districts in Siem Reap Province. Between 2003 and 2013, IJM trained a total of 504 persons, including 481 police officials and 23 other trainees, including DoSVY, NGO partners, and Deputy Governors of Districts in Siem Reap Province. Among the trainees, 274 were in the three

target areas and 230 were in the surrounding areas. Many trainees participated in more than one of IJM's trainings over the course of 10 years.

IJM also provided AHTJP with information about CSEC in the three target areas and provided technical expertise/assistance and mentoring in the office and in the field to gather criminal intelligence, conduct criminal investigations and raids, rescue and interview victims, identify and interview suspects, and prepare cases for prosecution. IJM has also provided AHTJP with technology and equipment to maintain evidence needed for investigations and raids. IJM's trainings and technical expertise/assistance has also helped to build AHTJPs capacities to use more victim-centered and child friendly approaches when working with rescued sex trafficking and CSEC victims.

Improvements to the Courts' Handling of CSEC Cases

Another important component of IJM's Program has been to ensure the evidentiary materials gathered through investigations and joint activities with police are used to prosecute perpetrators of CSEC. Thus, IJM focused their activities on providing professional legal representation to CSEC survivors, preparing CSEC survivors for court, and advocating for child friendly courts in CSEC cases. In addition, IJM conducted case management of legal cases and monitoring of the criminal proceedings of CSEC cases, from the point at which the case enters the court system to the prosecutors handling of the investigation, including the judicial investigation, and throughout the trial and appeals processes. IJM's legal case management and monitoring practices are designed to ensure legal cases are handled properly at every stage and that perpetrators of CSEC are prosecuted and convicted.

Previous IJM research documented that in the early 2000s, the judicial system was institutionally weak and backlogged, and in the early stages of reform. Judges and prosecutors were poorly trained, lacked sufficient resources to properly operate, and had an insufficient understanding of the laws, judicial procedures, and ethics. Components such as child friendly procedures, victim sensitivity, use of electronic or forensic evidence in court cases, and computerized case and data tracking were non-existent. In addition, the judicial system was significantly influenced by government leaders and corruption. Due to these realities, citizens distrusted the judicial system and tended to avoid engagement with the judicial system.²

The early 2000s was also marked by poor working relationships between the police and courts, and there was limited transparency and cooperation between the courts and NGOs who legally represented clients (e.g., sex trafficking victims). The result was that victims were often unwilling to cooperate or to participate in legal proceedings because they were uncertain as to the outcome and did not want to retell their trauma experience within the public court settings and risk further shame or threats to themselves or their families. Families were also more likely to settle the case with the perpetrator; a settlement that was often illegally accepted by the court.³

Data from this evaluation revealed IJM has played an important role in helping to improve the courts handling of human trafficking cases, including prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC, by monitoring and advocating that the courts use the proper child friendly criminal court proceedings in their role as legal representative to CSEC survivors. Some Government respondents recognized that IJM's monitoring of the courts handling of CSEC cases has contributed to improvements in the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC. Although the majority of NGO/IO/Other respondents recognized improvements in the courts handling of CSEC cases and prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC, some respondents were still critical of the courts and maintained there is still room for improving the courts handling of CSEC cases.

² Van der Keur, D. (2013). Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia and the Public Justice System Response: A stakeholder analysis of change between 2000-2012 (Summary Report), p. 8.

³ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 8.

One of the challenges IJM faced when it came to working with the courts, including prosecutors and judges, was that IJM never established an MOU with MoJ; nevertheless, IJM has managed to bring AHTJP police officials together with prosecutors through joint coordination meetings, trainings, and workshops.

Confidence in the Public Justice System

IJM's capacity building activities and monitoring of the public justice system's handling of CSEC cases has contributed to increased confidence in the public justice system's capacity to properly investigate and prosecute CSEC cases. IJM's monitoring of the courts handling of CSEC cases has contributed to improvements in the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC. Improvements to the public justice system's handling of CSEC cases most likely contributed to the reduction in the prevalence of CSEC in the three target areas. Despite increased confidence in public justice systems, respondents recognize there is still room for improving the abilities of the public justice system actors, including the AHTJP and courts' handling of CSEC cases.

Establishing Quality Crisis Aftercare for CSEC Survivors

Since 2004, IJM's Program has focused significantly on the identification and rescue of CSEC victims, as well as ensuring CSEC survivors are provided with protection and adequate care and support, reducing their risk of being re-trafficked and re-victimized. Between late 2004 and 2008, improvements within aftercare services and programming began to occur when a large number of local and international NGOs launched services within Cambodia to address the needs of trafficking and sexual exploitation victims. At the time, the majority of newly arrived NGOs launched shelter programs that included a protection, aftercare, and reintegration services.⁴

In 2011, IJM established an MOU with MoSVY to: a) improve the quality of care and support to CSEC victims during intervention, post-operation (after a raid), and legal proceeding in order to reduce the impact of trauma and ensure that victims' rights are upheld; b) facilitate successful and sustainable rehabilitation for victims through partnership with governmental and nongovernmental social service organizations; and c) promote collaboration and coordination between government social services and the IJM Aftercare Department through provision of training and coordinated assistance. IJM also had MOUs with NGO service providers to establish a collaborative working arrangement on all IJM CSEC cases for the protection and provision of quality aftercare services for survivors.

Over the past decade (2004-2014), IJM's Program has made some important contributions in each of the aforementioned MOU areas. Since 2008, IJM provided MoSVY/DoSVY and NGO service providers with a series of capacity building trainings and coordination assistance that has promoted improved knowledge and understanding of human trafficking and concepts and practices related to crisis care, aftercare, and case management. The capacity building trainings have also served to improve collaboration and coordination among governmental and nongovernmental aftercare service providers and the IJM Aftercare Department. IJM has also established minimum standards of care for CSEC survivors and structured aftercare treatment plans and case management protocols, forms, checklists. IJM has established their own protocols and assessment forms for assessing successful outcomes for CSEC survivors, including recovery, reintegration, and restoration. They also designed case management software that allows them to track and monitor all of their cases, including rescues, victim identification, intakes, referrals, legal proceedings, and victim outcomes.

Efforts of IJM to coordinate AHTJP and MoSVY/DoSVY to ensure proper protection and referral of CSEC survivors to quality aftercare services has not always been easy and likely required a great deal of lobbying and advocacy on the part of IJM with the government. IJM engaged the government in the long, slow process of change and capacity building, which also included improving communication and cooperation between the governmental agencies, such as AHTJP and MoSVY/DoSVY, as well as with NGOs to ensure protection and quality aftercare for trafficking and sexual exploitation victims.⁵

⁴ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 9.

⁵ Van der Kuer, 2013, p. 9.

Improvements in Victim Outcomes

IJM's Program also focused on improving outcomes for CSEC survivors. This was accomplished by establishing effective case management practices to confirm that rescued CSEC victims are provided with protection and aftercare services to reduce their risks of re-victimization and increase their opportunities for effective rehabilitation and recovery. IJM's case management approach involves collaboration with NGO shelter and aftercare service providers to ensure victims' needs are properly assessed and addressed at each of the various stages of protection and care, and progress is being made to support the recovery and rehabilitation of CSEC survivors. IJM has also established standards for determining when CSEC victims have been rehabilitated and recovered, and are ready for reintegration. At the stage of reintegration, IJM's aftercare case workers continue case management and follow-up directly with the survivors to monitor their progress and provide continued psycho-social support and other forms of needed support (e.g., sometimes temporary financial support) and access to services (e.g., assistance with accessing vocational skills training and employment services).

Confidence in Coordination of Aftercare for CSEC Survivors

IJM has made important contributions to increasing stakeholder's confidence in the performance of DoSVY to provide crisis care and to refer CSEC victims to quality aftercare. In addition, IJM has helped to improve the coordinated aftercare network, particularly among their partners, and provision of quality aftercare services to CSEC survivors. At the same time, this evaluation found there is still room for improvement. However, given the significant reduction in the number of CSEC cases and victim being referred for shelter and aftercare services many NGO-operated shelters are closing and NGO aftercare service providers are ending or limiting their services in Cambodia. Also, the documented reduction in the prevalence of CSEC cases in Cambodia has also led to a reduction in donor funding for CSEC projects and programs. Thus, the sustainability of quality aftercare service for CSEC survivors is unknown and will likely be much more limited in the future.

Mobilization of Faith-Based Communities

Although mobilizing community groups, particularly faith-based communities, for prevention of CSEC was not one of IJM's primary outcomes, it was an objective. IJM was focused on strengthening partnerships and networking with churches in IJM's three target areas to raise their awareness of CSEC in Cambodia and to mobilize church leaders to engage them in prevention of CSEC, including reporting suspected cases of CSEC in their communities. To accomplish this, IJM provided churches with trainings and materials to disseminate information in their churches specifically related to CSEC, and more generally to concepts of biblical justice and social injustices. This evaluation found faith-based communities are an important partner in the effort prevent and suppress CSEC in local communities, and helping church leaders to understand their roles and responsibilities to suppress CSEC within a framework of biblical justice was very meaningful to church leaders.

Reduction in Prevalence of CSEC in Target Areas

Since 2004, IJM's Program's overall goal has been to contribute to the reduction of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, and Siem Reap. In 2012, following eight years of implementing program activities, IJM conducted its first CSEC prevalence study. IJM collected data from 232 commercial sex establishments in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville, including karaoke clubs (KTVs), beer gardens, hostess bars, massage parlors, brothels, and brothels fronting as coffee shops. Based upon the sample IJM estimated the total prevalence of CSEC to be 8.16%, and the prevalence of children age 15 years or younger was estimated to be .75% (see Table 11). Based upon available historic data, IJM concluded the prevalence of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville had decreased substantially between 2000 and 2012, with the most notable decreased observed among children age 15 years or younger.⁶

In 2015, IJM conducted its second CSEC prevalence study. Again, IJM collected data in the three target areas – Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville – using the same methodology from their 2012 prevalence study.

⁶ International Justice Mission (2013). Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia.

Data collectors surveyed 287 randomly selected commercial sex establishments in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Sihanoukville and estimated the total prevalence of CSEC to be 2.22% (see Table 11). Based upon the findings from the two prevalence studies, IJM concluded that from 2012 to 2015, the overall prevalence of CSEC in commercial sex establishments across the three target areas declined by 73% (from 8.16% to 2.22%).

Respondents that were in Cambodia in the early half of the 2000s recalled that CSEC was prevalent and occurring openly on the streets; thus, they recognized a reduction in the situation of CSEC in Cambodia over the past 10 years. At the same time that respondents recognized a reduction in CSEC, many were not fully convinced that there had been such a drastic reduction in CSEC over the past 10 years (particularly as maintained in IJM's prevalence studies) because as they maintained, the demand for CSEC is still present in Cambodia. Many respondents contend the situation of CSEC in Cambodia has simply changed, it has become more clandestine, it is not as open as it was in the past, so it is more difficult to measure.

IJM's Ability to Adapt to Changes in the Situation of CSEC in Cambodia

IJM's Program has been able to adapt to the changing situation of CSEC in Cambodia, including changes in the operating environment and political landscape in which IJM was operating. Overtime, IJM was able to establish MOUs with MoI and MoSVY, and a few NGO aftercare service providers, which enabled them to contribute to a reduction in the prevalence of CSEC, and to build the capacities of public justice actors. It was also evidenced in the modifications of program objectives, outputs, and activities from 2004-2007 to the logframes of 2008-2011 and 2012-2014 that IJM was able to effectively adapt to the changing situation of CSEC, and the changing operating environment and political landscape in Cambodia. In addition, over time, IJM's Program activities and outputs remained consistent with the intended objectives, outcomes and impacts as defined in the logframes and work plans.

Of course, the ability to adapt has not been without challenges. Challenges IJM has faced are that CSEC activities largely became more clandestine and MoJ issued court orders denying MoI the use of UIA in sex trafficking cases. From 2012 to 2014, IJM petitioned MoJ on 16 different occasions to request the right of AHTJP to use UIA to pursue sex trafficking cases in the three target areas.

Conclusions

The findings from this summative evaluation revealed IJM Program to reduce the prevalence of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville and Siem Reap, and to improve outcome for victims in Cambodia was relevant at the time of the program's inception in 2004, and remained relevant over the ten years of program implementation (2004-2014). Moreover, IJM's *Justice System Transformation* approach through the combination of collaborative casework and targeted justice system reform initiatives have proven relevant and successful to contributing to a reduction in the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia, and capacity building of public justice actors, including police and courts, to suppress CSEC through investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of CSEC cases. Over the years, IJM has been among the leading NGOs working to combat CSEC in Cambodia; although not the only NGO working in this space.

Among the best practices identified by respondents was that IJM was able to remain continuously focused over the ten-year period of 2004 to 2014 on CSEC, to the point that IJM was able to contribute to and demonstrate a significant reduction in the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia which IJM has documented in their prevalence studies of 2012 and 2015. Other best practices have included: IJM's efforts to build the capacities of the police to suppress CSEC, and to facilitate collaboration among government agencies to provide crisis care and quality aftercare to CSEC victims following police raids and rescue; IJM's efforts to ensure CSEC survivors are identified and provided with protection and access to quality aftercare, and monitored for recovery are other best practices; and IJM's efforts to provide CSEC survivors with legal advocacy and to promote child friendly police and court proceedings.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. International Justice Mission Overview

International Justice Mission (IJM) is a global organization with headquarters (HQ) in Washington, DC, USA. IJM works to protect the poor from violence throughout the developing world, including slavery, sex trafficking, sexual violence, police brutality, and property grabbing. IJM employs a global team of attorneys, investigators, social workers, community activists and other professionals who work in nearly 20 communities throughout Africa, Latin America, and Asia. To accomplish their mission, IJM partners with local authorities to rescue victims of violence, bring criminals to justice, restore survivors, and strengthen justice systems.

IJM's work is built upon a Theory of Change (ToC) that strong public justice systems contribute to a lower prevalence of crimes against poor people and an improvement to victim outcomes. This ToC is grounded in IJM's observations and understanding that effective intervention by a public justice system can result in the rescue of individuals from abuse and exploitation, and perpetrators being held accountable for their crimes. Ultimately, a strong public justice system creates a strong deterrent effect that contributes to the overall reduction of a targeted crime.

1.2. Prevalence of Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia

In 2003, the Asia Regional Cooperation to Prevent People Trafficking (ARCPPT), an Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) supported project, implemented in collaboration with the Governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar (Burma) and Thailand, reported that human trafficking was a relatively new phenomenon in Cambodia. The first instances of trafficking reportedly dated back to approximately 1970, when cases of trafficking for the purpose of prostitution began to occur after Cambodia's border opened.⁷ Since the 1970s, there have been a number of factors that have contributed to the significant increase in human trafficking in Cambodia; foremost being poverty,⁸ as well as socio-economic imbalances between urban and rural areas, increased tourism and the growth of a sex tourism industry in Cambodia, lack of education and employment opportunities, and the traditional practice of holding children, particularly girls, responsible for helping to support their families in times of need.⁹ The International Labour Organization (ILO) also maintained the psychological and economic aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime had a direct effect on the growth and prevalence of human trafficking in the country.¹⁰ Under the economic reform policy of the Khmer Rouge regime, there was a massive evacuation and relocation of the population from urban to rural areas and men, women, and children were placed in labor camps where they were forced to perform agricultural work. After the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime, lack of opportunities in rural areas drove people and families to return to Cambodia's cities and urban areas in search of employment and a better standard of living. The Khmer Rouge regime left the nation's social structure in ruins, and the mass genocide and human rights abuses committed against Cambodian people by the brutal Khmer Rouge regime left the population traumatized and vulnerable. The subsequent invasion by the Vietnamese, who ruled for 10 years (ending in 1989), did not improve conditions for Cambodians.

In 1991, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was deployed to Cambodia to stabilize the country; however, the Human Rights Task Force on Cambodia suggested it was the presence of UNTAC's 20,000 peacekeepers and civilian personnel that contributed to a significant expansion of the commercial sex industry and laid the ground for sex trafficking.¹¹ In 1991, it was estimated that the total number of commercial

⁷ Gender, Human Trafficking, and the Criminal Justice System in Cambodia (2003). Asia Regional Cooperation to Prevention People Trafficking (ARCPPT). Australian Government AusAID, p. 12.

⁸ UNIAP: Cambodia Overview.

⁹ ARCPPT, 2003.

¹⁰ ILO-IPEC: Cambodia, The Situation.

¹¹ Shaw, D. (2013). *Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia*. International Justice Mission.

sex workers in Cambodia was 6,000; by 1992, there were reportedly more than 20,000 commercial sex workers in Phnom Penh.¹² Although the number of commercial sex workers reportedly dropped after the departure of UNTAC in early 1993, commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC) reportedly grew in the absence of a functioning public justice system and a realization among traffickers and exploiters that a significant amount of money could be made by promoting Cambodia as a sex tourism destination. Cambodia's child sex tourism industry grew in the 1990s as traffickers and exploiters catered to a segment of foreign sex tourists and paedophiles who desired young girls and boys and children. In fact, in the early 2000s, Cambodia developed a reputation as a child sex tourism destination for pedophiles from the West and other Asian countries.¹³ During this same time period, increased fears of HIV/AIDS led to an increase in CSEC.^{14,15}

In 1999, ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) reported more than 15% of prostitutes in Cambodia were between 9 and 15 years of age.¹⁶ By 2001, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported approximately 3,000 women and girls from southern Vietnam were trafficked into Cambodia on an annual basis, of which 15% were reportedly girls 15 years of age or younger.^{17,18} A contributing factor to the prevalence of sex trafficking of Vietnamese girls in Cambodia has been the large population of ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia, whose legal status was not acknowledged until only recently.¹⁹ Cambodia has experienced not only cross-border trafficking, but there has also been large-scale internal trafficking from the rural areas to cities in Cambodia for sexual exploitation.²⁰

Trafficking into the sex industry is "perhaps the most well-known occurrence of trafficking within Cambodia to the extent that it has become normalized."²¹ According to the 2003 Asia Regional Cooperation to Prevent People Trafficking (ARCPPT) Report, an estimated 14,000 women were working in the sex industry in Cambodia.²² Many were reportedly lured into commercial sexual exploitation through false promises of legitimate work in urban areas and cities.²³

The picture of who traffickers are in Cambodia is unclear. Some reports maintain sex traffickers and exploiters in Cambodia range from small-scale, ad hoc, largely loosely coupled networks of individuals that include opportunistic individuals and families, including parents who would sell their children into commercial sexual exploitation, to well-organized and profitable large-scale networks and organized crimes groups.²⁴ Others describe trafficking as a "cottage industry" in the Mekong subregion.²⁵ Although no specific studies have been

¹² "Cambodia, H. R. (2001, August 13). *Cambodia: Prostitution and Sex Trafficking - A Growing Threat to the Human Rights of Women and Children in Cambodia*. Retrieved June 5, 2013, from Human Solidarity Rights: <http://www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/1996vol06no04/219/>.

¹³ Van der Keur, D. (2013). *Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia and the Public Justice System Response: A Stakeholder Analysis of Change between 2000-2012*. International Justice Mission.

¹⁴ Shaw, D. (2013). *Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia*. International Justice Mission.

¹⁵ Original document cited by D. Shaw in 2013 was: Cambodia, H. R. (2001, August 13). *Cambodia: Prostitution and Sex Trafficking - A Growing Threat to the Human Rights of Women and Children in Cambodia*. Retrieved: June 5, 2013, from Human Solidarity Rights: <http://www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/1996vol06no04/219/>

¹⁶ U.S. State Department (2001). *Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC.

¹⁷ Shaw, D. (2013). *Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia*. International Justice Mission.

¹⁸ U.S. State Department (2002). *Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC.

¹⁹ Kneebone, S. and J. Debeljak (2012). *Transnational Crime and Human Rights: Responses to Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Subregion*. Routledge: New York, NY.

²⁰ U.S. State Department (2014). *Trafficking in Persons Report*. Washington, DC.

²¹ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, pp. 136-137.

²² AusAID, Asia Regional Cooperation to Prevent People Trafficking (ARCPPT), *Gender, Human Trafficking and the Criminal Justice System in Cambodia* (December 2003) 13.

²³ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, pp. 136-137.

²⁴ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, pp. 136-137.

²⁵ Dereks, A., R. Henke, and L. Vanna (2006). *Review of a Decade of Research on Trafficking in Persons, Cambodia*. Asia Foundation.

conducted on the criminal networks of traffickers and exploiters in Cambodia, evidence does suggest the involvement of family members, neighbours, and friends.^{26,27}

Over the past several decades, there has been an overwhelming focus on the commercial sexual exploitation of women and children in Cambodia which has shaped the discourse in the country and has influenced international donor funding of projects and programmes mainly targeted at sex trafficking of women and children in Cambodia. However, this focus and discourse has concealed the reality of other forms of human trafficking, including trafficking for labor and domestic servitude.²⁸

1.3. The Legal Framework and Trafficking Laws

Prior to 2007, the *Law on Suppression of Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Exploitation of Human Beings* (1996), and the UNTAC Code made up the trafficking laws of Cambodia.²⁹ The *Law on Suppression of Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Exploitation of Human Beings* was limited to only 10 articles that broadly addressed suppressing acts of kidnapping persons for trafficking or sale and the exploitation of persons. There was little language in the *Law on Suppression of Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Exploitation of Human Beings* that specifically addressed trafficking issues; therefore, most trafficking and exploitation cases were prosecuted under the term “debauchery.”³⁰ Limitations also existed in Criminal Procedural Law which lacked clarity and missed vital rules to ensure proper procedures for both the victim and the suspect.³¹

In 2007, the *Law on Suppression of Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Exploitation of Human Beings* was replaced by a new criminal law, the *Law on Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation (TIPSE Law 2007)*; the *TIPSE Law* was passed in 2008 and enacted in 2009. Drafted largely by foreign legal experts under the guidance of the Ministry of Justice, and funded by UNICEF, the *TIPSE Law 2007* was designed to align Cambodia’s national legislation with international legal frameworks, particularly the *UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children*, to suppress human trafficking and sexual exploitation, and to implement other international conventions and agreements with regard to human trafficking that the Royal Cambodian Government had signed and ratified.^{32,33} The *TIPSE Law 2007* clearly defines “trafficking in persons” in keeping with international legal frameworks, and specifically outlines and defines each element of the crime and offers clear sentencing schemes.³⁴ After enactment, there was controversy surrounding the *TIPSE Law 2007* because police were reportedly using the law to harass sex workers, despite the fact that prostitution in and of itself is not a crime in Cambodia or defined as a crime in the *TIPSE Law*.^{35,36} Eventually, the controversy was resolved and the *TIPSE Law 2007* emerged as an important tool to suppress sex trafficking, including CSEC.³⁷ In addition to the *TIPSE Law 2007*, *The Criminal Procedure Code of 2007* also clearly describes the roles and responsibilities of the police, prosecutors, clerks and the judiciary and has assisted in the strengthening of general procedures for law enforcement and prosecution, including in sex trafficking cases.³⁸

At the same time the *TIPSE Law 2007* was being enacted, the National Committee to Lead the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labour Exploitation, and Sexual Exploitation in Women and Children (herein referred to as the National Committee) was established. The National Committee is chaired by the Ministry of the Interior (Mol) and includes six different national taskforces on combatting trafficking in Cambodia, each of

²⁶ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, pp. 136-137.

²⁷ Dereks, Henke and Vanna, 2006.

²⁸ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, pp. 136-137.

²⁹ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, p 138.

³⁰ Van der Keur, 2013.

³¹ Van der Keur, 2013.

³² Kneebone and Debljank, 2012, p. 138-142.

³³ Van der Keur, 2013.

³⁴ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, p. 139.

³⁵ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, p. 139.

³⁶ Van der Keur, 2013.

³⁷ Van der Keur, 2013.

³⁸ Van der Keur, 2013.

which are chaired by various ministries, including the MoI, Department of Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection (AHTJP), the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA), and the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth (MoSVY).³⁹ The National Committee coordinates the efforts of more than 200 entities, including ministries and governmental agencies, international organizations (IOs), and local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to encourage collective action to combat human trafficking and exploitation.⁴⁰ Under Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT), the Royal Cambodian Government has also established a Second National Plan of Action (NPA) on Trafficking in Persons and Sexual Exploitation.^{41,42}

1.4. International Justice Mission in Cambodia

In 2000, IJM began documenting and investigating cases of CSEC in Cambodia. Initial assessments conducted by IJM staff revealed the prevalence of CSEC was quite high and children were easily accessible, and it was openly available in certain areas of Svay Pak, Toul Kork, and along Street 63 in Phnom Penh.⁴³ Sexually exploited pre-pubescent children, predominately of Vietnamese ethnicity, and older Khmer children were identified among the CSEC victims. It was during this time period that Cambodia had developed a reputation as a child sex tourism destination for pedophiles from the West and other Asian countries.

In 2002, IJM began talking with the Royal Cambodia Government about the CSEC problem and in 2004, IJM officially opened its Cambodia Field Office in Phnom Penh and began implementing its Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia (hereinafter referred to as "Program"). Over the past decade (2004-2014) IJM's Cambodia Field Office has focused the Program in three target areas - Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville.

IJM's aim is to build political will and capacity to protect the poor from the targeted form of violence, and to train, resource, and mobilize government and community partners to do the same. IJM's unique model is called *Justice System Transformation (JST)*. IJM provides direct services by working in partnership with government leaders and public justice system entities⁴⁴ to improve the capacities of the public justice system to effectively respond to CSEC, but also to address gaps and barriers that exist in the public justice system in an effort to change the system as a whole. IJM's Program focused on using a *Collaborative Casework* model to identify and investigate suspected cases of CSEC, provide collected evidence to local authorities, advocate for the arrest and prosecution of sex traffickers, and facilitate the rescue and referral of child sex trafficking victims to agencies that provide assistance for recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration.⁴⁵ IJM coupled their *Collaborative Casework* model with a *System Reform* approach which included capacity building of government partners and public justice system entities to change and strengthen the public justice system to handle and respond to CSEC. In IJM's System Reform phase, IJM continues Collaborative Casework and adds an intense focus on strengthening the criminal justice system.

This approach has enabled IJM to identify places in the public justice system where laws are not being enforced in CSEC cases, knowledge gaps and patterns of dysfunction exist, incidents of corruption occur, and gaps exist in the legal frameworks to effectively address CSEC; each of which keeps the public justice system from functioning and performing effectively in cases of CSEC.

³⁹ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, p. 138-142.

⁴⁰ Van der Keur, 2013.

⁴¹ In 2004, ministers of all six GMS countries – Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, and China – signed a MOU which established the COMMIT. The secretariat of COMMIT is UN ACT (formerly known as the UNIAP on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Subregion).

⁴² Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012, p. 138-142.

⁴³ Van der Keur, 2013.

⁴⁴ IJM partnered with various local stakeholders, some of which include: Cambodia's National Committee to Lead the Suppression of Human Trafficking, Smuggling, Labor and Sexual Exploitation; Ministry of Interior (MoI); Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY); and the Chab Dai Coalition.

⁴⁵ Van der Keur, D. & C. Touch (2013). *Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia and the Public Justice System Response: A Stakeholder Analysis of Change between 2000-2012*. International Justice Mission: Washington, DC, p.1

Since 2007, to achieve the desired impacts, IJM's Program activities have focused on two outcomes: 1) increased performance of the Cambodia's National Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Police (AHTJP Police) to identify and rescue victims, arrest suspects, and treat victims appropriately; and 2) increased performance of the Department of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (DoSVY) and the private aftercare network to refer victims and provide quality aftercare services. Accordingly, these two outcomes contribute to the overarching Program goal of reducing the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia, particularly in the three target areas of Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville.

2. EVALUATION APPROACH

2.1. Evaluation Purpose and Scope

In 2015, IJM concluded its Program to Combat Child Sex Trafficking in Cambodia and called for an external summative evaluation. In keeping with the Terms of Reference (TOR), the purpose of this external evaluation was to provide an independent, in-depth evaluation of the Program in terms of relevance, effectiveness, and impact during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014, and to assess the potential for sustainability of IJM's work and results achieved in Cambodia. In accordance, the evaluation scope is summative and focused on the Program's approach, results achieved, lessons learned, challenges encountered, and adjustments made in each of the three project areas of Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014. This external evaluation hopefully identifies areas of success and lessons learned that can be used by IJM leadership to inform decisions regarding future planning, design, and management of IJM system reform programs in other countries.

2.2. Evaluation Objectives

The objectives of this external evaluation were to assess the relevance, effectiveness, and impact of IJM's Program in Cambodia during the implementation period of 2004 to 2014, and to assess the potential for sustainability of IJM's results achieved in Cambodia. As defined in the TOR, the evaluation questions related to relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact are identified below.

Relevance: Was the program appropriately aligned with the relevant national plans and strategies of Cambodia for countering trafficking in persons? How did the program contribute to the development and implementation of appropriate national and stakeholder plans and strategies? Were the activities and outputs of the program consistent with the intended outcomes and impact? How well did the program adapt to changes in the operating environment?

Effectiveness: To what extent has the program achieved its intended outputs, outcomes, and impact? If not, what progress was made towards these results? What are the reasons for the achievement or non-achievement of program results? Did the program have effective monitoring mechanisms in place to measure progress towards results? How well did it use program information to adapt? What lessons learned, best practices, or recommendations should be considered by IJM or other anti-trafficking organizations? What lessons learned or best practices, if any, have already been adopted or replicated by other organizations?

Impact: To what extent has the program contributed to a reduction in the prevalence and scale of sex trafficking of minors (young minors 15 years old and younger; and borderline minors aged 16-17 years old) in the program target areas from 2004-2014? To what extent has the program contributed to a reduction in the number of establishments engaged in sex trafficking of children in the program target areas (especially a contraction in hotspots) from 2004-2014? Comparing 2004 to 2014, have key stakeholders' confidence increased in the performance of public justice system actors to appropriately address the problem of sex trafficking of children in Cambodia? What was IJM's contribution to the development of a coordinated aftercare system in Cambodia from 2004-2014? What was IJM's contribution to improved outcomes for specific IJM aftercare clients? What other positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term economic, environmental, and social change(s) were produced or likely to be produced by the program, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended?


Sustainability: To what extent do public justice system actors targeted by the program have increased capacity to perform their relevant roles in regards to sex trafficking of children (in particular the police, but also public prosecutors, and aftercare)? To what extent has the program built political support for a sustained public justice system response to sex trafficking of children?

2.3. Evaluation Methods and Processes

To ensure the evaluation approach was as thorough and reliable as possible, different data collection methods and tools were employed. The evaluation methods and tools were in keeping with the TOR for this consultancy. These included (each of these are described in more detailed in the sections that follow):

- Desk review of research on CSEC in Cambodia and IJM Program documents and reports
- Consultations with IJM HQ staff in Washington, DC, USA and Field Office staff in Phnom Penh, Cambodia
- Sample of and interviews with key stakeholders and IJM staff
- Focus group discussions with faith-based communities
- Interviews with adult survivors of CSEC
- Assessment of IJM police and social service trainings
- Consultation on preliminary findings and conclusions with IJM HQ and FO staff

Throughout the evaluation, the evaluation team used a participatory approach that recognizes key stakeholders and beneficiaries as important and active participants that contribute to the production of knowledge and understanding. In keeping, the evaluation team set out to collaborate with all key stakeholders and beneficiaries during the evaluation process, including IJM Cambodia staff. Triangulation was also an important part of the evaluation approach to ensure not only the credibility of information and data collected, but also to allow diverse perspectives and experiences to be captured. The external evaluators undertook analysis and interpretation of data collected in the field as an opportunity to allow the diverse perspectives and experiences of key stakeholders, IJM staff, and beneficiaries to be captured through triangulation and to come to the forefront and reveal the full influence or impact and range or reach IJM's Program activities in Cambodia.



2.3.1. Desk Review

The evaluation began with a preliminary desk review of IJM Program documents, including operational documents, and program logframes, work plans and reports, as well as system reform documents, aftercare process documents, and monitoring and donor documents and reports. Research reports produced by IJM on CSEC prevalence and the public justice system's response to CSEC were also reviewed. IJM provided digital copies of these documents for the desk review. In addition, research and reports produced by other organizations working in Cambodia and academics studying anti-trafficking initiatives and justice system and aftercare responses were reviewed.

The majority of the desk review was completed prior to arriving in-country which served to assist with the design of the evaluation approach and data collection tools to ensure all questions and measures were related to the evaluation criteria and focused on relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact, as well as defined activities, strategies, and outcomes of the Program. Early consultations with IJM HQ and Field Office staff helped

to ensure all IJM documents were properly organized and understood, both in terms of their merit and use in the report.⁴⁶

A more thorough and in-depth review and analysis of desk review materials and documents was carried out after field evaluation work was completed. For instance, desk review materials and documents were used to conduct assessments of work plans and logframes, to evaluate training materials, and to assess System Reform activities and gains. Content analysis of desk review materials was used to complement interview data collected during the field evaluation. Such an approach ensures a summative evaluation of the activities, strategies and outcomes of the Program, as well as the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact of the Program.

2.3.2. Consultations with IJM HQ and FO staff

Evaluations are typically characterized by extensive team engagement throughout the evaluation period, coupled with independent field assessments by the evaluation team to ensure independence and open discussion. Thus, IJM staff at IJM HQ in Washington, DC, USA and at the IJM Field Office in Phnom Penh, Cambodia were involved in this evaluation, including the planning for the evaluation, review of the evaluation approach and data collection tools developed by the Lead Evaluator, and the finalization of this report.

In May and June 2015, prior to beginning the field evaluation, a series of consultations with IJM HQ and Field Office staff occurred via Skype. The focus of these consultations was on the implementation of the Program from 2004 to 2014, which helped to inform the development of the Inception Report, including the evaluation approach and data collection tools. Upon arriving in-country, prior to conducting the evaluation in the field, a consultation meeting was also carried out with IJM Cambodia Field Office staff in Phnom Penh on 22 May 2015.

2.3.3. Sample of Key Stakeholders and IJM Staff

An important component of this evaluation approach was to interview key stakeholders who have a working knowledge of IJM's Program in Cambodia. IJM Cambodia provided a list of 148 representatives from various Cambodian governmental agencies, local and international NGOs, IOs, IGOs, and foreign Embassies in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville that had been identified as key stakeholders in the Program during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014. Given the field work for this evaluation was carried out over a three week period from June 22 to July 10, 2015, the external evaluators were unable to interview all 148 persons and representatives from each of the governmental agencies, local and international NGOs, IOs, IGOs, and foreign Embassies; therefore, the external evaluators worked in collaboration with IJM Cambodia staff to prioritize and identify which persons and representatives from each should be interviewed. A stratified purposive sampling approach was used to ensure a sample of representatives from as many of the various groupings of agencies/organizations as possible. IJM staff in IJM HQ and the Field Office were also interviewed; interviews with IJM staff in HQ occurred on 16 September 2015, after completion of the field evaluation. A few interviews were also conducted via Skype with IJM staff in July and August 2015.

A snowball sampling approach was also utilized in an effort to ensure a well-rounded and complete sample of representatives working on issues of sex trafficking of children in Cambodia (including those not necessarily selected or recommended by IJM). Some interviewees were asked to identify other persons they think we should speak to who were outside of IJM's Program, but have knowledge and understanding of the Program and its impact during the period of 2004 to 2014. This approach of snowball sampling was not very useful given the fact that the evaluators had very little time in the field and the schedule for meeting with key stakeholders who had a working knowledge of IJM's Program in Cambodia was very tight.

It is important to note that more than one person was identified as a relevant contact in many the different agencies/organizations selected to be sampled, and the external evaluators wanted the opportunity to interview more than one representative from each of the different agencies/organizations selected for the

⁴⁶ Early consultations included Skype sessions and e-mails with IJM HQ and FO staff.

sample. In many agencies/organizations, small group interviews were conducted to maximize the sample and to efficiently use time in the field.

Table 1 reveals a total of 54 key stakeholders and IJM staff were sampled via stratified and snowball sampling, and interviewed using the standardized data collection tools described in Section 2.3.4. In terms of organization type, the sample was fairly equally distributed to include 37.0% of respondents in the Royal Cambodian Government, 38.9% in NGO/IO/Other, and 24.1% in IJM. In regard to focus of work, the sample of respondents included service providers (46.3%), police and/or those engaged in investigation activities (38.9%), legal advocacy and/or the courts (9.3%), and community outreach (1.9%, i.e. working with faith-based communities). In terms of location, 70.4% of the sample was from Phnom Penh, 16.7% from Siem Reap, 9.3% from Sihanoukville, and 3.7% were from outside Cambodia. It is important to note that consultations were also conducted with an additional 4 IJM staff from IJM HQ; however, they are not included in Table 1 or any of the tables or graphs in this report because they were not interviewed using the standardized data collection tools. Only qualitative data from these consultations are presented throughout this report.

Table 1. Sample of key stakeholders and IJM staff		
	Sample N=54	
<u>Organization Type</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
Royal Cambodian Government	20	35.1
NGO/IO/Other	21	38.9
IJM	13	24.1
<u>Focus of Work^a</u>		
Service provider	25	46.3
Policing and investigations	21	38.9
Legal/courts	5	9.3
Outreach	1	1.9
<u>Location</u>		
Phnom Penh	38	70.4
Siem Reap	9	16.7
Sihanoukville	5	9.3
Outside Cambodia	2	3.7

^a Focus of work is missing for two respondents

Table 2 reveals the comparison of organization type and focus of work by location. In Phnom Penh, the sample of 38 respondents included 26.3% in the Government, 44.7% in NGO/IO/Other, and 28.9% in IJM. In terms of focus of work, in Phnom Penh, 47.4% were service providers, 36.8% were in policing/investigations, 7.9% were in legal advocacy and/or the courts, and 2.6% were doing outreach. In Siem Reap, the sample of nine included only government (77.8%) and NGO/IO/Other (22.2%) respondents; there were no IJM staff in Siem Reap. The focus of work represented in Siem Reap included 33.3% service providers, 44.4% in policing and/or investigations, and 22.2% in legal advocacy and/or the courts; no outreach workers were interviewed in Siem Reap. In Sihanoukville, the sample of five included 60.0% government and 40.0% NGO/IO/Other; there were no IJM staff in Siem Reap. The focus of work represented in Sihanoukville included 60.0% service providers and 40.0% police; no legal or outreach workers were interviewed in Sihanoukville. Finally, respondents outside of Cambodia included only two IJM respondents, including one that specialized in aftercare for victims and one that focused on working with the police.

Table 2. Organization type and focus of work by location								
	Phnom Penh N=38		Siem Reap N=9		Sihanoukville N=5		Outside Cambodia N=2	
<u>Organization Type</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Royal Cambodian Government	10	26.3	7	77.8	3	60.0	0	0.0
NGO/IO/Other	17	44.7	2	22.2	2	40.0	0	0.0
IJM	11	28.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	100.0
<u>Focus of Work^a</u>								
Service provider	18	47.4	3	33.3	3	60.0	1	50.0
Policing and investigations	14	36.8	4	44.4	2	40.0	1	50.0
Legal	3	7.9	2	22.2	0	0.0	0	0.0
Outreach	1	2.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0

^a Focus of work is missing for two respondents

Table 3 shows that among government respondents, 65.0% were police, 20.0% were in legal (i.e., prosecutors and magistrates), and 15.0% were service providers. In comparison, among NGO/IO/Other, nearly all respondents were service providers (90.0%); only 10.0% were working in the area of policing and investigations. Among IJM staff, the majority of respondents were in the area of policing and investigations (50.0%) and aftercare/service provision (33.3%); only 8.3% were doing legal advocacy and 8.3% outreach.

Table 3. Focus of work by organization type						
	Government N=20		NGO/IO/Other N=20		IJM N=12	
<u>Focus of Work^a</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
Service provider	3	15.0	18	90.0	4	33.3
Policing and investigations	13	65.0	2	10.0	6	50.0
Legal	4	20.0	0	0.0	1	8.3
Outreach	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	8.3

^a Focus of work is missing for two respondents

It is important to note that nine interviews were conducted as a small group interview with two persons. In small group interviews responses to close-ended questions were recorded as one interview. Therefore, data presented Section 3, Evaluation Findings, will be based only upon a sample of 45 respondents.

2.3.4. Interviews with Key Stakeholders and IJM Staff

It is important to note that in many cases more than one person was identified as a relevant contact in each of the different agencies/organizations selected to be sampled. Moreover, the external evaluators wanted the opportunity to interview more than one representative from each of the different agencies/organizations selected for the sample. Given this reality, the evaluation approach involved conducting a combination of one-on-one and small group interviews. One-on-one interviews were conducted in those situations where there was only one person in an organization/institution that needed to be interviewed and/or in situations where a senior level official/representative (e.g., executive officers, director, and chief of party) needed to be interviewed. One-on-one interviews were also used in situations where individuals had an area of specialization or expertise that required a one-on-one interview. One-on-one interviews were also conducted if an interviewee requested.

In comparison, small group interviews of two to three people maximum were utilized when interviews needed to be conducted with line level officers, frontline service providers, or staff of the same rank in the same agencies/organizations. Small group interviews allowed for some degree of synergy and discussion on questions which allowed for more depth and perspective by groups from the same agencies/organizations. Small group interviews also allowed the external evaluators to maximize their contact and data collection with each of the 148 persons and governmental agencies and NGOs in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville, as identified

by IJM. Most interviews were conducted by both the Lead Evaluator and the National Evaluator; however, some interviews were conducted by only the Lead Evaluator or the National Evaluator.

Structured interview schedules were used to guide interviews with key stakeholders and IJM Field Office staff. First, a master interview schedule was developed that included a list of interview questions that focused specifically on IJM's substantive focus areas, activities, and outcomes, and that included a focus on issues of relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and impact (see Annex B). The interview schedule included both the primary and probing questions, both of which were designed to generate a combination of quantitative and qualitative data related to each of the 13 thematic areas developed by the Lead Evaluator listed below:

- Familiarity with IJM's Program and goal
- Collaboration and roles and responsibilities to IJM's Program
- Working relationships with IJM
- Program outcomes
- Program gaps and challenges
- Program management and implementation
- Cambodian National Police Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Police Unit
- Response of the Cambodian public justice system to CSEC
- Aftercare, including work of DoSVY⁴⁷
- Work with faith-based communities
- Alignment with national plans and strategies
- Impact on prevalence
- Sustainability

Many of the questions included in each of the 13 thematic areas were designed to capture historical perspective, to the degree to which interviewees had a historical perspective of the implementation of IJM's Program from 2004 to 2014. It is important to note that the master interview schedule was translated into Khmer in advance of the interviews by the National Consultant in collaboration with IJM staff to ensure consistency in IJM terminology.

Based upon the master interview schedule, separate structured interview schedules were developed for each of the different agencies/organizations that were working in the substantive areas identified below.

- AHTJP Police and other agencies/organizations focused on policing
- Prosecutors and judges and other agencies/organizations focused on justice
- Aftercare and social service providers and coordinating agencies
- Other IGOs, Embassies, and Donors
- IJM staff

Thus, each of the groups was asked some of the same questions, but also different questions. When data is reported and findings presented in Section 3, Evaluation Findings, the number of persons that responded to each question does not always total the full sample of 54 respondents, but is based upon the number of persons that was asked the question and responded (i.e., the valid percent).

One of the limitations of this approach was that the interview schedules resulted in lengthy interviews during which some interviewee's time was limited and a few others were called away on other matters after the interview started. Given this reality, the external evaluators worked with IJM to identify primary questions that should be focused on in situations where interviewee's time was limited.

2.3.5. Focus Group Discussion with Members of Faith-Based Communities

⁴⁷ The Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY) is one of the few government supported national networks providing social welfare services across Cambodia. DoSVY is MoSVY's local community-based direct service provider branch; however, local DoSVY staff face capacity challenges in training, authority, and funding to carry out their work.

In 2013, IJM Cambodia established church mobilization as one of its goals. This included strengthening partnerships and better networking with churches in IJM Cambodia's three target areas to increase understanding among church leaders about biblical justice and to encourage practical action by the church. IJM also nurtured a prayer movement for justice within the church. Given IJM Cambodia's work with faith-based communities, focus group discussions with faith-based communities were conducted in each of the three target areas – Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville. A total of 3 focus group discussions were held with faith-based communities, one in each target area, and included a total of 14 participants.

Focus group discussions with faith-based communities were focused on three areas: 1) their familiarity with IJM's Program; 2) IJM's work with faith-based communities; and 3) best practices and lessons learned identified in IJM's work in Cambodia.

2.3.6. Interviews with Beneficiaries

Effort was also made to interview a small number of beneficiaries, particularly adult survivors of CSEC, who had reached restoration and reintegration in keeping with IJM's standards. Steps were taken to collaborate with IJM and local aftercare providers to identify adult survivors of CSEC willing to participate in a one-on-one interview.⁴⁸ A total of 4 adults survivors of CSEC were interviewed, including 3 in Phnom Penh and 1 in Siem Reap.

Interviews with beneficiaries were focused on issues of aftercare, including support provided by IJM in terms of coordinating their aftercare and support and providing access to the public justice system. The focus was also on perceived quality of care and support services received by the aftercare service provider(s), satisfaction with the public justice system response to their cases, and personal successes since rescue and plans for the future (see Annex C). At no point did questioning focus on their prior sexual exploitation or victimization, or their traffickers or exploiters.

2.3.7. Evaluation of IJM's AHTJP Police and Service Provider Trainings

Training the AHTJP, DoSVY, and local aftercare service providers has been a key strategy of IJM's Program. This evaluation evaluated those training materials, including training manuals, records of training participation, and other training data included in the desk review. A thorough review and assessment of these training materials was carried out following the field evaluation.

During the field evaluation, effort was made to assess the impact of IJM's trainings on the AHTJP, DoSVY, and local aftercare service providers. To accomplish this, steps were taken to conduct separate small group interviews with AHTJP, DoSVY staff, and local aftercare service providers who were trained by IJM, compared to their counterparts who were not trained by IJM.⁴⁹ This evaluation approach was not very useful given the fact that there have been a lot of IOs, IGOs, and NGOs in Cambodia providing a wide range of trainings, some of which are the same as or similar to IJM's trainings. Thus, we were not able to isolate a group of AHTJP or DoSVY staff that were not provided with trainings, either the same as or similar to IJM's training.

2.3.8. Consultations on Preliminary Findings and Conclusions

On 10 July 2015, a consultation was held with IJM Field Office staff in Phnom Penh, Cambodia to present and discuss preliminary findings and conclusions. In addition, following the analysis of collected data and a more in-depth desk review a consultation was held on 16 September 2015 with IJM HQ staff in Washington, DC. These consultations on preliminary findings and conclusions allowed the evaluators to present and discuss preliminary findings and conclusions. Both of these consultations with IJM Field Office and HQ staff provided forums to openly discuss the findings and conclusions from this external evaluation.

⁴⁸ The decision to interview adult survivors of CSEC, instead of children, was made in consultation with IJM based upon ethical research practices involving child victims of crime.

⁴⁹ AHTJP Police and local aftercare service providers who completed IJM trainings were identified from IJM Cambodia's roster of training participants.

2.4. Confidentiality

All respondents were guaranteed confidentiality. To ensure confidentiality, names were not recorded anywhere in the interview notes; instead, all interviewees were assigned an ID Number and that ID Number was recorded in the interview notes. In addition, each agency/organization that participated in an interview was assigned an ORG Number to ensure the identity of the agency/organization was also protected. Also, a Local Number was assigned to Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville in an effort to further ensure confidentiality.

All interviews were saved in files with only the identification numbers assigned to them to further ensure confidentiality and stored in a password protected file. All interviews were stored on the Lead Consultant's laptop only during the contract period; after the contract ended all interview files were deleted.

In the final report, only ID Numbers are used to identify and differentiate among respondents and agencies/organizations. Generic categories are also used to identify and differentiate respondents' organization type as coming from Government, NGO/IO/Other, and IJM. The location of respondents is not reported, as the number of respondents in Siem Reap and Sihanoukville are small.

It is also important to note that interviews were not audio recorded. Instead, detailed interview notes were typed directly into Microsoft Word on a laptop by the Lead Evaluator during the interviews and cleaned immediately thereafter. The Lead Evaluator has significant experience and the skills needed to record detailed interview notes in this manner, which is much more time efficient and just as effective as audio recording interviews. The National Consultant also took written interview notes to ensure that any gaps in notes and recordkeeping could be resolved and/or clarified after the interview. The National Consultant was not asked to record interview notes in a written form when engaged in simultaneous translation. Instead, the Lead Evaluator took detailed type written notes on a laptop during interviews and interview notes were reviewed by the National Consultant to ensure accuracy of understanding.

Interviewees were also asked to give written consent to participate in the interview and agreed to be quoted anonymously with only a general reference to participant's ID Number and 'organization type' (i.e. employment type as coming from Government, NGO/IO/Other, and IJM). Interviewees were also informed that if they wanted to skip questions or end the interview at any time they could do so.

All interviews were conducted in the language of preference to the interviewees; as a result, interviews were conducted in only English, only Khmer, and/or both English and Khmer.

2.5. External Evaluation Team

The external evaluation was conducted by two consultants: Dr. Robin Haarr, the Lead Evaluator from the United States, and Ms. Sophea Seng, the National Evaluator from Cambodia. The evaluation approach and data collection tools were developed by the Lead Evaluator, who worked closely with IJM's HQ and Field Office staff in Cambodia to ensure they were relevant to the Program's focus and activities in Cambodia. It is important to note that IJM HQ reviewed and approved the evaluation approach and data collection tools prior to beginning the external evaluation.

The field evaluation was developed and conducted solely by the two external evaluators, Dr. Robin Haarr and Ms. Sophea Seng, with input from IJM HQ and Field Office staff between 22 June and 10 July 2015. During this time period, field visits occurred in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville, Cambodia. Following the field work a first draft of the evaluation report was prepared by the Lead Evaluator, with additional input from the National Consultant. Finalization of the evaluation report was carried out by the Lead Evaluator following a review and feedback from IJM HQ.

2.6. Data Management and Analysis

All data was coded and analyzed using grounded theory.⁵⁰ Grounded theory allows data collection and analysis to occur simultaneously, strengthening both the quality of data and analysis. As data collection and analysis progresses and preliminary findings begin to emerge, the evaluation team was able to identify and explore emerging themes, such as results achieved, lessons learned, challenges encountered, and adjustments made.

Standardized coding procedures were also developed by the Lead Evaluator, Dr. Robin Haarr, for use in SPSS. Close-ended questions from interviews were coded and input into one SPSS data management system. Close-ended questions were then analyzed in SPSS in terms of frequencies, and when relevant to make comparisons between the organization type and focus of work of respondents. The Lead Evaluator was responsible for inputting and analyzing all data in SPSS.

Data from open-ended questions was saved in Word files and compiled and coded based upon themes and sub-themes, and then analyzed for patterns. The Lead Evaluator was responsible for coding and analyzing all qualitative data.

⁵⁰ Glaser & Strauss (1967). Grounded Theory.

3. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The purpose of this external evaluation was to provide an independent, in-depth evaluation of IJM's Program in terms of relevance, effectiveness and impact during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014, and to assess the potential for sustainability of IJM's work and results achieved in Cambodia. In accordance, the evaluation scope is also focused on the Program's approach, results achieved, lessons learned, challenges encountered, and adjustments made in each of the three project areas of Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville during the implementation period.

Evaluation findings are presented related to the key issues arising with IJM's Program. These key issues cross-cut in terms of relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. Key issues arising include:

- IJM's Program goal and outcomes
- Relevance of IJM's Program and goal
- IJM's Program aligns with NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking
- Key stakeholders' collaboration with IJM
- Key stakeholders trained and assisted with IJM
- Building the capacities of police to suppress CSEC
- Improvements to the courts' handling of CSEC cases
- Confidence in the public justice system
- Establishing quality crisis care and aftercare for CSEC survivors
- Improvements in victim outcomes
- Confidence in coordination of aftercare for CSEC survivors
- Mobilization of faith-based communities
- IJM's effectiveness at program implementation
- Reduction in prevalence of CSEC in target areas
- IJM's ability to adapt to changes in the situation of CSEC in Cambodia
- Best practices and lessons learned

3.1. IJM's Program Goal and Outcomes

In 2000, IJM began to document and investigate cases of CSEC in Cambodia. IJM's assessment revealed the Cambodian sex industry operated with many brothels that made no efforts to demonstrate any form of alternative legitimate business, and CSEC was occurring openly in Svay Pak, Toul Kork, and along Street 63 in Phnom Penh. At the time, Cambodia also had the reputation of being a sex tourism destination which attracted men from the West and other Asian countries, including pedophiles who came to have sex with prepubescent children and young girls and boys.^{51,52,53} The demand for virgin sales was also driven by Asian men who came to Cambodia to have sex with virgin girls, oftentimes for good luck. In the early 2000s, traffickers and exploiters were able to operate with impunity as there was a lack of interest from the government's side to take commercial sexual exploitation of women and children seriously, and public justice system actors lacked the knowledge and skills to combat sex trafficking. In addition, there was widespread corruption and abuse of power, and no adequate legal framework that addressed commercial sexual exploitation and sex trafficking.⁵⁴

In 2002, IJM started to talk with the Royal Cambodian Government about the CSEC problem in Phnom Penh, and by 2004, IJM officially opened its Cambodia Field Office in Phnom Penh. From 2004 to 2014, IJM's Program has focused on using a *Collaborative Casework Model* to identify and investigate suspected cases of CSEC, provide collected evidence to local authorities, advocate for the arrest and prosecution of sex traffickers, and to facilitate the rescue and referral of child sex trafficking victims to agencies that provide assistance for

⁵¹ Van der Keur, 2013.

⁵² Dereks, Henke, and Vanna, 2006.

⁵³ Kneebone and Debeljak, 2012,

⁵⁴ Van der Keur, 2013.


recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration.⁵⁵ In addition to *Collaborative Casework*, IJM implemented a *System Reform* program focused on building the political will and capacity of government leaders and the Cambodian public justice system to respond effectively to CSEC. In IJM's System Reform phase, IJM continues collaborative casework and adds an intense focus on strengthening the public justice system. IJM aims to build political will and capacity to protect the poor from the targeted forms of violence, and to train, resource, and mobilize government and community partners to protect the poor, including victims of CSEC.

The overall goal of IJM's Program was to reduce the prevalence of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, and Siem Reap, and to improve outcomes for victims. In Cambodia, IJM implemented its *Justice System Transformation* program model through collaborative casework and targeted justice system reform initiatives in the law enforcement and aftercare sectors.⁵⁶ IJM's *Justice System Transformation* model has three key phases:

- **Phase 1: Collaborative Casework (2004-2012)** - IJM experts provide tangible, hands-on support to local public justice systems in individual cases of violent abuse from beginning to end. Collaborative Casework not only provides urgently needed relief and safety to individual victims of violent crimes, but it is also the most effective way to accurately diagnose what is broken in the criminal justice system.
- **Phase 2: System Reform (2013-2014)** - While the primary objective for Collaborative Casework is service to individual victims of violence, the primary objective for System Reform is addressing problems within the justice system itself. System Reform projects build the practical, technical and resource capacities of the local public justice system to address the targeted form of violence.
- **Phase 3: Sustaining Gains (2015)** - IJM seeks to sustain the gains achieved through its system reform initiatives with robust advocacy initiatives, while reducing direct IJM Collaborative Casework support and scaling back System Reform initiatives implemented during Phase 2. Monitoring and evaluation activities measure whether or not gains are sustained.

Figure 1 below presents the model in graphic format.

Figure 1. Justice System Transformation



Note: This figure was provided by IJM.

⁵⁵ Van der Keur, D. & C. Touch (2013). *Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia and the Public Justice System Response: A Stakeholder Analysis of Change between 2000-2012*. International Justice Mission: Washington, DC, p.1

⁵⁶ The 3 phase justice system transformation conception model for IJM programs was introduced in 2014, but at the time it was introduced nearly all of IJM's programs were doing a mix of phase 1 and phase 2 activities.

Although the three-phase Justice System Transformation model was introduced in 2014, this evaluation considered how this model evolved during the implementation of IJM's Program in Cambodia. A desk review of IJM Cambodia Weekly Reports, logframes and work plans revealed IJM initially developed their Program to respond to the situation of CSEC in Cambodia, particularly in Phnom Penh, at a time when there was a high prevalence of CSEC, and CSEC was "normalized" (i.e. occurring openly) and traffickers and exploiters were operating with impunity. In the early years (2004-2007), IJM's Program in Cambodia was guided by several key objectives that focused on victim rescue, prosecution, investigative training for law enforcement officers, identifying lawyer partners, and community mobilization (see Box 1).⁵⁷

Box 1. IJM Program Objectives (2004-2007)⁵⁸	
Statement of Mission: To mobilize efforts to suppress systems of commercial sexual exploitation of minors in Cambodia through assisting investigations and prosecutions.	
Victim Rescue	Secure the release of victims of forced prostitution, successfully place them in appropriate aftercare, and conduct debriefings of their experiences.
Prosecution	Utilize the evidentiary materials gathered through investigations and joint activities with local law enforcement to cause the initiation and progress of perpetrators' prosecutions
Investigative Training	Conduct training sessions with law enforcement officers on democratic policing styles that encourage community-oriented policing
Lawyer Partners	Recruit and secure the services of a lawyer to advance the prosecution of brothel owners and agents
Community mobilization	Mobilize community groups (faith-based) to understand IJM's work and activities in Cambodia

By 2008, IJM's Program was evolving and was guided by more detailed logframes and a clearly defined Collaborative Casework approach (see Box 2). From 2008 to 2011, IJM's focus was on two key outcomes, including building the capacities of a local public justice system that provides a credible deterrent to CSEC, and ensuring CSEC survivors receive adequate care and support and are not re-victimized. As revealed in Box 2, by 2008 IJM experts were able to expand their objectives, outcomes, and activities to focus on providing more tangible, hands-on support to the local public justice system, including: building the capacities of the police with technical expertise/assistance to aggressively pursue reported cases of CSEC; building the capacities of prosecutors to prosecute CSEC cases; monitoring criminal proceedings to ensure prosecutors aggressively pursue reported cases of CSEC; and identifying and rescuing CSEC victims and ensuring those at high risk of re-victimization are placed in a secure environment and provided with adequate aftercare and support. IJM also continued to advocate for the closure of CSEC establishments through imprisonment of perpetrators and/or by forfeiture by law and to increase public demand for justice in CSEC cases.

During Phase 1 which extended from 2004 to 2011, IJM's Collaborative Casework approach was highly relevant to the situation of CSEC in Cambodia. IJM was not only able to provide urgently needed relief and safety to individual victims of CSEC, but was also effectively developing the capacities of public justice system actors to pursue cases of CSEC. IJM was also carefully monitoring and tracking cases through the public justice system to accurately diagnose what was broken in the public justice system.

⁵⁷ Prior to 2007, IJM field offices did not create logframes for its programs; instead, the objectives and program logic of the office was encapsulated in the field office Mission Memos.

⁵⁸ Information retrieved from IJM Cambodia Weekly Reports, 2004-2007.

Box 2. IJM Program Logframe (2008-2014)		
	Logframe, 2008-2011⁵⁹	Logframe, 2012-2014
Overall Goal	Contribute to the reduction of the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC) in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville and Siem Reap	To contribute to sustained intervention on behalf of minor sex trafficking victims by the public justice system, leading to a reduction in the prevalence of CSEC and improved victim outcomes
Outcome 1	Local public justice system provides a credible deterrent to CSEC	Increased performance of AHTJPP units to identify and rescue victims, arrest suspects and treat victims appropriately
Outputs and Activities (Summarized)	Build the capacities of police and provided them with technical expertise/assistance to aggressively pursue reported cases of CSEC	Build the capacities of AHTJP police officers with an enhanced training curriculum
	Build the capacities of prosecutors to prosecute CSEC cases and monitor the criminal proceedings to ensure prosecutors aggressively pursue reported cases of CSEC	Provide the enhanced police training curriculum to the National Committee (NC)
	Identify and rescue CSEC victims and ensure those at high risk of re-victimization are placed in a secure environment	Provide AHTJP with technical assistance and reports of intelligence to support their efforts at combatting human trafficking
	Advocate for the closure of establishments with CSEC through either through imprisonment of key actors or forfeiture by law	Meet with Cambodian government officials to advocate for expanded undercover investigative authority (UIA) for AHTJP police ⁶⁰
	Increase social demand for justice by training community groups in awareness and prevention of CSEC, and through increased media exposure to the problem of CSEC and the successful prosecution of perpetrators	Meet with members of the international community to develop support for expanded UIA for AHTJP.
Outcome 2	Ensure CSEC survivors receive adequate care and support and are not re-victimized	Increased performance of DoSVY and the private aftercare network to refer victims and provide quality aftercare services
Outputs and Activities (Summarized)	CSEC survivors receive adequate care and services and monitored for recovery	Establishing evidence-based definitions of high quality care
	CSEC survivors are assessed, along with their families, to reduce the risk of being re-victimized, and if necessary child survivors are placed in quality after care centers to ensure their safety, and provided with educational and vocational training opportunities	Developing aftercare training curriculum which can be used to train DoSVY and other aftercare providers
		Training for DoSVY and AHTJP officials on the inter-ministerial framework
		Participate in meetings to advocate for the creation of a guardianship framework for minors

⁵⁹ Obtained from Cambodia Sex Trafficking Log Frame: Project Term 2008-2011 (Draft 6 10.09.07)

⁶⁰ Undercover investigation methods, include the use of audio and video recordings. Due to the changing nature of CSEC in Cambodia, IJM maintains it is necessary for law enforcement to be able to utilize the internationally accepted law enforcement methodology of covert investigations and evidence collection. However, Cambodia's current legal framework addressing undercover authority and tactics is ambiguous and limiting; therefore, AHTJP does not have clear legal authority or guidance to utilize the undercover tactics needed to effectively determine the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia, to consistently and properly enforce anti-trafficking laws, or to ensure perpetrator accountability in Cambodian courts.

In 2012, IJM again modified its Program logframe to reflect progress made and changes in the situation of CSEC in Cambodia, changes in the political landscape in which IJM was operating, and the fact that IJM had established Memorandums of Understanding (MOU's) with MoI and MoSVY. By 2012, the defined impact was to contribute to the development of reliable, effective and independent interventions on behalf of current victims of sex trafficking by the public justice system, which would lead to a sustained reduction in the prevalence of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville and surrounding regions. The focus was on building the capacities of law enforcement officials to identify and rescue victims of trafficking, to pursue accountability for perpetrators of CSEC, and to build the capacities of MoSVY officials to provide victims of CSEC with crisis care and to facilitate referrals to appropriate services. In 2014, as the Program was coming to the end of Phase 2, IJM began to engage in various monitoring activities to assess the reduced prevalence of CSEC and improved victim outcomes.

By 2013, IJM transitioned into Phase 2 and System Reform. While the primary objective of Phase 1 and Collaborative Casework was service to individual victims of violence, the primary objective for Phase 2 and System Reform was addressing problems within the public justice system; in particular, building the practical, technical and resource capacities of the local public justice system to address CSEC. IJM spent two years (2013-2014) focused on Phase 2 and System Reform.

Finally, in 2015, IJM transitioned into Phase 3 and shifted their focus to sustaining the gains through monitoring and maintenance activities. IJM also undertook this summative evaluation of the Program in Phase 3.

3.2. Relevance of IJM's Program and Goal

The desk review and interviews with key stakeholders and IJM staff revealed IJM's Program has been highly relevant to the situation of CSEC in Cambodia over the past decade (2004-2014). Moreover, IJM has been among the leading NGOs working to combat CSEC in Cambodia; although not the only NGO working in this space. Since 2004, IJM has worked alongside other local and international NGOs, and IOs and IGOs working on issues of sex trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation, and child protection.

Of the 41 Government and NGO/IO/Other respondents interviewed, 26 were asked if IJM's Program has been relevant to the situation of CSEC in Cambodia. Among the 26 respondents, 88.5% reported they thought IJM's Program has been relevant to the situation of CSEC in Cambodia over the past decade.⁶¹ Further analysis revealed Government (83.3%) and NGO/IO/Other (92.9%) respondents were equally likely to recognize the relevance of IJM's Program to the situation of CSEC in Cambodia. Analysis based upon type of work revealed, legal advocates/officials (100.0%) and service providers (93.8%) were more likely to recognize IJM's Program as relevant to the situation of CSEC in Cambodia, compared to police and/or investigators (71.4%); nevertheless, the majority of police and investigators recognized IJM's Program has been relevant to the situation of CSEC in Cambodia.

IJM's Program is regarded as relevant to Cambodia given the very high rates of CSEC in Cambodia throughout the 2000s. In recent years, as a result of the collaborative work of IOs, IGOs, and NGOs (including IJM), in cooperation with the Royal Cambodian Government, the public justice system's response to CSEC has improved significantly, contributing to a decrease in the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia.⁶² This conclusion is based upon the prevalence studies performed by IJM in 2012 and 2015 and the drop in flow of child trafficking victims into aftercare centers in Cambodia, and findings from IJM's study of key stakeholders' analysis of change in CSEC in Cambodia and the public justice system response from 2000 to 2012.⁶³ At the same time, it is important to note that this evaluation revealed many interviewees expressed concern that despite the reduction in the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia, CSEC remains a problem in Cambodia, though at much lower rates than in the past. These interviewees argued that CSEC was still occurring in Cambodia, but in a clandestine manner. This is why respondents, including IJM Field Office staff, maintained it is very important that law enforcement obtain

⁶¹ Data revealed 23.8% of respondents didn't know if IJM's Program had been relevant to the CSEC situation in Cambodia.

⁶² Van der Keur, 2013.

⁶³ Van der Keur, 2013.

undercover investigative authority (UIA) so they can effectively investigate trafficking of persons for commercial sexual exploitation, including CSEC. Several respondents also maintained, *“That is why we need IJM to continue to do this job”* (12, NGO/Other).

Some respondents also expressed their concern that CSEC could re-emerge as a serious problem in Cambodia, particularly with the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) regional economic integration which is due to occur in 2016. The AEC will envisage four key characteristics: a) a single market and production base; b) a highly competitive economic region; c) a region of equitable economic development; and d) a region fully integrated in the global economy.⁶⁴ A joint study of the Asian Development Bank and ILO examined the impact of the AEC on labor and highlights several challenges and opportunities of the AEC. One challenge is that the AEC does not address movements of low-skilled workers, which can increase the risk of exploitation of migrant workers and trafficking in persons if there is no strategy to manage migration and protect migrant workers through increased and affordable access to regular migration channels, clear incentives for migrant workers to use those channels.⁶⁵ Critics also contend the AEC could place the most vulnerable at-risk of trafficking, particularly those low-skilled workers who were promised legitimate jobs, but instead found themselves trafficked into the sex industry.⁶⁶ Similarly, in this evaluation, one respondent expressed concerns that the *“ASEAN integration . . . It is about the free flow of human beings and tourists . . . the commercial exploitation will increase again; the need for sex and the need for children [will return to Cambodia as a problem]”* (12, NGO/IO/Other).

3.3. IJM Program Aligns with NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking

One of the evaluation questions related to relevance is, “Was IJM’s Program appropriately aligned with the relevant NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking?” The desk review revealed that IJM’s focus on CSEC and justice system transformation was clearly aligned with the NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking for 2011-2013 and for 2014-2018. This alignment is reflected in the fact that IJM was focused on building the capacities of government agencies to be able to identify victims of sex trafficking, provide victims with protection and support services, and to improve prosecutions in sex trafficking cases. In addition, IJM through their working relationships with AHTJP and the National Committee was able to have an influence on the NPA for 2014-2018; in particular, IJM was able to ensure that the UIA was included in the NPA for 2014-2018.

“It is aligned with the NPA because under the National Committee they have a working group they call the law enforcement team and the law enforcement team mainly takes care of suppression. And, under the National Committee they have other groups that do suppression and investigation. I think the results we received for our law enforcement team have been supported by IJM.” (29, Government)

“I think one of the NPA goals is to increase police training, court training, and aftercare; something for prosecution and protection. It is all right there and that is what IJM does. IJM’s work is really relevant to the NPA.” (12, NGO/IO/Other)

Table 4. IJM’s Program Alignment with NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking in Cambodia (Government & NGO/IO/Other ONLY)		
	Full Sample N=15	
	n	%
Aware of the NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking in Cambodia	12	80.0
	N=12	
IJM’s Program has been aligned with the NPA	9	75.0
IJM’s Program has contributed to the development and implementation of the NPA	7	58.3

Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

⁶⁴ Retrieved November 17, 2015 from: <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community>

⁶⁵ International Labour Organization and Asian Development Bank (2014). *ASEAN Community 2015: Managing integration for better jobs and shared prosperity*. Bangkok, Thailand.

⁶⁶ Retrieved on November 17, 2015 from: <http://thedi diplomat.com/2014/05/aec-delays-a-victory-for-human-trafficking/>

Among the 41 Government and NGO/IO/Other respondents, 15 were specifically asked if IJM's Program was aligned with the NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking in Cambodia. Table 4 reveals 80.0% of the 15 respondents reported they were aware of the NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking in Cambodia. Among those respondents aware of the NPA, 75.0% reported IJM's Program has been aligned with the NPA, and 58.3% reported IJM's Program has contributed to the development and implementation of the NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking in Cambodia.

3.4. Key Stakeholders' Collaboration with IJM

Of the 41 Government and NGO/IO/Other respondents, 27 were asked if they had collaborated with IJM to address CSEC in Cambodia. Table 5 reveals nearly all Government and NGO/IO/Other respondents that were asked this question reported they had collaborated with IJM to address CSEC in Cambodia (85.2%). Many respondents had collaborated with IJM over the long-term either in their law enforcement capacities or providing crisis intervention and aftercare services to survivors of CSEC; thus, they understood IJM's goal and focus on improving the abilities of police to rescue and protect victims, and to improve the abilities of police and aftercare service providers to partner with each other to ensure CSEC victims are protected and provided with quality aftercare services.

Among the 23 respondents that collaborated with IJM to address CSEC in Cambodia, 78.3% reported that when they started their collaboration with IJM they understood IJM's Program goal to contribute to the reduction of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, and Siem Reap. Among the 18 respondents who understood the goal of IJM's Program, 94.4% felt IJM had made progress toward its goal or had achieved its goal to reduce CSEC in the three target areas (this finding cross-cuts with questions related to impact).

Table 5. Familiarity with IJM's Program and Goal (Government & NGO/IO/Other ONLY)		
	Sample N=27	
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
Familiar with IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia	26	96.3
Have collaborated with IJM to address CSEC in Cambodia	23	85.2
	N=23	
When started your collaboration with IJM you understood the goal of IJM's Program	18	78.3
	N=18	
IJM has made progress toward its goal or has achieved its goal	17	94.4

Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

Royal Cambodian police officials who reported they had collaborated with IJM to address CSEC in Cambodia maintained they understood the goal of IJM's Program through their close collaboration. One respondent explained, *"We have long-time experience with IJM. The unit [AHTJP] has been established for more than 10 years. Both of us have been here the whole time . . . In terms of the collaboration with IJM we have good collaboration, especially for operations and raids. Both of our offices exchange information to make the operation easy"* (Government). More specifically, another respondent explained,

"With regard to the role of IJM, their primary goal is to conduct activities and provide training to the police so they are equipped with the knowledge and skills related to sexual exploitation and CSEC, and working with AHTJP to collect criminal evidence that afterwards leads to the rescue operation and arrest of offenders, and send them to court and provide support to the victim and to provide aftercare support. Another main role is after the rescue of the victim, when they bring the victim to the police station they try to take good care of the victim to provide counselling and psychological support to the victim, especially those who are seriously traumatized. And, on the offender side, when the criminal case file is sent to court for the prosecution, they keep monitoring very closely on all cases whether or not the offender and victim equally secure access to justice and legal proceedings before the courts." (33, Government)

Only a small proportion of respondents reported that when they started their collaboration with IJM they did not understand the goal of IJM's Program; however, most of these respondents reported that over time their understanding of IJM's Program and goal became more evident as they had more interaction and collaboration with IJM. For instance, one respondent explained,

"We were in partnership for many years . . . My understanding from the beginning was IJM was focused on aftercare, but then saw they try to build up the support to police and courts. They remain focused on their goal, they focus on aftercare and they learned the CSOs cannot do anything until they get support from law enforcement, and they provide training and technical support to police and government . . . I see more and more that IJM is a partner and tries to get relevant partners to work with each other and make progress from year-to-year." (1, NGO/IO/Other)

"The first time I met IJM was in 2004 . . . We did not do a lot of things together yet. IJM spent time to build the relationship and survey in many provinces. After 2004, we started to discuss and later that year we started the collaboration. The first thing IJM did is they trained the police. The first training was in 2005, they took us to Phnom Penh for the training. They invited all the provinces that they collaborate with to join together, and later on they started to come to the site to train in the local area. They also invited the province nearby to train. At that point, we started to learn more about the crime [CSEC] and we started to pass information to each other to work as a partner." (25, Government)

Similarly, respondents from MoJ maintained that because IJM does not have an MOU with MoJ they do not work directly with IJM; however, through IJM's collaborative casework with AHTJP, some MoJ respondents had contact with IJM through collaborative casework meetings involving the police and prosecutors. As one respondent explained,

"IJM doesn't work with the prosecutors. I came to know of them mainly through their work with the police and survivors. I was invited to join some sort of coordination meeting between the police and prosecutors. IJM also joined the meeting . . . It was a meeting about a specific case and IJM coordinated with the prosecutor to provide evidence for a specific case . . . So police try to collect evidence to provide to the prosecutors and IJM is there so they can understand what type of evidence they can collect. I worked with them [police and IJM] on a few cases, not so many. . . . The last time was a long time ago, about two years ago." (16, Government)

Some NGO/IO/Other respondents did not fully understand IJM's Program goal, but reported they appreciate the collaboration and working relationships that IJM has forged over the years with other local and international NGOs. In addition, they recognized the social capital that IJM developed with government agencies has been a real benefit to smaller local NGOs operating in the same space to address issues of human trafficking and CSEC, as well as broader issues of child protection. As one respondent explained,

"I didn't understand the whole picture. I knew they were helping with rescues and reintegration, and working with the police and the justice system . . . I think what I really trust IJM for is that they do great work at a high level, they have developed good relationships with MoJ and Mol, and they really know the individuals . . . they are so good at the politics of it and building relationships, having workshops, and knowing and spending time with the right people. They have the local knowledge." (27, NGO/IO/Other)

"I can see their goal has been focused on trafficking of children and service provision, but they have also focused on service provider capacity. I think this is the key point, as a stakeholder they understand what they are doing." (1, NGO/IO/Other)

Another respondent explained that they really appreciated “IJM’s approach of working with the police in terms of having a clear strategy and plan.” This same respondent reported, “I like the strategy of having results and showing progress. If things are not working, let’s find a solution . . . and to say at a certain point, our services are not needed any more . . . and to leave the country.” (11, NGO/IO/Other)


Table 4 also reveals that 94.4% of respondents who understood IJM’s Program goal believed that IJM made progress toward or achieved its goal to contribute to the reduction of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, and Siem Reap. As one respondent explained,

“I think they have [contributed to a reduction of CSEC in Cambodia], not 100%, but they have almost reached their complete goal. They have built the capacity of the Anti-Trafficking Police, they have built the social workers, and they bring the case to court and provide legal counseling, and so on” (13, NGO/IO/Other).

Another NGO/IO/Other respondent added, “I think the performance of IJM is outstanding; they have done an excellent job. They work alongside us. We have real success on suppressing and cracking down on the cases [CSEC]; they have achieved their goal” (33, Government). At the same time, other respondents maintained that while the prevalence of CSEC has decreased in Cambodia, “there is a lot more to do still; the numbers have reduced, but the situation [of CSEC] has changed” (27, NGO/IO/Other).

Chart 1 reveals NGO/IO/Other respondents (92.3%) were slightly more likely to report that they have collaborated with IJM on CSEC (92.3%), and that when they started their collaboration with IJM they understood IJM’s Program goal (100.0%), compared to Government respondents (78.6% and 77.8% respectively). In addition, 100.0% of NGO/IO/Other and 85.7% of Government respondents reported IJM has made progress toward or has achieved its goal.

Chart 1. Collaboration with IJM’s Program by Organization Type




Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

In addition, Chart 2 shows that among Government and NGO/IO/Other respondents, service providers (100.0%) and police (77.8%) were significantly more likely to report they have collaborated with IJM on CSEC in Cambodia, compared to legal (33.3%) respondents. This finding is largely grounded in the fact that IJM has had MOUs with MoI and MoSVY, but not MoJ.⁶⁷ Among those respondents that did collaborate with IJM, the majority of aftercare service providers (92.3%), police and/or investigator (80.0%), and legal (100.0%) respondents reported that when they started their collaboration with IJM they understood IJM’s Program goal. In addition, 91.7% of service providers and 100.0% of police reported they believe IJM has made progress toward or has achieved its goal; no legal officials were either asked or answered this question.

⁶⁷ MOU’s are established with the Ministries, including MoSVY and MoI, although the majority of IJM’s field work is carried out with DoSVY and AHTJP.

Chart 2. Collaboration with IJM's Program by Focus of Work



Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

Government and NGO/IO/Other respondents who collaborated with IJM were also asked if there was clear communication with IJM. All respondents maintained they had clear communication with IJM.⁶⁸ In fact, one NGO/IO/Other respondent reported, *“One thing I appreciate when I work with IJM is the coordinator speaks fluent Khmer.”* This same respondent went on to add, *“They [IJM] are strong in building relationship and they know who they are working with. The tendency in Cambodia is not to trust outsiders, so it is important to build that channel of communication; they [IJM] are good at doing that”* (11, NGO/IO/Other).

In comparison, some respondents felt that communication with IJM was not always so good or clear, particularly in the early years of collaboration when IJM did not have an MOU with both MoI and MoSVY. For instance, one respondent explained, *“Currently it [communication] is much better; earlier it was not. In the beginning, we only received information and communication from the police, but later on we started to do it [communicate] with IJM . . . When we have the case we should get together and meet and talk so it is clear”* (19, Government)

3.5. Key Stakeholders' Trained and Assisted by IJM

Since 2004, a critical component of IJM's Program in Cambodia was to build the capacities of the anti-trafficking police and aftercare service providers, both governmental and nongovernmental, to be able to understand, identify, and respond to CSEC. Of the 41 Government and NGO/IO/Other respondents, 22 were asked if their agency/organization received training or technical assistance from IJM. Among the 22 respondents asked this question, 68.4% reported they received training and/or technical assistance from IJM. Government respondents (100.0%) were more likely than NGO/IO/Other respondents (50.0%) to report their agency/organization received training and/or technical assistance from IJM. In addition, police (80.0%) were more likely than service providers (64.3%) to report they received training and/or technical assistance from IJM. This finding is reflective of the fact that a larger proportion of services providers were from NGO's, IO's or Other.

Over the past decade (2004-2014), IJM conducted a wide range of capacity building trainings, some specifically for the police, others specifically for aftercare services providers, and others have been joint trainings for both police and aftercare service providers. One aftercare service provider explained,

“We joined the training to discuss with the police the procedure after the raid, what should everyone do and how to refer to the social worker . . . The joint cooperation for the raid operation among the

⁶⁸ 59.4% of the total sample of 32 were asked or responded to this question, 40.6% (n=13) had missing data meaning they were either not asked the question or did not respond.

NGO, police, and social worker has been so useful, and we discussed the procedures for raids, that was very useful. IJM must have been trying very hard to lobby to get us – police and DoSVY – to meet [and collaborate]; it was not very easy” (28, Government).

The majority of respondents recognized, “IJM has a really good training programme and the content and curriculum is generally really good” (12, NGO/IO/Other). Another respondent added, “I learned from IJM how to work with the justice system and how to work with the victim” (27, NGO/IO/Other). IJM’s trainings for the police and service providers will be discussed in later sections (see Section 3.6., Table 6 for the number of police and aftercare service providers trained).

3.6. Building the Capacities of Police to Suppress CSEC

IJM’s previous research has documented that “In the early 2000s, Cambodian law enforcement anti-trafficking efforts were marked by inadequate training on basic investigative techniques, poor knowledge of the law, mistreatment of suspected traffickers and victims, severe lack of resources, widespread corruption and abuse of powers, and a lack of interest from the government’s side to take the matter seriously. These factors resulted in an environment in which successful anti-trafficking operations leading to the rescue of victims and arrest of suspected traffickers were the exception, rather than the norm.”⁶⁹ This reality contributed to the high prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia in the early 2000s.

In 2000, MoI launched the *Law Enforcement against Sexual Exploitation, Abuse & Trafficking of Children (LEASETC) Project* in an effort to combat CSEC in Cambodia. The LEASETC Project started collaboration between development agencies, including NGOs and the police to combat CSEC in Cambodia. The goal of the LEASETC Project was to improve the capacity of the Cambodian National Police, judges, and prosecutors to investigate cases of sexual exploitation and trafficking of children, including rescue of victims, development of referral systems, arrest of offenders and initiation of court proceedings.⁷⁰ Some NGOs and law enforcement agencies from Western countries collaborated on a case-by-case basis with the police, which led to successful interventions, such as the operation in Svay Pak that IJM conducted in cooperation with police in 2003. At this time, the majority of police investigations into CSEC only occurred as a result of significant pressure put on the police from anti-trafficking NGOs operating in Cambodia. After the establishment of the AHTJP, some international development agencies, including IOs, IGOs, and NGOs started working to develop the capacities of the AHTJP.⁷¹

In the early 2000s, most Cambodian National Police officers had no formal investigative training or training on investigating crimes of trafficking in persons; thus, all evidence gathering and building of cases for court was done by assisting agencies. Although the Cambodia National Police had the exclusive authority to enforce the law in Cambodia, their capacity was too low to enforce the law and they often failed to properly follow-up on reports of human trafficking brought to their attention by civilians and NGOs. Although the AHTJP was established in 2002, the AHTJP was new and officers lacked proper training and technologies, including forensic analysis, to handle cases of CSEC.⁷² Due to these limitations, evidence usually consisted of testimony of victims and suspects, and occasionally witness reports, police reports, and NGO reports.⁷³

Since 2004, IJM’s Program has focused on building the capacities of police, particularly the AHTJP, to aggressively pursue reported cases of CSEC. Findings from this evaluation revealed that over the past decade (2004-2014), IJM’s Program has made significant and meaningful contributions to building the capacities of police to combat human trafficking and sexual exploitation, CSEC in particular, including:

- Production and delivery of professional and high quality training for police, particularly the AHTJP;

⁶⁹ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 7.

⁷⁰ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 63.

⁷¹ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 7.

⁷² Van der Keur, 2013, p. 66.

⁷³ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 67.

- Technical expertise/assistance to police in the area of operations and enforcement, including to conduct raids and close the open brothels where CSEC was occurring;
- Improvements in police knowledge and awareness, skills, and abilities to identify trafficking in persons, in general, and CSEC, in particular;
- IJM's efforts to strengthen AHTJP's and collaboration with other public justice agencies in CSEC cases has contributed to a reduction in CSEC; and
- Improvements made to AHTJP's response to CSEC that can be sustained over time.

Findings from this evaluation support findings from IJM's stakeholders' analysis of change in CSEC in Cambodia and the public justice system response from 2002-2012. In particular, in 2012, IJM found evidence and the majority of stakeholders indicated that the Cambodian National Police are now significantly better resourced and equipped, better trained on investigative and interview techniques and anti-trafficking laws, and substantially more responsive to reported cases of sex trafficking.⁷⁴

Respondents also recognized that IJM's approach of including provincial police in IJM's trainings of police from Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Sihanoukville has been an efficient way of delivering trainings, but also effective at expanding capacity building of police beyond the three target areas.

Over the past decade, IJM has developed and delivered 17 different training modules to AHTJP and other provincial police in the three target areas and surrounding areas. These training modules include:

- Law enforcement code of ethics
- Criminal intelligence gathering
- General criminal investigation and report writing
- Physical evidence collection and preservation
- Suspect identification and fugitive apprehension
- Interviewing witnesses and victims
- Suspect interviewing techniques
- Courtroom case preparation and testimony
- Witness protection
- Criminal network investigation
- Prevention and suppression of human trafficking
- Law on Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation
- Identification and treatment of victims of trafficking
- Procedural and evidentiary requirements for obtaining search and arrest warrants in cases involving human trafficking and/or sexual exploitation
- Instructor Trainer Certification Course
- Trafficking in persons for specialist anti-trafficking unit commander course
- Introduction to basic computer and PowerPoint

From 2003 to 2013, IJM used the 17 different training modules to conduct 90 different trainings. Most were one-week trainings and the majority were conducted between 2004 and 2011. While most of these trainings involved police officials, some trainings were joint trainings with officials from DoSVY, representatives from NGOs, and Deputy Governors of Districts in Siem Reap Province.

Between 2003 and 2013, IJM trained a total of 504 persons, including 481 police officials and 23 other trainees, including DoSVY, NGO partners, and Deputy Governors of Districts in Siem Reap Province (see Table 5). Among the trainees, 274 were in the three target areas and 230 were in the surrounding areas. Many trainees participated in more than one of IJM's trainings over the course of 10 years.

Some AHTJP officials trained by IJM reported they appreciate the fact that IJM's trainings are very detailed and in-depth, and that IJM has strict rules for participation in the trainings, such as the need to be on time for training sessions. They also appreciated the fact that at the end of every session they were tested and the tests were

⁷⁴ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 7.

set up in a way that trainees could not cheat or copy from each other. They recognized that this approach helped to improve the learning process.

“We take a break every hour and at the end of every session we take a test, and it is strict, you can’t cheat, you have to sit far apart and at separate tables . . . Early in the morning, everyone has to chant out all the rules and the ethical rules before you start the class. The way they train is really intensive; they have strict rules and principles. That is what makes everyone work hard. Even in the class you don’t sit next to each other. This table maybe two persons only, and for the test they spread the tables more. . . . The trainer is usually the former police, former prosecutor, and former judge . . . They have some trainers from the human trafficking department as well.” (25, Government)

Table 5. Persons Trained by Agency and Location (2003-2013)	
	Number Persons Trained
Target Areas	
Phnom Penh Provincial AHTJP	124
Phnom Penh Municipal AHTJP	19
Phnom Penh Office of District Inspectors	24
Police Academy of Cambodia	2
Sihanoukville Provincial Police	46
Siem Reap Provincial Police	49
DoSVY Phnom Penh Municipal	3
DoSVY Sihanoukville	2
DoSVY Siem Reap	2
APLE in Sihanoukville	2
M’Lop Tapang in Sihanoukville	1
Subtotal	274
Surrounding Areas	
Kep Provincial Police	5
Kangpong Spue Provincial Police	5
Takeo Provincial Police	6
Kampot Provincial Police	9
Koh Kong Provincial Police	8
Kampong Thom Provincial Police	10
Preah Vihea Provincial Police	7
Udor Meanchey Provincial Police	16
Battambang Provincial Police	30
Pailin Provincial Police	9
Banteay Meanchey Provincial Police	18
Pursat Provincial Police	8
Kampong Chnang Provincial Police	8
Kandal Provincial Police	5
Kampong Cham Provincial Police	8
Steung Treng Provincial Police	7
Prey Veng Provincial Police	6
Svay Rieng Provincial Police	6
Rattanak Kiri Provincial Police	6
Mondul Kiri Provincial Police	7
Kratie Provincial Police	33
Chab Dai in Battambang	1
Deputy Governors of Districts in Siem Reap Province	12
Subtotal	230
Total	504

“The support is very useful because in the training course they also have us apply it, implement it. And after we learn in the course they then divide us into groups to take action, to role play. Some groups play the police, another group the victims, another group the perpetrators, and another group the court and justice officials. We did role playing to be consistent with the training modules and lessons. In some exercises we are sent out to the establishment to actually do it. We use the space in the training court room, but we also go outside as well, such as how to collect evidence and discuss priorities in terms of taking action based upon evidence collected. . . Some lessons are practical and can be applied here, and some are too difficult to be applied here; because some are for countries with more resources . . . They recognize Cambodia does not have such standards, but at least we have the information about international standards.” (25, Government)

In addition to trainings, IJM also provided AHTJP with information about CSEC in the three target areas and provided technical expertise/assistance and mentoring in the office and in the field to gather criminal intelligence, conduct criminal investigations and raids, rescue and interview victims, identify and interview suspects, and prepare cases for prosecution. IJM has also provided AHTJP with technology, including surveillance equipment and equipment to maintain evidence, needed for investigations and raids.

Interviews with AHTJP officials revealed IJM’s trainings and technical expertise/assistance has helped to build their capacities to combat human trafficking and sex exploitation, including to close down establishments where CSEC occurs. As one respondent explained, *“IJM pays attention to strengthening the capacity at the department and the provincial level in the target areas. For investigation, IJM collaborates with the Department to investigate and lead to the suppression of the crime. Most of the information reported by IJM leads to the suppression”* (29, Government). Similarly, IJM staff maintain AHTJP is much better at suppressing CSEC because of IJM’s capacity building and technical expertise/assistance; even though AHTJP remains under resourced.

“They are always open to communication. One thing I like is after a raid they would have debriefing together, they would invite our staff and discuss what steps could have been done differently. I think it takes a different type of learning . . . We have close relationships; we are part of the team.” (37, NGO/IO/Other)

“It really is just as we would bring a case to the police and help them walk through the planning and the tactical planning, and reminders of how to disburse the manpower, and the good evidence collection techniques and being there to help them work through things in the planning stage and when the operations are going on. Let’s cover the girls’ faces to make sure they are not exposed, let’s use crime scene tape, and let’s move the suspects so they are not looking at the victims. Like any training, once you start doing it, it is cemented. The last few operations we didn’t have to tell them how to structure the crime scene . . . compared to 2004, very different. ATHJP has guys with skills, but they are not resourced as well as they should be, they want to be professional and resourced well; they want to be respected.” (6, IJM)

Among the 54 respondents, 22 were asked specifically about the improved capabilities of AHTJP to identify and rescue CSEC victims, 14 were asked about AHTJP’s treatment of CSEC victims, and 19 were asked about AHTJP’s ability to arrest perpetrators of CSEC. Table 6 reveals that among the respondents that were asked about the improved capabilities of AHTJP to suppress CSEC, all respondents reported that the AHTJP has gotten better over the past 10 years at identifying and rescuing victims of CSEC. In addition, 85.7% of respondents reported

AHTJP's treatment of CSEC victims had improved, and 63.2% reported AHTJP has gotten better at arresting perpetrators of CSEC.⁷⁵

Table 6. Improved Capabilities of AHTJP to Suppress CSEC		
	Sample N=22	
	n	%
Over the last 10 years, AHTJP has gotten better at identifying and rescuing CSEC victims	22	100.0
	N=19	
Over the last 10 years, AHTJP has gotten better at arresting perpetrators of CSEC	12	63.2
	N=14	
Over the last 10 years, AHTJP's treatment of CSEC victims has improved	12	85.7

Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

In the early 2000s, police often did not know how to distinguish suspects from victims; as a result, they typically did not separate them after an operation, resulting in further traumatization for the victims and opportunities for suspects to intimidate their victims prior to and during interviews. Physical confinement of victims in police stations was also common when interviews were being conducted.⁷⁶ This evaluation found that Government respondents spoke about the improved capabilities of AHTJP to identify and rescue CSEC victims and in the way they treat CSEC victims, particularly separating victims from suspects, and children from adults. As one respondent explained,

"We know how to identify the victim better and we know to separate the victim from the suspect, and we need to pay more attention to the minor survivors and separate them from the adult. And, we need to have the parents at the interview . . . We also start to consider the psychological things of the child . . . In 2006, we rescued 13 minors of sex trafficking and no one answered anything and after that we started to apply IJM's model and we learned after that, that one of them was a trafficker. That is why the girls were not saying anything. So, we separated them and we got them to speak. After that we started to practice this separation . . . So we send our staff to build relationships with some of the survivors and during the investigation we set out to learn among them who is in control, who is the leader of the group . . . So we separate them and tell them that person cannot hurt them." (15, Government)

Another respondent explained that the police have learned to use more victim-centered approaches when working with rescued sex trafficking victims, and to use child friendly approaches with CSEC victims. Many of the child friendly approaches supported by IJM were directly aligned with the child friendly approaches being supported by UNICEF and Hagar Cambodia, including reinforcing the use of child friendly rooms in police stations.

"When after being rescued we bring them [trafficking survivors] to the office and we need to check to see if they need the medical treatment and we try to respect their needs. If they need medical treatment we need to allow them to see the doctor first. We ask them to take a rest if they don't want to answer any questions, it is up to them. And, we try to find the best place to conduct the interview and if they need a support person we get them a support person, and if they want to be interviewed with the male or female officer we support them. We also pay attention to their rights. We also have the child friendly room and toys . . . UNICEF initiated to create the child friendly room . . . but after the project finished then some of the materials broke and IJM helped to fix all of the materials. So, in the interview, IJM provides the counselor to provide the psychological counselor to the child. We can see more improvements; it has become a good practice . . . We provide food and accommodation to the survivors." (33, Government)

⁷⁵

⁷⁶ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 68.

Similarly, another respondent maintained they have seen significant improvements over the last 10 years in the way the police treat CSEC victims.

“Ten years ago they treated them [trafficking victims] as a criminal, now it is better, now they use gentle words to talk with the survivors; before they questioned them . . . You know in the past, 10 years ago, when they [trafficking victims] go to the police station they [the police] kept the trafficker and the victim together, and now it is better and now they can identify who is the real trafficker and who is the sex worker. And now they refer the child to MoSVY for protection.” (12, NGO/IO/Other)

When asked what impact IJM has had on improving the capacities of AHTJP, many respondents reported, “it is not just IJM, there are many other NGOs, many courses, and experience sharing; it is not just IJM alone.” This same respondent went on to add, “[But] if you compare to 10 years ago you can see the capacity building of the police. If you asked them [police] 10 years ago what is human trafficking, no one was able to answer the question because they did not know about human trafficking” (30, Government).

At the same time that respondents reflected on the fact that there are other NGOs, IOs, and IGOs working with the police to improve their capacities to respond to human trafficking, some respondents maintained, “There is a big difference between the official that has been through the IJM training and those that have not been through the training; a big difference between the investigation techniques and report writing.” This same respondent explained that in the past “everyone used to go through that training [IJM], but now AHTJP has some new people because people move . . . Most of those that were trained have been promoted” (15, Government).

Both qualitative and quantitative data revealed the majority of respondents recognized that “with IJM’s support, police capacity is much better” (7, Government), particularly in their ability to conduct police raids of sex establishments and rescue trafficking victims, as well as to identify victims versus perpetrators, and to collect necessary evidence and prepare cases for prosecution. One respondent explained, “Now we [police] can even challenge the prosecutor or the court about the laws because IJM teaches us TIP laws.” This same respondent went on to explain, “We can handle the case by ourselves now” (7, Government).

While AHTJP respondents maintained they will continue with their anti-trafficking initiatives, they also recognized they will face challenges sustaining initiatives that were previously supported by IJM in the MOU with Mol. The challenge for AHTJP is largely a “shortage of material and financial support for operations” (29, Government). But, also some respondents recognized that AHTJP is also reliant upon IJM for identifying cases of CSEC in the community and sharing this information to AHTJP for

“I think IJM is good at working alongside the police. I think they try to work closely with them doing operations and rescues, and at the same time the police are motivated . . . I fear if IJM stopped doing this, stopped monitoring these places . . . that bad things can go backwards again. Police will get less motivation, the momentum is lost, the partnership is lost; there is a risk it will reverse . . . IJM needs to keep doing, keep monitoring, keep checking. If you just stop it is not a good move.” (27, Government)

“Even without IJM that is still our core work to address CSEC, but with IJM the work is even better because they have the means, they provided us with technical support.” (25, Government)

“It is OK in terms of IJM phasing out, we will continue to do our work; however, the level of effectiveness will not be as good if you only have one hand. We will achieve, but less. With two people you have more eyes; you see more. If you walk alone on that road you will not see as many things. More people, more eyes; less people, you see less . . . Of course, this is our core we have the capacity, we have to do it.” (25, Government)

enforcement. As one respondent stated, *"If IJM was not with us, we would have had fewer cases because IJM helps to report to us a lot"* (7, Government).

This evaluation found that the contributions made by IJM's Program to building the capacities of the AHTJP and other police officials to combat human trafficking and sexual exploitation, CSEC in particular, have been significant and meaningful. As one respondent explained, *"Frankly, speaking in terms of the police capacity in investigation and identification of victims, there is a sea of change"* (33, Government). Still, however, some respondents felt there is more capacity building and technical expertise/assistance that IJM could provide to the police. For instance, some government respondents thought IJM needs to strengthen the knowledge and capacities of police to identify new and emerging strategies being used by traffickers to recruit victims, and new trends and patterns in human trafficking and exploitation. This includes new trends and patterns in human trafficking, including sex trafficking of young girls (minors), that was predicted by respondents to increase with the AEC.

The majority of AHTJP respondents believe that improvements made to AHTJP's response to CSEC over the past decade (2004-2014) can be sustained over time. This is because AHTJP will continue to do their work and CSEC is now recognized as a priority by AHTJP. Thus, they maintain *"the police will work on it [CSEC] regularly, so we will do raids and it will depend on the police . . . but it is the strategic plan for the police to keep it [child sex and forced sexual exploitation] the priority"* (15, Government). Nevertheless, many AHTJP respondents expressed concern that without IJM as a partner, their ability to effectively identify and investigate cases of CSEC may be reduced in the future. Respondents also recognized that AHTJP is still reliant on IJM for resourcing anti-trafficking operations, including helping to fund police operations, investigations, and raids on entertainment establishments. Since the early 2000s, AHTJP has lacked the resources needed to effectively perform their duties up to standard and to conduct proactive investigations.⁷⁷

AHTJP respondents also recognized that traffickers and exploiters will change their approach in the future and AHTJP will need continued capacity building and technical skills to keep up-to-date with emerging trends in CSEC and new strategies of trafficking and exploiters. Respondents recognize this is a space that IJM has filled over the past decade and they have concerns that a gap will be left when IJM's Program ends. While there are other NGOs (e.g., APLE and Agape), IOs (e.g., UN ACT and UNICEF), and IGOs partners (e.g., AAPTIP) that AHTJP partners with, one respondent explained *"IJM is the one that took the leap in the collaboration, they were the first one to start"* and they have the ability to bring experts from the USA to conduct trainings aligned with international standards.

Some NGOs also reported that IJM has provided a great deal of technical expertise/assistance and funding resources to AHTJP over the years that has enabled the police to be proactive in identifying and investigating CSEC cases, as well as conducting raids on suspected establishments where CSEC is occurring. Thus, they maintain, *"I am still hesitant to say it will be sustainable . . . We still need IJM involvement in these cases"* (38, NGO/IO/Other). Similarly, IJM shared their concerns about the challenges AHTJP will face in the future once IJM ends their program. To mitigate some of these effects, IJM had a one-year phase out that included a monitoring and maintenance plan—which identified a risk management plan and activities to monitor and respond to slippage in program gains.


"Their [AHTJP] challenge for sustainability includes suppression and the AHTJP budget, if there is no money, they may not sustain. If they do not have money, how can they investigate, how can the case be successful . . . The relationship between police and DoSVY is still a gap. Police say they do not need to inform DoSVY in advance about the raid because they're afraid of the leak of information. DoSVY does not come to coordinate, saying that they are not ready to take victims on time. So there is still the problem about trust . . . For the practice that police always report to the prosecutor to get advice before and during the raid, this can be sustained because the two work closely together now." (40, IJM)

⁷⁷ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 70.

Chart 3 reveals the number of perpetrators identified and arrested by AHTJP in IJM cases in the three target areas by year. In 2003, IJM identified eight perpetrators of CSEC and supported the Cambodian police to arrest four of those perpetrators. By 2004, the number of perpetrators arrested increased to 15, and to 31 perpetrators arrested in 2005. By 2005, the number of arrests was nearly aligned with the number of perpetrators identified. From 2006 to 2009, IJM continued to support AHTJP with as many as 15% to 25% of their arrests in human trafficking cases, particularly those related to CSEC.⁷⁸ From 2006 to 2010, as many as 28 to 43 perpetrators of CSEC were identified per year, and arrest of as many as 63% to 88% of those perpetrators.⁷⁹

After 2011, although IJM continued to provide technical assistance to AHTJP in regard to the identification and arrest of perpetrators of CSEC, the proportion of arrests to the number of perpetrators declined. This was due in part to the court's ruling that Mol did not have UIA in human trafficking cases. This court ruling curtailed Mol's ability to investigate CSEC cases in the same manner that they had been doing in previous years. At the same time, many of the entertainment establishments that were previously openly engaged in CSEC had closed down and commercial sexual exploitation moved into more closed establishments, such as KTVs and massage parlours, making investigation of commercial sexual exploitation much more difficult for AHTJP. Nevertheless, from 2011 to 2013, IJM supported AHTJP with as many as 45% to 56% of their arrests in human trafficking cases. By 2014, as IJM moved into Phase 3, they supported AHTJP with only 17% of the arrests in human trafficking cases.⁸⁰

Chart 3. Number of Arrests of Perpetrators of Human Trafficking in IJM cases by Year (2003-2014)⁸¹



Note: There are likely some minor variations in the total numbers, particularly in the early years (pre-2007).⁸²

Chart 4 reveals the number of victim rescues made by AHTJP with IJM support in the three target areas by year. In 2003, the first year of IJM's operations, IJM carried out 11 rescues. By 2004, the number of rescues increased to 50, 77 in 2005, and 84 in 2008. From 2006 to 2008, IJM supported AHTJP with as many as 23% to 39% of rescues of human trafficking victims, particularly CSEC victims.⁸³ By 2009, the proportion of rescues IJM supported AHTJP with jumped to as many as 61%, and as many as 68% of the rescues in 2011; this is despite the fact that the actual number of victims rescued decreased in 2010 and 2011. The increase in rescues during this period is also related, in part, to the fact that IJM opened a second office in Siem Reap from 2010 to 2012 to help AHTJP combat CSEC in a more concerted and strategic manner in Siem Reap. From 2012 to 2014, the proportion of rescues IJM supported AHTJP with decreased significantly to only 7 to 14 per year. Again, this significant decrease is likely linked to the court's ruling that Mol did not have UIA in human trafficking cases. This court ruling curtailed Mol's ability to identify and rescue CSEC victims in the same manner that they had

⁷⁸ Data obtained from IJM Document, Casework – AHTJP and IJM Case Statistics 2003-2014

⁷⁹ Data obtained from IJM Document, Casework – AHTJP and IJM Case Statistics 2003-2014

⁸⁰ Data obtained from IJM Document, Casework – AHTJP and IJM Case Statistics 2003-2014


⁸¹ Data for perpetrators arrested obtained from IJM Document, Victim Relief and Perpetrator Accountability, 2003-2014. Data for perpetrators identified obtained from IJM Document, IJM Cambodia - Cases by Year.

⁸² In 2011, IJM implemented its Casework Tracking Management System (CTMS) which has enabled IJM to better track and manage casework and statistics.

⁸³ Data obtained from IJM Document, Casework – AHTJP and IJM Case Statistics 2003-2014, based upon data exported from CTMS.

been doing in previous years. At the same time, CSEC became clandestine making investigation of CSEC much more difficult.

Chart 4. Number of Victims Rescued by Year (2003-2014)⁸⁴



Note: There are likely some minor variations in the total numbers particularly in the early years (pre-2007).

Some respondents recognized that it is not just AHTJP's collaboration with IJM that has led to the police being more effective at suppressing CSEC; but over the past decade, IJM has helped to improve AHTJP's collaboration with other public justice agencies, particularly prosecutors and judiciary, to improve prosecution of perpetrators of CSEC. In other words, IJM's efforts to strengthen both AHTJP and ATHJP's collaboration with other public justice agencies has contributed to increased prosecution of CSEC cases and a reduction in CSEC. One respondent explained, *"If the two [the police and courts] work together closely the cases will decrease; if the two do not work together the cases will increase. If the two do not work together, the evidence will not be good and the perpetrators will gain confidence"* (29, Government). Discussion of better collaboration among agencies that make up the public justice system has led many ATHJP respondents to talk about the need for MoI to have UIA in human trafficking cases. IJM contends that UIA is very important and *"police really need it; if they don't have this kind of authority, crime will increase, and more victims will be abused"* (42, IJM).

This evaluation did reveal that given the quality of trainings developed by IJM, a best practice would have been to mainstream the policing trainings into the Cambodian Royal Police Academy. This would have ensured sustainability of IJM's Program activities with the police, as well as further build the knowledge and skills of all police to suppress human trafficking and sexual exploitation.

3.7. Improvements to the Courts' Handling of CSEC Cases

Another important component of IJM's Program has been to ensure the evidentiary materials gathered through investigations and joint activities with police are used to prosecute perpetrators of CSEC. To accomplish this objective, IJM has focused their activities on providing professional legal representation to CSEC survivors, preparing CSEC survivors for court, and advocating for child friendly courts in CSEC cases. In addition, IJM has conducted case management of legal cases and monitoring of the criminal proceedings of CSEC cases, from the point at which the case enters the court system to the prosecutors' handling of the investigation, including the judicial investigation, and throughout the trial and appeals processes. IJM's legal case management and monitoring practices are designed to ensure legal cases are handled properly at every stage and that perpetrators of CSEC are prosecuted and convicted.

Previous IJM research documented that in the early 2000s, the judicial system was institutionally weak and backlogged, and in the early stages of reform. Judges and prosecutors were poorly trained, lacked sufficient resources to properly operate, and had an insufficient understanding of the laws, judicial procedures, and ethics. Components such as child friendly procedures, victim sensitivity, use of electronic or forensic evidence in court


⁸⁴ Data for IJM Rescues obtained from IJM Document, Victim Relief and Perpetrator Accountability, 2003-2014.

cases, and computerized case and data tracking were non-existent. In addition, the judicial system was significantly influenced by government leaders and corruption.^{85,86} Due to these realities, citizens distrusted the judicial system and tended to avoid engagement with the judicial system.⁸⁷

The early 2000s was also marked by poor working relationships between the police and courts, and there was limited transparency and cooperation between the courts and NGOs who legally represented clients (e.g. sex trafficking victims).⁸⁸ The result was that victims were often unwilling to cooperate or to participate in legal proceedings because they were uncertain as to the outcome and did not want to retell their trauma experience within the public court settings and risk further shame or threats to themselves or their families. Families were also more likely to settle the case with the perpetrator; a settlement that was often illegally accepted by the court.⁸⁹

A desk review of IJM's internal documents and analysis of interview data revealed that IJM has played an important role in helping to improve the courts handling of human trafficking cases, including prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC. Charts 5 through 7 will demonstrate their influence. Chart 5 reveals the number of CSEC legal cases filed with the courts each year from 2003 to 2014, with support from IJM's Legal Department. The increase in the number of legal cases is related to the fact that IJM opened a second office in Siem Reap from 2010 to 2012 to help AHTJP combat CSEC in a more concerted and strategic manner in Siem Reap. It is important to note that CSEC legal cases can often take several years from the point at which the legal case is filed with the prosecutor's office by AHTJP to the point when the court ruling in the case is issued. Some court rulings are also appealed by IJM's Legal Department which means the case continues on further through the appeals process. So, the data in Chart 5 does not reflect the number of legal cases IJM is working on in a given year; rather, it only reflects the number of CSEC legal cases filed each year.

Chart 5. Number of Legal Cases with IJM Support by Year (2003-2014)⁹⁰



Note: There are likely some minor variations in the total numbers particularly in the early years (pre-2007).

Chart 6 reveals that the number of perpetrators identified⁹¹ and perpetrators arrested, charged, and restrained in IJM's CSEC cases by year. As can be seen, the number of arrests is not aligned with the number of persons charged each year because some of the perpetrators charged were not arrested, and arrests and charges were not always processed in the same year. Chart 6 reveals many more perpetrators of CSEC are identified, compared to arrested and charged in any one year, and even fewer perpetrators are restrained. From 2003 to 2010 IJM was able to support AHTJP with ensuring the arrest and charge of perpetrators of CSEC; however, by 2009 the number of arrests and charges began to drop off. This is due in large part of the fact that in January 2008, AHTJP officers and IJM technical experts were threatened with arrest by the Siem Reap Court's

⁸⁵ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 8.

⁸⁶ The Royal Academy of Judicial Professionals was established in 2004.

⁸⁷ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 8.

⁸⁸ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 8.

⁸⁹ Van der Keur, 2013, p. 8.

⁹⁰ Data for perpetrators identified obtained from IJM Document, IJM Cambodia - Cases by Year. Data for arrests, charges, and pre-trial detention obtained from IJM Document, Victim Relief and Perpetrator Accountability, 2003-2014, based upon data exported from CTMS.

⁹¹ Identified implies established or indicated to be perpetrators of sex trafficking, including CSEC.

Investigating Judge after IJM assisted local AHTJP officers with a prosecutor-authorized investigation by posing as buyers, completing the transaction for a minor girl being trafficked for her virginity, and arresting the trafficker involved. The court's ruling in this case was that IJM had broken the law by engaging in the sale of the girl, looking only at the actions involved and ignoring the intent of the police operation, namely to investigate an ongoing criminal offense, i.e., CSEC.^{92,93} The interpretation in this case became increasingly prevalent within other courts in Cambodia over the next two years, and IJM maintained some defense lawyers and court officials found this argument useful to stall or derail trafficking cases. Operations of this type were suspended and police were no longer able to utilize undercover tactics as they were not accepted within Cambodian courts.⁹⁴

These court rulings came at the same time that IJM investigations and research revealed a noticeable shift in the tactics being used by traffickers in Cambodia's commercial sex industry to avoid arrest and prosecution, especially as it related to CSEC. The majority of commercial sex establishments were no longer allowing sex on premises, but would arrange to have girls meet customers away from the business establishments. Tactics also changed in regards to CSE of young minors, particularly children 15 years and under. Commercial sex establishments were no longer openly displaying and advertising children 15 years and under for sex; instead CSEC was being done through brokers and street- or community-based networks mainly to known customers.⁹⁵

The court ruling significantly curtailed MoI's ability to investigate CSEC cases in the same manner they had been doing prior to 2008,⁹⁶ which in turn affected the number of arrests AHTJP were able to make and charges brought against perpetrators. Nevertheless, the number of arrests and charges remained nearly aligned from 2008 to 2014. At the same time, the proportion of perpetrators restrained⁹⁷ increased to be more aligned with the number of perpetrators of CSEC arrested and charged. This finding is significant as it appears that either the cases of CSEC after 2008 were more serious and/or the public justice system was responding more seriously to CSEC cases.

"UIA is a legal challenge . . . After the new TIP law, some court officials and some law enforcement said you are not allowed to do that [undercover investigations] anymore; that is entrapment. After that, in 2010, a new penal code was enacted, so we no longer were able to use the audio or video recording. Sometimes it is hard for us and law enforcement to collect evidence . . . our video recordings are no longer admissible in court. We said we need UIA. IJM in cooperation with MoJ and Mol conducted a big UIA workshop for two days . . . police are still reluctant without written authority to do the UIA." (42, IJM)

⁹² UIA are internationally accepted law enforcement methods of covert investigation and evidence collection, including the use of audio and video recordings.

⁹³ IJM's Cambodia Field Office maintains the court's ruling in 2008 did not deny MOI use of UIA, but instead began a three-year debate within the legal system. MOI was not denied use of UIA until 2011, after the Penal Code was updated and criminalized the use of audio/video recording. Police and IJM continued to use audio/video recording and buy bust techniques into 2011. The case did create debate and hesitancy within the judicial system on how to consider UIA-obtained evidence, but it did not result in across the board changes until the Penal Code was revised in 2010 (taking effect in 2011).


⁹⁴ Referenced source: 21 February 2013 Memo on Granting Undercover Investigative Authority to the Cambodian AHTJP from IJM, Cambodia to Counter Trafficking Stakeholders

⁹⁵ Referenced source: 21 February 2013 Memo on Granting Undercover Investigative Authority to the Cambodian AHTJP from IJM, Cambodia to Counter Trafficking Stakeholders

⁹⁶ Prior to 2008, undercover operations were a common methodology used by Cambodian police and their partner NGOs to investigate human trafficking cases, and the Cambodian court system approved of and included undercover evidence in anti-trafficking trials.

⁹⁷ "Restrained" can be met either through a conviction, pre-trial detention, or other court-ordered detention.

Chart 6. Number of Arrests, Charges and Restrained in IJM CSEC Cases by Year (2003-2014)⁹⁸



Note: There are likely some minor variations in the total numbers particularly in the early years (pre-2007).

Chart 7 shows the number of acquittals and convictions in IJM's CSEC cases by year. Each year the number of convictions is greater than the number of acquittals in IJM's CSEC cases. This finding demonstrates that Cambodia's Law on Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation, coupled with the work of various IOs, IGOs, and NGOs, including IJM's efforts to improve the public justice system through capacity building, sharing of technical expertise/assistance, and monitoring has had an impact on the public justice system's handling of CSEC cases.

Chart 7. Number of Acquittal and Convictions in IJM CSEC Cases by Year (2003-2014)⁹⁹





Diagram 1 demonstrates the funnel effect that exists in the public justice system in CSEC cases in Cambodia. The funnel effect in the criminal process reflects that there are many more cases early in the process, but the number of cases dwindles as decision makers remove cases from the process. Some cases are dismissed, while others are acquitted. An analysis of IJM's case data reveals that from 2003 to 2014, a total of 502 CSEC victims were rescued by the Cambodia police with support from IJM and 383 perpetrators were identified. Among the 383 perpetrators identified, 65.8% of those perpetrators were charged and 59.8% were arrested. In turn, only 49.9% of perpetrators of CSEC identified were convicted by the courts. It is important to note that most of these cases would not have been brought to the attention of the public justice system or processed through the system if it were not for IJM's Program. Interview data that follows reveals the perceptions of key stakeholders as to improvements of the courts' handling of CSEC cases.

⁹⁸ Data for perpetrators identified obtained from IJM Document, IJM Cambodia - Cases by Year. Data for perpetrators arrested, charged, and restrained obtained from IJM Document, Victim Relief and Perpetrator Accountability, 2003-2014.

⁹⁹ Data for obtained from IJM Document, Victim Relief and Perpetrator Accountability, 2003-2014.

Diagram 1. Funnel Effect in the Public Justice System in CSEC Cases (2003-2014)



Some respondents were also specifically asked about improvements to the courts' handling of CSEC cases in Cambodia. Table 7 reveals among the 54 key stakeholders interviewed, 21 were asked specifically about improvement to the courts' handling of CSEC cases. Among those respondents, the majority reported that over the past 10 years there have been improvements to the courts' handling of CSEC cases (71.4%) and an increase in the prosecution and convictions of perpetrators of CSEC (80.0%). While the handling of CSEC cases by the courts has reportedly improved, there is still a lack of transparency. As IJM explained, *"While they [the courts] may not be able to release the perpetrator, they sometimes lighten the level of penalty"* (8, IJM).

Table 7. Improvements to the Courts' Handling of CSEC Cases

	Full Sample N=21	
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
Over the past 10 years, there have been improvements to the courts' handling of CSEC cases	15	71.4
	N=15	
Over the past 10 years, there has been an increase in the prosecution and convictions of perpetrators of CSEC	12	80.0

Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

Further analysis revealed that among the 21 respondents, all IJM respondents reported improvements in the courts' handling of CSEC cases and an increase in the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC over the past 10 years. In comparison, 75.0% of Government and 55.6% of NGO/IO/Other respondents reported improvements in the courts' handling of CSEC cases, and 83.3% of Government and 66.7% of NGO/IO/Other respondents reported an increase in the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC over the past 10 years.

Although UNICEF and Hagar Cambodia have been at the forefront of working with the courts to ensure the establishment of child friendly courts that more fully reflect the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, including establishing guidelines and protocols for the courts' treatment of children and children's participation in court proceedings, IJM has also been regularly monitoring and advocating that the courts use the proper child friendly criminal court proceedings in their role as legal representative to CSEC survivors. IJM reported they have seen improvements in the establishment of child friendly procedures in the courts, including the use of child friendly questioning and child friendly screens to ensure children do not have to look at their perpetrator(s) during court proceedings. IJM also reported speedy processes in cases involving minor victims, which is an improvement from the past. IJM's role in advocating for child friendly processes, coupled with UNICEF and Hagar Cambodia's work to establish child friendly courts, has helped to improve the courts' handling of CSEC cases.

"IJM has presented in the court hearing and advocated for the child friendly processes and judges asking child friendly questions, and ask the court to conduct private hearings. Every time that IJM asked the same thing it became a habit . . . UNICEF also provides with checklists and tools . . . but practically IJM and APLE advocate directly with the judges to use the screen and to conduct the private hearings. Recently we provided a bunch of pictures to explain the process." (42, IJM)

Some Government respondents recognized that IJM's monitoring of the courts' handling of CSEC cases has contributed to improvements in the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC. As one respondent explained, *"I believe for the CSEC cases, IJM seriously pays attention and provides the lawyer, which means the result of the court case is successful . . . The lawyer always watches out closely"* (33, Government). On the other hand, Government respondents reported that while *"IJM has contributed [to improvements in the courts' handling of CSEC cases], but the whole success is not due to IJM."* This same respondent went on to add,

"IJM has been able to build the capacity of the police to handle cases; however, IJM rarely builds the capacity of the prosecutors . . . AAPTIP does more with prosecutors, not IJM. They [IJM] do not seem to have a lot of influence when it comes to the real trial, but in the earlier stages in police investigations and evidence collection that support does have influence in the beginning of the case; but, when it comes to the court case there is not so much influence any more" (16, Government).

Although the majority of NGO/IO/Other respondents recognized improvements in the courts' handling of CSEC cases and prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC, some respondents were still critical of the courts and maintained there is still room for improving the courts' handling of CSEC cases. As three different NGO/IO/Other respondents explained,

"The courts now have been successful in prosecuting traffickers, they have conducted proper evidence collection with the police and they [the courts] work together with the police and have been successful, but there are still cases of big traffickers that they need to work more to be successful" (13, NGO/IO/Other).

"Sometimes I feel they [the courts] did not change . . .

. Honestly, I cannot see any change. Even though I heard about the child friendly court room, it is not here in Phnom Penh. For me, I did not see any change for the court system. Sometimes they make the decisions just on their perception/thinking, not based upon evidence. What has changed is the process of the case . . . before one case took two to three years and now the process is faster, it is six months to one year." (12, NGO/IO/Other)

"One mistake or difficulty for IJM is to help the client to receive full justice. Some perpetrators, the court said they are in jail, but later we see them outside. And sometimes, [the perpetrators are ordered] to pay to the girl [compensation, but] they don't get compensation. Despite the effort and work on the side of justice there is still a lack of justice for girls." (22, NGO/IO/Other)

In comparison, Government respondents were more likely to recognize that *"step-by-step the case of CSEC has become the priority"* for the government and they *"see the conviction rate has become stronger and the penalty has become more serious over the years, because it is the children's case"* (16, Government). Similarly, other Government respondents recognize that over the past decade there has been more and better collaboration between the police, prosecutors, and judges which has contributed to improvements in the courts' handling of CSEC cases.

"We have heard more about successful convictions and the contribution was to IJM providing legal support to the victims. In those cases, the prosecution relies upon testimony of the victim. To go to court and to be willing to testify that has led to stronger convictions. The fact that IJM was present at the arrest and search, and the handling of the court case, that has contributed to the case as well. When IJM joined the search they make sure that the police follow the procedures, which contributes to successful convictions. And IJM advocates when the courts or investigators want to drop the charge." (35, NGO/IO/Other)

“I think the court has made much better progress. They have also contributed significantly to combatting CSEC. They [prosecutors] attended trainings in Phnom Penh with different NGOs and occasionally we have the joint meeting of the AHTJP, prosecutors, and judges to meet because we recognize it is a new type of crime. From that time, we believe the courts handle better such cases. Currently, the court and prosecutor invited us to have meetings with them once a month, but in the past they did not do so.” (25, Government)

IJM’s previous research further revealed that over the past decade, judges, prosecutors, and court clerks have gained more knowledge and understanding of the laws, court procedures, and their roles in the public justice system. Today, trainings for prosecutors and judicial officials are reportedly offered on a regular basis and a requirement for all court personnel. In addition, the number of law students graduating from the Royal University of Law and Economics has reportedly increased, as have the number of student applying for admission to the Cambodian Bar. Finally, funding for the courts has also reportedly improved court functioning and facilities, such as court buildings.¹⁰⁰

Despite improvements made to the judicial system over the past decade, including in terms of the courts’ handling of CSEC cases, there are still challenges and gaps that remain. IJM’s research revealed the Cambodian government continues to maintain strong influence over the courts and corruption remains a problem in the judicial system. There is also a lack of legal clarity in certain areas, including as it relates to investigation and prosecution of commercial sexual exploitation cases, which hampers the ability of law enforcement to investigate CSEC cases and to collect evidence for use in prosecution of perpetrators of CSEC. Also, cooperation between the police and courts is still not working at an optimal level. The courts remain underfunded and judicial officials are lacking in number and in legal training, resulting in a back log of cases and excessive pre-trial detention, and the courts have poor record keeping and evidence maintenance practices.¹⁰¹ Most judges are also expected to be able to handle a wide range of case types as there are no specialized courts that handle human trafficking cases. IJM’s previous research revealed these deficiencies have led to the situation that CSEC cases can be successfully pushed through the court system provided the victim is supported by a team of legal aid professionals from NGOs. Still, however, transparency of the court’s work and decision remains an issues as cases and judgments are not typically published, and court rulings that perpetrators pay compensation to victims are not enforced. Given these realities and the undue political influence over the judicial system, there is still very little public trust in the courts.¹⁰²

One of the challenges or limitations that IJM faced when it came to working with the courts, including prosecutors and judges, is that IJM never established an MOU with MoJ. It would have been a significant benefit to IJM’s public justice transformation approach to have established an MOU with both Mol and MoJ; that is, resources permitting. Nevertheless, even without an MOU with MoJ, the findings from this evaluation reveal that IJM has managed to bring AHTJP police officials together with prosecutors through joint coordination meetings, trainings, and workshops.

3.8. Confidence in the Public Justice System

One of the questions related to impact is do key stakeholders have increased confidence in the performance of public justice system actors to appropriately address the problem of CSEC in Cambodia? Respondents were asked specifically if they have increased confidence in the performance of public justice system actors, particularly the AHTJP and courts’ handling of CSEC cases. In general, the majority of respondents maintained they have more confidence in the AHTJP to handle CSEC cases, compared to 2004. Respondents maintained this is because AHTJP has been trained to understand the *TIPSE Law* and to suppress human trafficking, in general, and CSEC in particular. Respondents largely recognized AHTJP have a better understanding of *“the laws and their roles and responsibilities”* to suppress sex trafficking; however, some respondents outside of the AHTJP reported they are not 100% confident in AHTJP’s handling of CSEC cases. Many respondents recognize there is

¹⁰⁰ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), pp. 7-8.

¹⁰¹ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), pp. 7-8.

¹⁰² Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), pp. 7-8.

room for improving the abilities of the public justice system actors, including the AHTJP and courts' handling of CSEC cases.

Most respondents recognized that 10 years ago there was no *Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation in Cambodia* and that neither police, prosecutors, nor judges had been trained to understand CSEC. Thus, respondents maintained *"today it is much better than 10 years ago, 10 years ago they [traffickers] might not be convicted"* (25, Government). Respondents also reported increased confidence in prosecutors and courts' handling of CSEC cases; however, when it comes to prosecutors and courts, respondents were more likely to report *"it depends on their will"* (2, NGO/IO/Other). NGO/IO/Other respondents maintained that CSEC survivors who *"go to court with an NGO have more leverage to win a case. If you have an NGO behind the victim, the court is more likely to find against the defendant"* (4, NGO/IO/Other). Another reason NGO/IO/Other respondents reported more confidence in the courts' handling of CSEC cases is because CSEC cases are tried more quickly by the courts today, compared to in 2004.

Some NGO/IO/Other respondents recognized IJM's contribution to addressing CSEC, but were still critical of the police's abilities to suppress human trafficking. As one respondent explained, *"Investigations have not gotten more professional, if there has been progress it has not been any massive progress . . . Witness protection does not exist in Cambodia, there is no team or resources . . . evidence collection has not improved . . . there is no evidence and witnesses are just the evidence . . . They [the police and courts] have no place to put evidence and there are no evidence labels. IJM has helped to move a lot and have kept the issue in the spotlight"* (4, NGO/IO/Other).

Respondents were also asked if there is increased public demand for the police and courts to respond to CSEC, compared to 2004. Among respondents that were asked or answered this question, 60.0% reported there is increased public demand for the police and courts to respond to CSEC.¹⁰³ Further analysis revealed Government (100.0%) and IJM (100.0%) respondents were more likely than NGO/IO/Other (33.3%) respondents to maintain there is increased public demand for the police and courts to respond to CSEC, compared to 2004. Similar to other respondents, one respondents explained,

"The situation has been changing; the attitude towards law enforcement, and the public response to this situation has been improving. So, people have gained more confidence in the public justice system and victims are more willing to complain and participate [in criminal processes as witnesses]" (35, NGO/IO/Other).

In comparison, some respondents thought there is a *"lower expectation because CSEC cases seem to disappear from society, because in general it looks like they don't see that establishment as obvious anymore, so expectation decreases"* (3, NGO/IO/Other). Other respondents maintained, *"it is difficult to measure"* because of a reported *"lack of trust of courts and police"* (11, NGO/IO/Other).

Findings from this section and previous sections reveal that IJM has made significant and important contributions to increasing the confidence in the performance of public justice system actors, particularly the AHTJP, and have monitored the courts' handling of CSEC cases. Still, however, there is room for improvements in the public justice system's handling of CSEC cases, and there is a need for increased public demand for public justice actors to respond to CSEC in Cambodia.

"Before we spent 2 years for one case, but now 6 months to 1 year; so you can see improvements and more confidence in them [the courts]. Also, before we heard about the dismissal of CSEC cases, but now we don't hear about that." (12, NGO/IO/Other)

¹⁰³ The sample size was 15 respondents.

3.9. Establishing Quality Crisis Aftercare for CSEC Survivors

IJM's previous research revealed that in the early 2000s, few NGOs existed in Cambodia that focused their programs on anti-trafficking efforts in a targeted manner and MoSVY had minimal resources to provide protection and services to human trafficking or sexual exploitation victims. MoSVY's local community-based direct-service provider branches (termed DoSVY) were significantly lacking in funding, training, guidance, and authority for providing protection and aftercare services for CSEC victims.¹⁰⁴ As a result, the limited number of NGOs that existed provided the vast majority of protection and aftercare services to victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation. However, not all NGOs were properly trained to assess the individual needs of victims and to provide them with quality aftercare.¹⁰⁵ Aftercare services were typically limited to safe accommodation, some life skills and job skills trainings, and medical care. Aftercare services were also typically structured as long-term, residential shelters with high client-to-staff ratios and large dormitory style rooms; most shelters were overcrowded. There were some early aftercare home models, but they were not evidence-based and often lacked trafficking expertise, trauma-focused programming, professional mental health services, case management services, and tracking systems for effective reintegration.¹⁰⁶ Other crucial gaps in care that were identified in the early 2000s included: limited cooperation among government ministries on counter-trafficking issues since the Ministries were not yet clear on their role in anti-trafficking efforts and the government had not yet set trafficking as a priority issue; collaboration among NGOs offering aftercare services, except in the event of a rescue operation when aftercare options needed to be coordinated; lack of professional training for caregivers; multiple changes in care settings for victims; and, poorly planned reintegration of trafficking victims back into their families and communities.¹⁰⁷

Generally, governmental and nongovernmental aftercare service providers were unable to effectively meet the comprehensive needs of traumatized trafficked and sexual exploited girls/women, and there was a general lack of quality standards and monitoring of these standards by MoSVY. Because early trafficking shelters were designed for medium to long-term care, few transitional and community-based services were available; as a result, most victims were sent home after they aged out of the shelters.¹⁰⁸ Some aftercare organizations monitored women and girls after they left the shelters, but most did not have the staff, case management programming, or reintegration protocols to ensure quality follow-up after reintegration.¹⁰⁹

"In the past, DoSVY did not understand the problem of the trafficked child so sometimes they just referred immediately, even before the child was ready for such placement. That is why sometimes the child would run away. The trafficked child is not like victims of child abuse. The trafficked child is more active and will try to run away . . . They have been trafficked from one to another people and place, they don't trust anyone and they were brainwashed by the perpetrator . . . So we spent time with DoSVY to make them understand the services and the different shelters and what they are equipped with." (14, IJM)

Since 2004, IJM's Program has focused significantly on the identification and rescue of CSEC victims, as well as ensuring CSEC survivors are provided with protection and adequate care and support, reducing their risk of being re-trafficked and re-victimized. Between late 2004 and 2008, improvements within aftercare services and programming began to occur when a large number of local and international NGOs launched services within Cambodia to address the needs of trafficking and sexual exploitation victims. At the time, the majority of newly arrived NGOs launched shelter programs that included protection, aftercare, and reintegration services.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9-10.

¹⁰⁵ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9.

¹⁰⁶ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9.

¹⁰⁷ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9.

¹⁰⁸ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9.

¹⁰⁹ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9.

¹¹⁰ Van der Keur, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9.

In 2011, IJM established a MOU with MoSVY to: a) improve the quality of care and support to CSEC victims during intervention, post-operation (after a raid), and legal proceeding in order to reduce the impact of trauma and ensure that victims' rights are upheld; b) to facilitate successful and sustainable rehabilitation for victims through partnership with governmental and nongovernmental social service organizations; and c) to promote collaboration and coordination between government social services and the IJM Aftercare Department through provision of training and coordinated assistance. IJM has also had MOUs with NGO service providers, including World Hope, Ratanak, and Hope for Justice to establish a collaborative working arrangement on all IJM CSEC cases for the protection and provision of quality aftercare services for survivors. As part of their outputs, IJM also focused on establishing evidence-based definitions of high quality aftercare and case management, including monitoring survivors' recovery, reintegration, and restoration.

Findings from this evaluation revealed that over the past decade (2004-2014), IJM's Program has made some important contributions in each of the aforementioned areas. Since 2008, IJM has provided MoSVY/DoSVY and NGO service providers with capacity building trainings and coordination assistance that has promoted improved knowledge and understanding of human trafficking and concepts and practices related to crisis care, aftercare, and case management. The capacity building trainings have also served to improve collaboration and coordination among governmental and nongovernmental aftercare service providers and the IJM Aftercare Department. In 2014, IJM introduced the training entitled, "Crisis Intervention Skills: A Training of Trainers Curriculum for MoSVY and DoSVY," which was highlighted by both governmental and nongovernmental aftercare service providers as being relevant and meaningful. The curriculum provides research-based information, practicum exercises, and best practice models for providing effective crisis intervention and referral services to trafficking victims during law enforcement interventions, which have been proven to lead to increased successful rehabilitation and reduced risk of re-victimization. This training includes modules specific to: understanding crisis; professional response to crisis; crisis intervention stages; value and skills for providing crisis intervention; basic needs assessments; aftercare referrals; and problem-solving. Despite progress made, IJM still recognizes there are some gaps when it comes to providing CSEC victims with crisis care and aftercare services.

Another training IJM offered is entitled, "The Caregiver's Role: Advice to Aftercare Staff on Caring for Children in the Justice System." This training focuses more specifically on Cambodia's courts and child witnesses, including court requirements and expectations of the child, child witness reactions to testifying in court (pre-trial, during trial and post-trial), preparing a child witness for trial, attending court with a child witness, and addressing a child witnesses' needs post-trial.

IJM has also established minimum standards of care for CSEC survivors and structured aftercare treatment plans and case management protocols, forms, and checklists. IJM has established their own protocols and assessment forms for assessing successful outcomes for CSEC survivors, including recovery, reintegration, and restoration. IJM also designed case management software that allows IJM to track and monitor all of IJM's cases, including rescues, victim identification, intakes, referrals, legal proceedings, and victim outcomes.

"DoSVY knows how to refer and which service providers are best for the victim, and if the child is a minor they need to refer to the assessment center. In 2004, they didn't know how to do this. In our target areas, police call DoSVY and then DoSVY calls to the assessment center, like World Hope, so the NGO goes out and does the assessment with the victim. DoSVY does not do the assessment; that is the big gap." (5, IJM)

"I see that NGOs work more and more in cooperation, even with the government. When there is a case they put it on the floor to discuss and see more and more collaboration between the NGOs, they can learn and share . . . I can see many NGOs run the shelter and try to integrate minimum standards to care for the victims of human traffickina." (1, NGO/IO/Other)

Despite IJM's efforts to improve crisis care and aftercare systems in the three target areas, interview data with 19 Government and NGO/IO/Other respondents revealed only 42.1% of respondents believed that CSEC victims are provided with crisis care at police stations. Among the 19 respondents, police (80.0%) were more likely than service providers (28.6%) to believe that CSEC victims are provided with crisis care at police stations. In addition, Government (71.4%) respondents were more likely to than NGO/IO/Other respondents (25.0%) to believe that CSEC victims are provided with crisis care at police stations. Government respondents were more likely to maintain CSEC victims are provided with crisis care at police stations because they recognize that *"[ten years ago] police and DoSVY did not understand each other, and after 10 years of collaboration we started to talk to each other and discuss our work, and do joint efforts . . . When there is a raid operation the police would contact DoSVY, so it is like a multi-disciplinary group; IJM with the police and social workers do the work together"* (19, Government). At the same time, this same respondent explained the government simply does not have the resources or manpower needed to ensure that CSEC victims are always provided with quality crisis care at police stations.

"We have skills and knowledge, but we don't have the resources and package (food and clothes) for the victim. We don't have money to pay for the package for the survivors and we don't have the money for the operations for the government officials. This is the challenges for the government." (19, Government)

"I see that NGOs work more and more in cooperation, even with the government. When there is a case they put it on the floor to discuss and see more and more collaboration between the NGOs, they can learn and share . . . I can see many NGOs run the shelter and try to integrate minimum standards to care for the victims of human trafficking." (1, NGO/IO/Other)

Despite the gaps that exist, NGO aftercare service providers and shelter operators reported they regularly hold coordination meetings, often facilitated by Chab Dai, in an effort to improve coordination of services for child victims of abuse, violence, and exploitation. Coordination and cooperation has also been facilitated other umbrella organizations such as COSECAM, ECPAT, SNAN, NGO CRC, CNCC and the Child Safe Network.¹¹¹ Although not the focus of this evaluation, IJM's previous research revealed a divide in the cooperation between secular and faith-based organizations.¹¹²

"I can see there are still some gaps in coordination of services. We meet regularly, we are in coordination with organizations. There was an effort to map services and build databases, but that didn't work. In an informal way we coordinate services, but not a systematic way." (11, NGO/IO/Other)

Over the years, IJM has also provided MoSVY/DoSVY with the financial support needed to support their work following police raids and rescue of CSEC victims (e.g. IJM provided phones cards for DoSVY, hygiene packages for survivors, and food for victims, DoSVY, and police following raids). Government respondents recognized it is really IJM that takes the lead when it comes to providing crisis care and quality aftercare for CSEC survivors. As one respondent recalled, *"We give children to IJM. IJM refers them to the shelter and then reports back to us about the referral. They say now the child has been referred to this shelter"* (19, Government).

Respondents also recognized that the efforts of IJM to coordinate AHTJP and MoSVY/DoSVY to ensure proper protection and referral of CSEC survivors to quality aftercare services has not always been easy and likely required a great deal of lobbying and advocacy on the part of IJM with the government. There has also been little trust between NGOs and the government. For instance, the police felt that NGOs were out to criticize them, and NGOs typically assumed the police were corrupt.¹¹³ IJM engaged the government in the long, slow process of change and capacity building, which also included improving communication and cooperation between the governmental agencies, such as AHTJP and MoSVY/DoSVY, as well as with NGOs to ensure protection and quality aftercare for trafficking and sexual exploitation victims.¹¹⁴ As one Government

¹¹¹ Van der Kuer, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9.

¹¹² Van der Kuer, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9.

¹¹³ Van der Kuer, 2013 (Summary Report), p.10.

¹¹⁴ Van der Kuer, 2013 (Summary Report), p. 9.

respondent explained, *“IJM must have been trying hard to coordinate the service providers [both governmental and nongovernmental service providers], especially with MoI, to get the police to coordinate with NGOs and shelter providers. So, I think IJM must have lobbied a lot”* (28, Government).

When asked about the ability of MoSVY/DoSVY to continue to provide CSEC victims with quality aftercare, some respondents recognized MoSVY/DoSVY lacks the financial and human resources needed to provide CSEC victims with shelter and food, and quality aftercare. As one respondent explained, *“I hope after IJM phases out we could have money to do it ourselves; we do not really have a budget and means to do it”* (10, Government). Similarly, IJM recognized, *“We know it is a gap because they [the Government] do not have the human resources or funding to do that [crisis care]. We told MoSVY that this is something the government should do, but it is not sustainable. MoSVY is aware of the gap, but they don’t do anything”* (5, IJM). Given this finding, some IJM staff expressed concern that that DoSVY will not be able to sustain the crisis care at police stations into the future. Similarly, NGO/IO/Other respondents recognized, *“They [DoSVY] has improved a lot, but it is not sustainable. They need to refer cases to quality service providers, but they cannot afford that kind of services”* (3, NGO/IO/Other).

“It is difficult to say because currently we can see some shelters close down because of no funding. Some others turn to do community-based care instead. With the new shelter standard, they need to have 2,000 square meters to be able to open a shelter; therefore, the small shelters will have to close down. If any shelter cannot fulfill the requirement as the standard, they wouldn’t get a MoU with MoSVY . . . We actually do not encourage more shelters to be created because residential care is recognized as the last choice. We consider the freedom of the survivor and we don’t want them to be re-victimized by shelter abuse. The shelter makes survivors unable to adapt with the outside world. I think IJM understands that too, but in reality, we have children who suffered because of their families and some of them are having court case to deal with, so they need shelter.” (10, Government)

The government must also realize that their ability to provide trafficking and sexual exploitation victims with quality aftercare services will be limited in the future by the fact that some NGO-operated shelters and quality aftercare services are closing or changing their program and/or population focus away from CSEC survivors given the fact that there are fewer reported cases of CSEC and fewer CSEC victims being referred to shelter and aftercare services. For instance, IJM maintained some shelters have shifted to focusing on labor trafficking survivors, while other shelters have moved to community-based care for rape survivors and direct outreach to sex workers. In recent years, donor funding for nongovernmental shelters and aftercare providers has also been reduced. As a result, the challenge today is finding *“a place to provide the best support to those victims. There are less care centers now, so the NGOs pulled back their budget, but how can we find a good place for them to get the psychological counselling or legal services. It requires much cost to provide those services, but now there are budget cuts”* (3, NGO/IO/Other).

3.10. Improvements in Victim Outcomes

IJM’s Program has also focused on improving outcomes for CSEC survivors. This has been accomplished by establishing effective case management practices to confirm that rescued CSEC victims are provided with protection and aftercare services to reduce their risks of re-victimization and increase their opportunities for effective rehabilitation and recovery. IJM’s case management approach involves collaboration with NGO shelter and aftercare service providers to ensure victims’ needs are properly assessed and addressed at each of the various stages of protection and care, and progress is being made to support the recovery and rehabilitation of CSEC survivors. IJM has also established standards for determining when CSEC victims have been rehabilitated and recovered, and are ready for reintegration. At the stage of reintegration, IJM’s aftercare case workers continue case management and follow-up directly with the survivors to monitor their progress and provides continued psycho-social support and other forms of needed support (e.g., sometimes temporary financial

support) and access to services (e.g. assistance with accessing vocational skills training and employment services).

Chart 8 reveals the number of CSEC survivors reintegrated into their families and/or communities. Reintegration remained a priority for IJM for the period of 2005 to 2014, and even into 2015 IJM continued to reintegrate four survivors of CSEC.

Chart 8. CSEC survivors placed in shelter and reintegrated by year (2004-2014)¹¹⁵




Table 8 reveals that among the 25 service providers interviewed, 11 were asked about victim outcomes. Only 44.4% of the 11 service providers questioned reported there are standards for determining when a sex trafficking victim has been rehabilitated, recovered, and successfully integrated; however, these are not necessarily IJM's standards. In addition, 54.5% of service providers reported they know what steps IJM takes to track CSEC survivors to ensure they receive quality aftercare and achieve recovery and reintegration. Those respondents that were aware of IJM's case management practices reported IJM regularly follow-ups with survivors, typically once a month for up to 18 months after reintegration into the community, depending the needs of the survivors. As one IJM respondent explained, *"We still occasionally follow-up with the clients on the case and we have our own forms, the follow-up form, so we know what we are looking for . . . we know if they need more support in a particular area and we can follow-up with the service provider using our IJM form"* (14, IJM).

Table 8. Standards of Aftercare and Victim Outcomes (Service Providers ONLY)		
	Service Providers ONLY N=11	
	n	%
There are standards for determining when sex trafficking victims have been rehabilitated, recovered, and successfully integrated	4	44.4
Know what steps IJM takes to track CSEC survivors to ensure they receive quality after care and achieve recovery and reintegration	6	54.5
There have been reductions in the last 10 years in the number of CSEC victims re-trafficked after police rescue.	4	36.4

Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

Table 8 further reveals that among 11 service providers interviewed, only 36.4% reported there have been reductions in the number of CSEC victims that have been re-trafficked after police rescue; many respondents reported they simply don't know. In particular, Government respondents maintained they really don't know if CSEC survivors are re-trafficked because *"after they have been rescued they go to different shelters in different places and if they are re-trafficked they do not come here (back to the same town), so we do not know. And*

¹¹⁵ Data based upon annual Cambodia Field Office Reports to IJM HQ, 2004-2014, and the 2006 Mission Memorandum for IJM Cambodia OFP.

some stay in the shelter for many years and they grow up and become adults, so we don't know if they are trafficked as adults" (28, Government). In comparison, some NGO/IO/Other respondents given the challenges and limitations of aftercare services they do see girls return to commercial sexual exploitation. As one respondent explained,

"For trafficking girls we see about 20% go back to sexual exploitation or sex work. We have some girls that after being in the shelter a few months they run away, we still look for them and you can see a few cases. We cannot force them to stay in the shelter. One of the big gaps for us is finding good job placement. There is a lot of family pressure to make money . . . there are not good jobs for them. We have had to fight with them to find good job opportunities vs. going to work in the KTVs . . . We do both job skills training and link them to job skills training. If they are too old to be in school we put them in vocational training to learn tailoring, cosmetology, and some work at [a local business]. Our options are limited. What we can provide in-house is limited by budget, so we have to outsource all that." (22, NGO/IO/Other)

3.11. Confidence in Coordination of Aftercare for CSEC Survivors

What was IJM's contribution to the development of a coordinated aftercare system in Cambodia from 2004 to 2014? What was IJM's contribution to improved outcomes for specific IJM aftercare clients? To answer these questions, IJM and key stakeholders were asked a series of questions related to their confidence in coordination of aftercare for CSEC survivors, and IJM's contribution to these changes. Table 9 reveals among 18 respondents that were specifically asked these questions, 61.1% of respondents reported that over the past 10 years (2004-2014) they have had increased confidence in the ability of DoSVY to provide crisis care and to refer CSEC victims to quality after care. Also, 78.6% of respondents reported that over the past 10 years there have been improvements in the capacity of the coordinated aftercare network to provide quality aftercare services to CSEC survivors. Finally, 63.6% of respondents reported over the past 10 years they have seen improvements to the quality of aftercare service to CSEC victims.

Table 9. Confidence in Coordination of Aftercare for CSEC Survivors		
	Sample N=18	
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
Over the last 10 years, there is increased confidence in the ability of DoSVY to provide crisis care and to refer CSEC victims to quality aftercare	11	61.1
	N=14	
Over the last 10 years, there have been improvements in the capacity of the coordinated aftercare network to provide quality aftercare services to CSEC survivors	11	78.6
	N=11	
Over the last 10 years, there have been improvements to the quality of aftercare services to CSEC victims	7	63.6

Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

Interview data also revealed that among Government respondents, given their participation in capacity building offered by and collaboration with IJM, they were aware that DoSVY had increased knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to provide crisis care to CSEC survivors and that they knew where to refer them for quality aftercare. DoSVY also recognized that caring for CSEC survivors was part of their mandate. As one respondent explained, *"there is a big difference. When you talk about the welfare of the survivor, I think we are the best one to care about this. If you compare with another agency in the government, I don't think they are responsible for the care of children"* (19, Government).

Findings presented in this section and preceding sections provide evidence that IJM has made important contributions to increasing confidence in the performance of DoSVY to provide crisis care and to refer CSEC victims to quality aftercare. In addition, IJM has helped to improve the coordinated aftercare network, particularly among their partners, and provision of quality aftercare services to CSEC survivors. At the same

time, this evaluation found there is still room for improvement. However, given the significant reduction in the number of CSEC cases and victims being referred for shelter and aftercare services many NGO-operated shelters are closing and NGO aftercare service providers are ending or limiting their services in Cambodia. Also, the documented reduction in the prevalence of CSEC cases in Cambodia has also led to a reduction in donor funding for CSEC projects and programs. Thus, the sustainability of quality aftercare service for CSEC survivors is unknown and will likely be much more limited in the future.

3.12. Mobilization of Faith-Based Communities

Although mobilizing community groups, particularly faith-based communities, for prevention of CSEC was not one of IJM's primary outcomes, it was an objective since 2004. In particular, IJM was focused on strengthening partnerships and networking with churches in IJM's three target areas to raise their awareness of CSEC in Cambodia and IJM's Program. IJM's focus has been on mobilizing church leaders to engage them in prevention of CSEC, including reporting suspected cases of CSEC in their communities. To accomplish this, IJM provided churches with various trainings and materials to disseminate information in their churches specifically related to CSEC, and more generally to concepts of biblical justice and social injustices.

In 2013, IJM began organizing a series of workshops and trainings for faith-based leaders each year on CSEC, justice for children, and child victims, in cooperation with the police and NGOs, in an effort to encourage faith-based communities to collaborate with police and NGOs to report suspected cases of CSEC. IJM did not provide churches with funding, but some churches had their own resources to do outreach activities or arrange events. For instance, local churches sometimes organized outreach activities at beer gardens and KTVs, handing out flyers to the women and girls working in such entertainment establishments. Church leaders were also encouraged to report to the police and/or IJM suspected cases of CSEC in their communities. IJM also encouraged collaboration among churches to prevent CSEC.

Focus groups with faith-based groups in each of the three target areas consistently revealed that these groups had increased understanding of CSEC as a result of their engagement with IJM's Program. As one group of faith-based leaders explained,

"For us, it is not just knowledge we receive, but we have more awareness and confidence in the community. It makes the community look to us because we seem to have more influence because we have more knowledge. It gives us knowledge and a reputation in the community. We have more confidence to report and we have someone we report to and they keep good confidentiality for us."

This same group of faith-based leaders went on to explain,

"IJM is very smart to choose to network with [the] faith-based community because abuse can happen anywhere, even in the church. Using the church, you can prevent better. Raising awareness of church leaders is very important and useful . . . the church can also [be] very supportive after the client is reintegrated back home. The church now knows the impact of sex trafficking and the trauma, so the client can seek support from us at the community level. We also have many survivors come to our church to pray; it helps the reintegration to be successful."

Findings from this evaluation revealed faith-based communities are an important partner in the effort prevent and suppress CSEC in local communities, and helping church leaders to understand their roles and responsibilities to suppress CSEC within a framework of biblical justice was very meaningful to church leaders. At the same time, this evaluation found it is important that IJM clearly communicates their focus to faith-based communities to reduce confusion. IJM should also provide church leaders with a directory for reporting different types of suspected cases of rape/sexual assault, child abuse and neglect, domestic violence, sex trafficking, and CSEC, in particular. Such as directory would help to reduce confusion among church leaders as to who they should report different forms of violence against women and children.

3.13. IJM's Effectiveness at Program Implementation

Desk review of IJM internal documents and data revealed IJM has effective results-based monitoring mechanisms in place to measure expected outcomes and impact of activities. Since 2004, those monitoring mechanisms and case management database systems have been significantly enhanced and improved; however, being able to extract data that covers the full ten-year span of the Program was challenging at times given changes made to database management systems and inconsistencies in data collected overtime. Some of the data that was extracted is presented in charts throughout this report.

Among the 11 IJM staff interviewed, nine were asked their perceptions on IJM's effectiveness at implementing the Program. Table 10 reveals among the nine IJM staff respondents, 88.9% reported IJM has effective results-based monitoring mechanisms in place to measure expected outcomes and impact of activities. IJM staff recognized, *"We [IJM] have a good system, we always use data to design a program"* (5, IJM). IJM staff also reported each the office departments has protocols they need to follow, and they set goals and targets that they monitor on a monthly and annual basis for progress, such as the number of establishments closed and victim rescued, perpetrator accountability, and the number of convictions. IJM also holds weekly and monthly meetings of staff, as well as organizes staff retreats to ensure good team work and that progress is being made related to each of the planned activities and defined Program outputs and outcomes.

"We have protocols that we use . . . We use the protocols at every stage . . . How we monitor the results, after every proceeding we conduct a de-briefing and gather all the parties involved. What went well, what did not go well, after the trial we debrief; we debrief at various stages in the process. Every trial our team sits in the court and takes notes . . . Showing the change in the system is hard; we do the quarterly reports." (42, IJM)

"We have a monthly plan for our activities. We set what each department needs to do. Then each department reports the results weekly. We set our goals and outcomes clearly for Phase 3. We make a list of activities to be done. We then divide it all as monthly activities. We follow our time frame and monthly activities; therefore we can see the results clearly. We can measure it well." (40, IJM)

Table 10. IJM's Effectiveness at Implementing the Program		
	IJM Sample N=9	
IJM has effective results-based monitoring mechanisms in place to measure expected outcomes and impact of activities	8	88.9
	N=8	
IJM has faced challenges managing and implementing the Program	6	75.0
IJM faced challenges working with NGOs to ensure quality crisis care and aftercare services for CSEC survivors	6	75.0
Since 2004, IJM has been able to effectively adapt to the changing situation of CSEC in Cambodia	8	100.0
	N=7	
IJM has face challenges working with government agencies to combat CSEC in Cambodia	7	100.0

Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

Table 10 also reveals that among eight IJM respondents, all reported IJM has been able to effectively adapt to the changing situation of CSEC in Cambodia, yet 75.0% also recognized that IJM has faced challenges from time-to-time managing and implementing their Program. This includes challenges working with government agencies to suppress CSEC and challenges working with NGOs to ensure quality crisis care and aftercare services are provided to CSEC survivors. Sometimes IJM has faced challenges in communication with and among government agencies and NGOs (e.g. in terms of screening of CSEC survivors following raids and obtaining the necessary consent and referrals from MoSVY/DoSVY to place CSEC survivors in shelters). In later years of the Program, it was also a challenge for IJM when the government in cooperation with UNICEF focused on de-institutionalizing

children which contradicted with IJM's goal at times to ensure the best interest of the client to be protected and to achieve recovery, which can take several years.

"Some clients, estimate 50%, don't want the legal actions in the court and they don't want to participate in the legal process. There are many reasons – security, emotional, family-related – because if they pursue legal action on a civil matter they are killed and threatened by the perpetrators. Some of the cases, it is mom [the perpetrator]; that is a hard decision. Others are a personal issue; she doesn't want to talk about the abuse . . . The key how to address it is our team needs to encourage the girl, this is very important, these are her rights. We need to extend her basic rights as a human being . . . Our goal is we want a successful conviction and for that there needs to be a direct statement from the victim. If the girl leaves the shelter and lives in the community, her statement changes . . . this is our concern and it can undermine our judicial case . . . For the sake of justice and the best interest of the child they stay in the shelter for years. We have been advocating for the girls to be in the shelter and we have been assisting our partners, after receiving the counter action against shelters . . . The shelter needs to prove it is in the best interest of the child." (42, IJM)

IJM also faced challenges with UIA in sex trafficking cases, and despite advocating strongly for UIA for MoI IJM was unable to convince MoJ to provide MoI with UIA in sex trafficking cases. Despite facing various challenges, which are natural for any organization attempting to implement a Program in a foreign country, all IJM staff reported IJM has been able to effectively adapt to the changing situation of CSEC in Cambodia over the past 10 years.

"In Asia, if you are there long enough and build relationships and they recognize they can trust you, that makes a big difference. I think I have seen that grow where the government really trusts us [IJM] and values our opinion and what we bring to the fight."

This same respondent added, *"I think we are recognized as bringing the kind of intimate expert field work to try to inform how to change the policies. We want to do more than just be doing field work, how can we use the knowledge to influence policy from the field work"* (6, IJM).

This same respondent went on to explain the additional challenge IJM has faced over the years and continues to face in Cambodia is ensuring there is political will to continue to address CSEC, even after IJM's Program comes to an end.

"You still deal with a government that there is no transparency in their budget and potential resources they have, so the challenge of how can you fund needs without becoming an enabler and allowing them to depend on NGOs and outside sources. To really move the political will to do what we are doing is seen as a priority, a priority for the government to fund. Obviously the economy is developing. I think they are recognizing that they have to prioritize and that has been a challenge; that is the current challenge, getting the system to function at a minimum standard." (6, IJM)

3.14. Reduction in Prevalence of CSEC in Target Areas

Since 2004, IJM's Program's overall goal has been to contribute to the reduction of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville, and Siem Reap. In 1999, ILO estimated more than 15% of prostitutes in Cambodia were between 9 and 15 years of age.¹¹⁶ In 2000, Cambodia's Ministry of Planning estimated that 30% of persons in commercial sex in Phnom Penh were children.¹¹⁷ And in 2001, IOM reported approximately 3,000 women and girls from southern Vietnam were trafficked into Cambodia each year, with girls younger than 15 years of age constituting 15% of this number.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2001.

¹¹⁷ Planning, 2000.

¹¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, 2002.

In 2012, following eight years of implementing program activities, IJM conducted its first CSEC prevalence study. IJM collected data from 232 commercial sex establishments in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville, including karaoke clubs (KTVs), beer gardens, hostess bars, massage parlors, brothels, and brothels fronting as coffee shops. Based upon the sample IJM estimated the total prevalence of CSEC to be 8.16%. More specifically, the prevalence of CSEC of children age 15 years or younger was estimated to be .75%, and borderline young minors was estimated at 7.41% (see Table 11).¹¹⁹ Based upon available historic data, IJM concluded the prevalence of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville had decreased substantially between 2000 and 2012, with the most notable decreased observed among children age 15 years or younger.¹²⁰

In 2015, IJM conducted its second CSEC prevalence study. Again, IJM collected data in the three target areas – Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville – using the same methodology from their 2012 prevalence study. Data collectors surveyed 287 randomly selected commercial sex establishments in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Sihanoukville and estimated the total prevalence of CSEC to be 2.22%. More specifically, the prevalence of CSEC of children age 15 years or younger was estimated to be .10%, and borderline young minors was estimated at 2.12% (see Table 11). Based upon the findings from the two prevalence studies, IJM concluded that from 2012 to 2015, the overall prevalence of CSEC in commercial sex establishments across the three target areas declined by 73% (from 8.16% to 2.22%).

Table 11. IJM Prevalence Study Results by City and Year

City	Overall Prevalence		Children Prevalence (15 years or younger)		Borderline Young Minor Prevalence (16-17 years)	
	2012	2015	2012	2015	2012	2015
Phnom Penh	8.32%	2.86%	0.66%	0.09%	7.66%	2.76%
Siem Reap	9.21%	0.75%	1.18%	0.19%	8.03%	0.56%
Sihanoukville	3.72%	0.53%	0.22%	0.00%	3.49%	0.53%
Total	8.16%	2.22%	0.75%	0.10%	7.41%	2.12%

As part of this evaluation, key stakeholders were specifically asked whether they had seen a reduction in the prevalence of CSEC of children 15 years and younger, as well as minors 16 to 17 years of age in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and/or Sihanoukville. They were also asked what contribution IJM made to the reduction of CSEC in Cambodia. Table 12 reveals that among the 41 Government and NGO/IO/Other interviewed, 23 respondents were specifically asked about reductions in the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia. Among the 23 respondents, 73.9% reported that compared to 2004, they had seen a reduction in the prevalence of CSE of children age 15 years and younger in the three target areas. In addition, 64.9% of respondent reported they had seen a reduction in the prevalence of CSE of minors 16 to 17 years of age in the three target areas. Finally, 73.7% of respondents reported, compared to 2004, there are fewer establishments where CSEC occurs.

Table 12. Reduction in Prevalence of CSEC in Target Areas (Government and NGO/IO/Other ONLY)

	Sample N=23	
	n	%
Compared to 2004, have seen a reduction in the prevalence of CSE of children age 15 years and younger	17	73.9
	N=17	
Compared to 2004, have seen a reduction in the prevalence of CSE of minors age 16 to 17 years	11	64.7
	N=19	
Compared to 2004, there are fewer establishments where CSEC occurs	14	73.7

Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

¹¹⁹ Sampled establishments were randomly selected from a comprehensive list of 990 suspected CSEs in the three target cities.

¹²⁰ International Justice Mission (2013). Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia.

Interview data revealed all respondents that were in Cambodia in the early half of the 2000s recalled that CSEC was prevalent and occurring openly on the streets; thus, they recognized a reduction in the situation of CSEC in Cambodia over the past 10 years. At the same time that respondents recognized a reduction in CSEC, many were not fully convinced that there had been such a drastic reduction in CSEC over the past 10 years (particularly as maintained in IJM's prevalence studies) because as they maintained, the demand for CSEC is still present in Cambodia. Many respondents contend the situation of CSEC in Cambodia has simply changed: it has become more clandestine and it is not as open as it was in the past, so it is more difficult to measure. As one respondent explained, *"It is hard for me to say about this because sex trafficking has changed the pattern, before it was on the street, but now it is hard to monitor and observe . . . I cannot say it has increased or decreased, but the problem still exists"* (11, NGO/IO/Other). This same respondent went on to add,

"We discuss many times the prevalence studies . . . it is important to have a system for monitoring what we are doing, but there is a lot of debate about the results . . . from one side IJM is saying it is not there anymore and there is another organization in Svay Pak saying it is still there and it has gone underground . . . now it is more difficult to measure the prevalence. I'm a little less optimistic than IJM that the problem is going down." (11, NGO/IO/Other)

Another responded explained,

"Statistically, I see the decrease [of CSEC of 15 years or younger] based upon the number reported, but we don't know the number not reported. We are not too confident to say the crime is gone. There are still a big number we are not able to discover . . . but if we look at brothels we see almost no presence of minor girls. It just happens in a different way." (35, NGO/IO/Other)

Respondents were more likely to contend CSEC of minors 16 to 17 years of age is still prevalent in Cambodia and exists in massage parlors and KTVs. As one respondent explained,


"When I was first asked to take on this job, and the more we focused on the issue the more I got into it. I am finding these cases everywhere. We have done seven cases this year of kids in brothels; we have six brothels now with 15 to 17 year olds. They are definitely there . . . I am not convinced that it is down to less than 2%. There are so many cases." (4, NGO/IO/Other)

"Honestly that is not convincing to me [the reduction in 16 to 17 years of age] because we still see the higher number of border age girls among massage parlors and KTV. We get a lot of reports from the tourists and the public that say they are able to purchase sex with the young girls. Based upon our observations when we see them they are 15 to 17 years." (35, NGO/IO/Other)

These findings are not necessarily inconsistent with the findings of IJM's prevalence studies. In 2012, IJM's prevalence study identified 141 minors (age 17 years or younger) among a total of 1,911 individuals working in commercial sexual establishments and available for sex in the three target cities; whereas, in 2015, IJM's prevalence study identified 38 minors (age 17 or younger) among a total of 2,104 individuals (see Table 11). Commercial sexual establishments included in these studies were karaoke clubs (KTVs), massage parlors, hostess bars, beer gardens, and brothels. In 2012, the higher numbers of CSEC victims were identified in brothels and KTVs. It is important to note that while respondents in this evaluation maintain CSEC has gone underground in Cambodia, IJM's prevalence studies did not measure street-based or community-based CSEC, but rather focused on CSE in entertainment establishments.

Chart 9 reveals among 23 respondents, Government respondents were more likely to report a reduction in CSE of children 15 years of age (88.9%) and minors 16 to 17 years of age (83.3%) over the past 10 years, compared to NGO/IO/Other respondents (64.3% and 54.5% respectively). In addition, all Government respondents reported there has been a reduction in the number of establishments where children are commercially exploited for sex, compared to 61.5% of NGO/IO/Other respondents. Interview data revealed Government respondents were more likely to maintain that following the implementation of the *Law on Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation*, AHTJP *"did a lot of suppression operations, mainly around 2009 and 2010 . . . and achieved a lot, and 2012 you didn't see a lot of the establishments anymore"* (25, Government).

Chart 9. Reduction in Prevalence of CSEC in Target Areas by Type of Organization



Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

A few respondents reported CSEC of children age 15 years or younger has been significantly reduced or eliminated because people recognize it is *“taboo to sell anyone under 15 years of age”* (4, NGO/IO/Other). This same respondent went on to explain,


“Now they [traffickers] have gone more underground. It has improved and with the creation of the human trafficking police. So the police have professionalized and are much more ethical and honest ... that is the challenge with Cambodia, where they are doing well in Cambodia, police have upped the game in those areas. The relationship between the police using their game and economic development and you can see it in the police and economically.” (4, NGO/IO/Other)

Some NGO/IO/Other respondents also recognized that more effective investigations of CSEC by AHTJP have served as *“a deterrent and sends a message that you are committing a crime”* (11, NGO/IO/Other). Other respondents maintained the reduction in CSEC is due in part to the fact that Cambodians now understand that the CSEC is illegal, and that having sex with a girl under 15 years of age illegal. As one respondent explained,

“The other thing that has contributed to the reduction, the offender knows the law, before the offender did not know it was illegal . . . the parent might not know it either . . . not even the government knew what it was, many people don’t even know that you are not allowed to have sex with the girl under 15 years of age. Even the higher educated people do not know this. Only in the last two to three years, people started to know better.” (31, Government)

Chart 10 reveals among the 23 respondents, police (100.0%) were significantly more likely to report there has been a reduction in the prevalence of CSEC of children 15 years of age or younger in the last 10 years, compared to service providers (57.1%). Whereas, only 75.0% of police and 58.3% of service providers reported there had been a reduction in the prevalence of CSEC of minors 16 to 17 years in the last 10 years. At the same time, all police and 61.5% of service providers reported over the last 10 years there has been a reduction in the number of establishments where children are commercially exploited for sex.

Chart 10. Reduction in Prevalence of CSEC in Target Areas by Focus of Work



Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

On the one hand, data revealed respondents recognized that CSEC has been reduced in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Sihanoukville; while on the other hand, respondents were largely reluctant to agree that CSEC had been reduced to as little as 2.2%, in general, and to 0.10% of children 15 years of age or younger.

When asked about IJM's contribution to the reduction of CSEC in the three target areas, a large proportion of respondents recognized that IJM has played an important, but partial role reducing CSEC in Cambodia. Respondents recognized that IJM's work *"building the capacity of law enforcement, prosecutors and judges, and work with the anti-trafficking police on investigations, and then bringing the trafficker to the court were significant"* (13, NGO/IO/Other). Similarly, respondents recognized, IJM *"tried to advocate on behalf of those victims in the court; they tried to break the case so the incident of the minor under 15 years has gone down"* (3, NGO/IO/Other).

Respondents that work in the space of CSEC recognize IJM has been one of the lead NGOs working to suppress CSEC and *"driving the raids"* and as a result *"brothel owners changed the way they did their business."* This same respondent went on to explain, *"IJM has been the voice against CSEC since 2004, they have been the good international voice and they have been honest and they have integrity. There are a lot of NGOS that cut corners, but that is not IJM. They are a strong ethical NGO . . . IJM was very successful from 2003 to 2009 in terms of working with the police and getting rescues,"* however, their success was limited when *"the police tightened up on the law and said they had to work in the confines of the law . . . and they said IJM had to work within the criminal procedures, that was a checking point for IJM"* (4, NGO/IO/Other). At the same time, a government respondent reported, *"I am not saying it is anybody's achievement, the contribution is from MoJ and Mol, they pay attention to it [CSEC]"* (16, Government).

When asked about sustainability of the reduction of CSEC in Cambodia, many NGO/IO/Other respondents expressed concerns that CSEC can come back if the demand increases or if there are natural disasters that make vulnerable families and persons even more vulnerable. Some respondents also maintained, *"If NGOs stop working on it no, you will see an increase; if IJM is not there, if NGOs start dropping out, they will not manage to keep that [CSEC] under control"* (4, NGO/IO/Other). Similarly, another NGO/IO/Other respondent maintained, *"The police need to continue to make sure it doesn't re-emerge. If people take their eye of the ball it can reappear."* (37, NGO/IO/Other)

"I feel it can be sustained and it cannot be sustained. It can be sustained if the level of work can be continued, but if the commitment and work becomes complacent . . . With more foreigners coming and opening of the border [Asean Integration] it can increase; but, if we can maintain the commitment." (13, NGO/IO/Other)

3.15. IJM's Ability to Adapt to Changes in the Situation of CSEC in Cambodia

The desk review of IJM's internal documents and research demonstrates that IJM has been able to adapt to changes in the situation of CSEC in Cambodia over the past decade (2004-2014). Of course, the ability to adapt has not been without challenges as was revealed in findings presented in earlier sections. Challenges that IJM was unable to adapt to were that CSEC activities largely became more clandestine and MoJ issued court orders denying Mol the use of UIA in sex trafficking cases (see Section 3.7 for further explanation of the UIA). As one respondent explained, *"Because of the adoption of TIP laws, the brothels changed to be hidden, hidden behind coffee shops and so on. [Now] the sex services/procurement is done through phone contact, they just call, and the girl will be delivered at the hotel. IJM requested the government to amend TIP laws [to allow for undercover investigative authority, UIA] because IJM knows that the trick is changed by the perpetrators"* (7, IJM). From 2012 to 2014, IJM petitioned MoJ on 16 different occasions to request the right of AHTJP to use UIA to pursue sex trafficking cases in the three target areas; each request was denied by MoJ.

In addition, since 2012, IJM lobbied hard in partnership with counter-trafficking stakeholders, including AHTJP and Winrock International, to encourage MoJ to provide Mol with UIA. IJM also offered revisions to the Royal Cambodian Government's Proclamation (Prakas) on Undercover Law Enforcement in Counter-Trafficking Investigation, drafted *Procedural Guidelines on Undercover Law Enforcement for AHTJP*, and developed a practicum training for law enforcement and judicial officers entitled, *Undercover Investigative Authority*. Despite these lobbying and advocacy efforts, MoJ has continued to deny Mol the use of UIA in sex trafficking cases.


Some respondents maintained IJM has not been able to fully adapt to changes in the CSEC situation in Cambodia because IJM's ability to investigate CSEC was significantly reduced when the TIP law was passed and the courts ruled that Mol had no UIA in sex trafficking cases. One respondent explained, although *"IJM has tried to conduct the investigations, now they don't have the law or the authority to conduct the undercover investigations; this is the challenge they face"* (13, NGO/IO/Other). It is important to note that this perception is not aligned with the reality. Technically, IJM is legally able to conduct undercover investigations; however, the police do not have the law or authority for UIA, which results in any information gathered this way by IJM or other NGOs, and shared with the police to be ruled inadmissible by the courts. Technically speaking, the challenge IJM has faced is that the police do not have UIA; not that IJM is not legally able to conduct undercover investigations.

Despite the lack of UIA, AHTJP maintained IJM was able to adapt to changes in CSEC, largely because *"IJM has worked closely with police, so they can know about the new updated situation and find new ways to rescue victims, arrest the perpetrator, and close down the opened brothels. IJM has a network among various government stakeholders, they initiate joint discussion to discuss on how to work together to better solve the problem together."* (10, Government)

3.16. Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Finally, 28 out of 54 respondents were specifically asked if there are best practices that have been identified in IJM's Program in Cambodia. Chart 11 reveals among 28 respondents, 85.7% of all respondents reported there are best practices that have been identified in IJM's work in Cambodia. More specifically, 100.0% of government respondents, 85.7% of IJM staff, and 76.9% of NGO/IO/Other respondents reported there are best practices that have been identified in IJM's work in Cambodia.

Chart 11. Best Practices in IJM's work in Cambodia by Organization Type



Note: Percentages are based upon valid percent of respondents that answered the question.

In recognition that lessons learned can be either positive or negative, respondents were asked to identify either positive lessons learned (i.e., those that should be replicated in future programming) and/or lessons learned that were mistakes and should not be replicated in future programming. In this section those lessons learned and best practices are briefly presented (other best practices have been highlighted and presented in previous sections).

Among the best practices identified by respondents was that IJM was able to remain continuously focused over the ten-year period of 2004 to 2014 on CSEC, to the point that IJM was able to contribute to and demonstrate a significant reduction in the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia which IJM has documented in their prevalence studies of 2012 and 2015.

Another best practice has been IJM's efforts to build the capacities of the police to suppress CSEC, and to facilitate collaboration among government agencies to provide crisis care and quality aftercare to CSEC victims following police raids and rescue. As one respondent recognized, "IJM stays very close to the case by involving all the authorities, police and DoSVY, and keep authorities working on the case until it is completed; that is a very good practice" (3, NGO/IO/Other).

Other respondents recognized IJM's approach of ensuring CSEC survivors are identified and provided with protection and access to quality aftercare, as well as are monitored for recovery are other best practices. In addition, respondents recognized as a best practice that IJM provides CSEC survivors with legal advocacy and promotes child friendly police and court proceedings. As one respondent explained, "We have the legal consultation and psychological preparation, the other good point is about psychological preparation for the client before going to court – pre-trial, during trial, and post-trial preparation. I think IJM lawyers have done a good job in terms of the legal preparation of the children for the case" (14, IJM).

"The best practice is they [IJM] help the police in implementing, doing the investigation together. The other good thing is that if the case continues to the appeal courts, IJM has the lawyer to protect the case and the police continue to support. They continue through the whole case to the end . . . The other thing that is useful is to support the victim, so IJM is always there to coordinate with the victim." (15, Government)

Similarly, another respondent recognized, "IJM prepares the girl for the court case, thinking about the potential feelings and the questions the lawyer will ask. I do not see another NGO [that] does this" (22, NGO/IO/Other).

In terms of lessons learned, respondents largely identified lessons learned from missteps that IJM made over the years during program implementation. One of the lessons learned for IJM was that some government respondents sometimes felt IJM used their political leverage and authority too much, sometimes pushing AHTJP to act more quickly than AHTJP was ready to act. As one respondent explained,

"For the first phase the collaboration was only training. For the second phase we seem to have a little problem and the police, we sometimes feel like IJM has too much power, like the same power as the police. When they give us the report they want us to take action on it. When we get the report we need to consider whether the procedure IJM used was legal, we need time to consider the evidence, but at the same time IJM feels the police don't want to take action and they go to the top to push the case." (15, Government)

This same respondent went on to explain,

"IJM expects us to take action because they want us to see the results immediately, but if they go from the top it affects our work. They are going to write a report about us; we are worried it will end up in the TIP report. They might write something like the police in Cambodia is not willing take action in a particular case and that is why we have a problem with sex trafficking in Cambodia." (15, Government)

Some Government respondents maintained that IJM did not always understand the Cambodian context and sometimes pushed to have things done the way they wanted, and wanted to see the results of their activities too quickly. So, on the one hand, Government respondents greatly appreciated the capacity building and technical expertise/assistance provided by IJM; but on the other hand, felt IJM pushed the government too hard at times without consideration for the law or their role as civil servants. As one respondent explained,

"They are from another country. We have our own way to do things; we cannot do exactly what they can do. The point is that we have different ways to deal with things, we have our steps and our levels that IJM needs to understand and follow." (25, Government)

"I understand they really want to support the victim, but sometimes they should not push too hard against the law" (28, Government). Another respondent reported, "They wanted to put pressure on us, but I warned them and gave them feedback that we are government servants, we have our own rights and decision to be made. They can't order us to do what they want . . . IJM takes a foreign style to apply in the Cambodian context; they should have considered the context and our tradition" (10, Government).

Other respondents recognized that IJM has *"done excellent at building relationships, whether partnership with people on the ground like us or at the national level. That is something they have done really well. They have been an important bridge between people working on the ground (service providers) and they have good relationships with those in Mol and MoJ"* (27, NGO/IO/Other). At the same time, some NGO/IO/Other respondents were critical of IJM's approach of paying a daily allowance to the police for participating in trainings because other local NGOs do not have the budget to pay the police to participate in their trainings or to work with them on projects.¹²¹ As one respondent explained,

"We had a lot of case work in the first five years and then we saw the case work drop down. Then we had the prevalence study in 2012 and the research on the public justice system. So, it gave us information about the next step is to do." (5, IJM)

"Every time we work with the police they say that IJM pays us more and it creates an unfriendly environment that we have to challenge with the police every time, and we discuss with IJM every time; that was never settled . . . Too much money has to be invested by the NGO to work on those cases with the police. Every NGO has to follow the same practices that they have to give money to the police. IJM needs to be careful how much they pay." (35, NGO/IO/Other)

¹²¹ IJM maintained they do not pay a daily allowance to police to participate in trainings, but do pay the police a travel reimbursement (for bus/car travel) and a daily per diem for meals/hotel/taxi not provided by IJM.

A final lesson learned is that IJM should have established an MOU with MoJ. An MOU with both MoI and MoJ would have enabled IJM to more effectively and efficiently work with prosecutors and judges to address identified places in the public justice system where laws are not being enforced in CSEC cases, knowledge gaps and patterns of dysfunction, and gaps that exist in the legal frameworks to effectively address CSEC; each of which keeps the local public justice system from functioning and performing effectively in cases of CSEC. As one respondent explained,

“I think the next step is they should work with MoJ, they are doing a good job with the police already, now they should do the same thing with the courts and the prosecutors to provide procedural training to the courts and prosecutors. I believe IJM has enough resource to do so and I think it is a good opportunity to do so, so it would be consistent with the reforming strategy of the Ministry. There is top level mandate with the national strategy to do deep reforming. This should be the first step and the second step should be the UIA will come.”

This same respondent recognized,

“If they don’t come through MoJ they will find it a challenge to work with the courts. Don’t jump too high, small steps, don’t push. I notice that MoJ has started to soften their behavior a little bit . . . They even come to the point to consider the amendment of the TIP law to include the UIA. They should grab a chance and hold on tightly to MoJ.” (31, Government)

4. Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1. Conclusions

The findings from this summative evaluation resulted in eleven key conclusions, each of which are presented below. It is important to note that the key conclusions are grounded in the findings presented in Section 3, Evaluation Findings, and aligned with the evaluation objectives outlined in Section 2, Evaluation Approach.

In terms of *relevance*, there are four key conclusions, including:

1. IJM's Program to reduce the prevalence of CSEC in Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville and Siem Reap, and to improve outcome for victims in Cambodia was relevant at the time of the program's inception in 2004, and remained relevant over the ten years of program implementation (2004-2014). Moreover, IJM's *Justice System Transformation* approach, which combines collaborative casework and targeted justice system reform initiatives, has proven relevant and successful to contributing to a reduction in the prevalence of CSEC in Cambodia, and capacity building of public justice actors, including police and courts, to suppress CSEC through investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of CSEC cases.
2. IJM's Program has been able to adapt to the changing situation of CSEC in Cambodia, including changes in the operating environment and political landscape in which IJM was operating. Overtime, IJM was able to establish MOUs with MoI and MoSVY, and a few NGO aftercare service providers, which enabled them to contribute to a reduction in the prevalence of CSEC, and to build the capacities of public justice actors. It was also evidenced in the modifications of program objectives, outputs, and activities from 2004-2007 to the logframes of 2008-2011 and 2012-2014 that IJM was able to effectively adapt to the changing situation of CSEC, and the changing operating environment and political landscape in Cambodia. In addition, over time, IJM's Program activities and outputs remained consistent with the intended objectives, outcomes and impacts as defined in the logframes and workplans.
3. IJM's Program has been appropriately and clearly aligned with relevant national plans and strategies of Cambodia for countering trafficking in persons, including the NPA's to Suppress Human Trafficking for 2011-2013 and 2015. In particular, IJM's focus on building the capacities of government agencies to be able to identify victims of sex trafficking, provide victims with protection and support services, and to improve prosecutions in sex trafficking cases has been aligned with national plans and strategies. In addition, IJM through their working relationships with AHTJP and the National Committee was able to have an influence on the NPA for 2015; in particular, IJM was able to ensure that the UIA was included in the NPA for 2015.
4. IJM has been among the leading NGOs working to combat CSEC in Cambodia; although not the only NGO working in this space. IJM has worked alongside other local and international NGOs, and IOs and IGOs working on issues of sex trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation. IJM's Program has been significant over the past decade because it has contributed to the development and implementation of appropriate national and stakeholder plans and strategies, which are directly aligned with the NPA to Suppress Human Trafficking.

In terms of *effectiveness* and *impact*, there are eleven key conclusions, including:

1. IJM has played an important, but partial role reducing CSEC in Cambodia. Respondents that work in the space of CSEC recognize IJM has been one of the lead NGOs working to suppress CSEC.
2. IJM's Program made progress toward and achieved some of its intended outputs, outcomes, and impacts. Over the past decade (2004-2014), IJM conducted a wide range of trainings for police and governmental and nongovernmental aftercare service providers, and coupled these trainings with technical expertise/assistance in order to build the capacities of police, particularly the AHTJP, to aggressively pursue reported cases of CSEC, and of aftercare service providers to provide crisis care and quality aftercare

services. This evaluation found IJM's activities directly contributed to an increase in the number of raids on and closures of open brothels where CSEC was occurring, identification and rescue of CSEC victims, and identification, prosecution, and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC. IJM's capacity building activities also contributed to improved crisis care for CSEC victims in police stations by DoSVY and AHTJP, and the referral of CSEC victims to quality aftercare services, reducing the risk of CSEC victims being re-trafficked and re-victimized. IJM's activities to build the capacities of police and aftercare service providers to suppress CSEC and to rescue and support CSEC victims with their recovery and reintegration has contributed, in part, to the reduction of the prevalence of CSEC in the three target areas as documented in prevalence studies conducted by IJM in 2012 and 2015.

3. Another important component of IJM's Program has been to ensure the evidentiary materials gathered through investigations and joint activities with police are used to prosecute perpetrators of CSEC. To accomplish this objective, IJM has focused their activities on providing professional legal representation to CSEC survivors, preparing CSEC survivors for court, and advocating for child friendly courts in CSEC cases. In addition, IJM has conducted case management of legal cases and monitoring of the criminal proceedings of CSEC cases, from the point at which the case enters the court system to the prosecutors handling of the investigation, including the judicial investigation, and throughout the trial and appeals processes. IJM's legal case management and monitoring practices are designed to ensure legal cases are handled properly at every stage, proper child friendly criminal court procedures are followed, and that perpetrators of CSEC are prosecuted and convicted.
4. IJM established minimum standards of care for CSEC survivors and structured aftercare treatment plans and case management protocols, forms, checklists. IJM also established their own protocols and assessment forms for assessing successful outcomes for CSEC survivors, including recovery, reintegration, and restoration. They also designed case management software that allows them to track and monitor all of their cases, including rescues, victim identification, intakes, referrals, legal proceedings, and victim outcomes.
5. IJM's Program has also focused on improving outcomes for CSEC survivors. This was accomplished by establishing effective case management practices to confirm that rescued CSEC victims are provided with protection and aftercare services to reduce their risks of re-victimization and increase their opportunities for effective rehabilitation and recovery. IJM's case management approach involves collaboration with NGO shelter and aftercare service providers to ensure victims' needs are properly assessed and addressed at each of the various stages of protection and care, and progress is being made to support the recovery and rehabilitation of CSEC survivors. IJM has also established standards for determining when CSEC victims have been rehabilitated and recovered, and are ready for reintegration. At the stage of reintegration, IJM's aftercare case workers continue case management and follow-up directly with the survivors to monitor their progress and provides continued psycho-social support and other forms of needed support (e.g. sometimes temporary financial support) and access to services (e.g. assistance with accessing vocational skills training and employment services).
6. Some respondents recognized that it is not just AHTJP's collaboration with IJM that has led to the police being more effective at suppressing CSEC; but over the past decade, IJM has helped to improve AHTJP's collaboration with other public justice agencies, particularly prosecutors and judiciary, to improve prosecution of perpetrators of CSEC. In other words, IJM's efforts to strengthen both AHTJP and ATHJP's collaboration with other public justice agencies has contributed to increased prosecution of CSEC cases and a reduction in CSEC.
7. IJM's capacity building activities and monitoring of the public justice system's handling of CSEC cases has contributed to increased confidence in the public justice system's ability to properly investigate and prosecute CSEC cases. IJM's monitoring of the courts' handling of CSEC cases has contributed to improvements in the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators of CSEC. Improvements to the public justice system's handling of CSEC cases most likely contributed to the reduction in the prevalence of CSEC in the three target areas. Despite increased confidence in the public justice system, respondents recognize

there is still room for improving the abilities of the public justice system actors—including the AHTJP and courts—handling of CSEC cases.

8. IJM has also made important contributions to increasing confidence in the performance of DoSVY to provide crisis care and to refer CSEC victims to quality aftercare. In addition, IJM has helped to improve the coordinated aftercare network, particularly among their partners, and provision of quality aftercare services to CSEC survivors.
9. Although mobilizing community groups, particularly faith-based communities, for prevention of CSEC was not one of IJM's primary outcomes or outputs, it was an objective since 2004. IJM was focused on strengthening partnerships and networking with churches in IJM's three target areas to raise their awareness of CSEC in Cambodia and to mobilize church leaders to engage them in prevention of CSEC, including reporting suspected cases of CSEC in their communities. To accomplish this, IJM provided churches with various trainings and materials to disseminate information in their churches specifically related to CSEC, and more generally to concepts of biblical justice and social injustices. This evaluation found faith-based communities are an important partner in the effort prevent and suppress CSEC in local communities, and helping church leaders to understand their roles and responsibilities to suppress CSEC within a framework of biblical justice was very meaningful to church leaders.
10. Challenges or barriers that IJM faced when it came to program implementation included:
 - a. Working with the courts, including prosecutors and judges. IJM never established an MOU with MoJ. It would have been a significant benefit to IJM's Justice System Transformation approach to have established an MOU with both MoI and MoJ; that is, resources permitting. Nevertheless, even without an MOU with MoJ, the findings from this evaluation reveal that IJM has managed to bring AHTJP police officials together with prosecutors through joint coordination meetings, trainings, and workshops.
 - b. Efforts of IJM to coordinate AHTJP and MoSVY/DoSVY to ensure proper protection and referral of CSEC survivors to quality aftercare services was not always easy and required a great deal of lobbying and advocacy on the part of IJM with the government. There has also been little trust between NGOs and the government. IJM engaged the government in the long, slow process of change and capacity building, which also included improving communication and cooperation between the governmental agencies, such as AHTJP and MoSVY/DoSVY, as well as with NGOs to ensure protection and quality aftercare for trafficking and sexual exploitation victims.
 - c. IJM was unable to adapt to the fact that CSEC activities largely became more clandestine and MoJ issued court orders denying MoI the use of UIA in sex trafficking cases. Some respondents maintained IJM has not been able to fully adapt to changes in the CSEC situation in Cambodia because their ability to investigate CSEC was significantly reduced when the TIP law was passed and the courts ruled that MoI had no UIA in sex trafficking cases.
11. IJM has effective results-based monitoring mechanisms in place to measure expected outcomes and impact of activities. Since 2004, those monitoring mechanisms and case management database systems have been significantly enhanced and improved; however, being able to extract data that covers the full ten-year span of the Program was challenging at times given changes made to database management systems and inconsistencies in data collected over time.

In terms of *sustainability*, there are four key conclusions, including:

1. Public justice system actors targeted by IJM's Program (in particular AHTJP, but also public prosecutors) have increased capacity to perform their relevant roles in regard to the suppression of CSEC in Cambodia, particularly in the three target areas. While AHTJP respondents maintained they will continue with their anti-trafficking initiatives, they also recognized they will face challenges sustaining initiatives that were previously supported by IJM in the MOU with MoI. The challenge for AHTJP is largely a shortage of material and financial support for operations. Also, some respondents recognized that AHTJP is also reliant upon IJM for identifying cases of CSEC in the community and sharing this information to AHTJP for enforcement.

2. IJM provided MoSVY and DoSVY with the financial support needed to support crisis care in police stations and aftercare for CSEC victims. Respondents expressed concern that the government simply does not have the resources or manpower needed to ensure that CSEC victims are always provided with quality crisis care at police stations and aftercare services.
3. MoSVY and DoSVY's ability to provide trafficking and sexual exploitation victims with quality aftercare services will also be limited in the future by the fact that many NGO-operated shelters and quality aftercare services are closing given the fact that there are fewer reported cases of CSEC and fewer CSEC victims being referred to shelter and aftercare services. In fact, one of the challenges going forward in terms of sustaining quality aftercare for CSEC survivors is that as the prevalence CSEC has been reduced, donor funding for nongovernmental shelters and aftercare providers has been reduced. Thus, sustainability of quality aftercare service for CSEC survivors is unknown and will likely be much more limited in the future.
4. Many NGO/IO/Other respondents expressed concerns that CSEC can come back if the demand increases or attention and focus is taken off CSEC by public justice actors. Respondents maintained CSEC could also increase in the future if there are natural disasters that make vulnerable families and persons even more vulnerable, or the AEC places the most vulnerable at risk of sex trafficking and exploitation.

4.2. Recommendations

The recommendations that follow are guided by some of the findings and key conclusions from this evaluation.

Recommendation 1: IJM should develop MOUs with both MoI and MoJ if the goal is to promote a Transformative Justice System Reform Model

Findings from this evaluation revealed IJM cannot efficiently and effectively reform public justice systems as a whole if they do not have MOUs with both MoI (the police) and MoJ (prosecutors and judiciary). In Cambodia, challenges or limitations that IJM faced when it came to working with prosecutors and judges were due to the fact that IJM did not establish an MOU with MoJ. It would have been a significant benefit to IJM's public justice transformation approach to have established MOUs with both MoI and MoJ in Cambodia; resources permitting.

In IJM's future public justice system transformation programs, IJM should pursue establishing MOUs with both MoI and MoJ to more efficiently and effectively address identified places in public justice systems where laws are not being enforced in CSEC cases, and knowledge gaps and patterns of dysfunction exist in the legal frameworks to effectively address CSEC; each of which keeps public justice systems from functioning and performing effectively in CSEC cases.

Recommendation 2: IJM should take steps to integrate their future police training programs into the nation's national police academy

In Cambodia, given the quality of trainings developed by IJM, IJM should have taken the steps needed to integrate or mainstream their police trainings into the Royal Cambodian Police Academy. This would have helped to ensure capacity building of all police with IJM's curriculum, and sustainability of IJM's Program activities (curriculum and approach) to suppress sex trafficking and exploitation, particularly CSEC. Given this lesson learned, it is important to IJM's future programs that IJM take steps to integrate future police training programs into the nation's national police academy. This will help to ensure sustainability of IJM's Program activities, but also continued capacity building of police recruits and officials at no cost to IJM, and even long after IJM's Program's come to an end.

Recommendation 3: IJM should develop and deliver additional knowledge and capacity building trainings to identify emerging strategies of recruitment, deceit, and exploitation used by traffickers/exploiter

There is more capacity building and technical expertise/assistance that IJM could provide to the police. For instance, some AHTJP respondents thought IJM needs to strengthen the knowledge and capacities of police to identify new and emerging strategies being used by traffickers to recruit victims, and new trends and patterns in human trafficking and exploitation. This includes new trends and patterns in human trafficking, including sex trafficking of young girls (minors), that was predicted by respondents to increase with the AEC.

Recommendation 4: IJM needs to more clearly communicate their focus to the faith-based community to reduce confusion and provide faith-based communities with a clear directory for reporting different types of offenses

Faith-based community should be used mainly for awareness-raising and prevention. It is important that IJM clearly communicates their focus to faith-based communities to reduce confusion. IJM should also provide church leaders with a directory for reporting different types of suspected cases of rape/sexual assault, child abuse and neglect, domestic violence, sex trafficking, and CSEC, in particular. Such a directory would help to reduce confusion among church leaders as to who they should report different forms of violence against women and children.

Recommendation 5: IJM should be more sensitive to the local context and protocol when encouraging reform of the public justice system

One of the lessons learned for IJM was that some government respondents sometimes felt IJM used their political leverage and authority too much, sometimes pushing AHTJP to act more quickly than AHTJP was ready to act. Also, some Government respondents felt that IJM did not always understand the Cambodian context and sometimes pushed to have things done the way they wanted, and wanted to see the results of their activities too quickly. So, on the one hand, Government respondents greatly appreciated the capacity building and technical expertise/assistance provided by IJM; but on the other hand, felt IJM pushed the government too hard at times without consideration for the law or the role as civil servants.

ANNEX A

INTERVIEW INTRODUCTION

My name is Dr. Robin Haarr and this is Sophea Seng. We are working together to conduct an external evaluation for IJM of their Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia. The evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations will be shared with IJM leadership to measure program effectiveness and inform decisions regarding planning, design, and management of future programs. Additionally, evaluation results will be shared with stakeholders in the Cambodian government, foreign governments, and partner organizations to share lessons learned and inform decisions regarding future planning, design, and management of programs to address sex trafficking of children in Cambodia.

We are particularly focused on IJM's approach, results achieved, lessons learned, and challenges encountered during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014. We do not work for IJM; we have been contracted as external consultants only to conduct this evaluation. As part of the external evaluation we will interview key stakeholders and beneficiaries to the program, including those in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville. In addition, we will interview representatives from IJM.

I anticipate the interview will take approximately 1 to 1.5 hours. The purpose of the interview is to gather information from you about your agency/organization's collaboration with IJM to combat child sex trafficking and/or to ensure child survivors are provided with local aftercare. The questions I am asking are particularly related to IJM's approach, results achieved, lessons learned, and challenges encountered during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014. I have attempted to tailor the questions to be particularly relevant to the work of your organization/agency; however, there may be some questions that you are unable to answer, in which case we can simply skip those questions.

Everyone we interview is guaranteed confidentiality. Not even IJM will know who says what to us. To ensure confidentiality no names will not be recorded in the interview notes; instead, everyone will be assigned an ID number and that number will be recorded in the interview notes. In addition, each agency/organization will also be assigned an organization number to ensure the identity of the agency/organization is protected. Also, at no point will this interview be audio-recorded; I would just like to take notes on my laptop.

In the final report, quotes will be used but will be anonymous; no specific statements or comments will be attributed to a particular person or agency/organization in the final report. Only ID numbers assigned to respondents will be included, location (i.e., Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville), and generic categorizations identifying the type of agency (i.e., Government, NGOs/Agencies/Other, and IJM) will be included in the final report.

Your participation in this interview is voluntary, so if you choose not be interviewed or to end the interview at any time, there will be no penalty to you.

Later, if you have questions about this evaluation, you can contact IJM at 023-991-420. We will give you a copy of this consent form to take with you.

Printed Name

Signature

Date

ANNEX B

MASTER LIST OF QUESTIONS INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

ID Number:
Agency Number:
Type of Agency:
Position:
Location:
Date:

Familiarity with IJM's Program and Goal (All Interviewees)	
1	What are your organization/agency's priorities related to combatting commercial sexual exploitation of children in Cambodia or working with child survivors of sex trafficking?
2	Are you familiar with IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9)
3	Do you collaborate, or have you collaborated in the past, with IJM on their Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia, either in the past or more recently? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, in what way do you collaborate, or have you collaborated, with IJM?
4	When did your organization/agency start collaborating with IJM on their Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia? When did you personally start collaborating with IJM in your current or prior role?
5	When you started your collaboration or work with IJM, did you understand their goal? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) If yes, what is IJM's goal?
5.1	If no, explain the goal and ask if they were aware that this was IJM's goal? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2)
5.2	If yes to Q4, do you think IJM has remained focused on this goal over the years? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If no, what has been the issue?
5.3	If yes, do you think IJM has made progress toward its goal or has achieved its goal? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? If no, what has been the issue?

6	Did you feel IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children has been relevant and able to adapt to changes in the situation of child sex trafficking since 2004 (or since you first started working with IJM)? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, what has IJM done well? Have you seen any successes? If no, what was/has been the problem with IJM's work and their focus?
<u>Collaboration and Roles and Responsibilities to IJM's Program (All Interviewees)</u>	
7	You said that your work with IJM has included . . . , can I ask more specifically what are your organization/agency's roles and responsibilities to IJM's Program?
7.1.	Have those roles and responsibilities remained the same or changed over the years of working with IJM? ☐ Remained the same (1) ☐ Changed (2) If they have changed, how have they changed?
8	At any time from 2004 to 2014, did IJM provide you and others in your agency/organization with training or technical support to accomplish or enhance your roles and responsibilities? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you tell me what type of training or technical support you have received from IJM, and the benefits of those trainings?
9	What knowledge, skills or capabilities do you and others in your organization/agency have now as a result of the training or technical support provided to you by IJM? How has this translated into the work you do?
<u>Working Relationships with IJM (All Interviewees)</u>	
10	How would you describe your working relationship with IJM?
11	Has there been clear communication with IJM? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If no, what have been the communication challenges/problems with IJM?
<u>Public Justice System Program Outcomes (All Interviewees)</u>	
12	From your perspective, since 2004, do you think the AHTJP Police have gotten better at identifying and rescuing victims of commercial sexual exploitation of children? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? What has IJM contributed to these improvements? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time?

	If no, what have been the barriers to improving the AHTJP Police's ability to identify and rescue child sex trafficking victims?
13	From your perspective, since 2004, do you think the AHTJP Police have gotten better at arresting perpetrators of commercial sexual exploitation of children? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? What has IJM contributed to these improvements? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? If no, what have been the barriers to improving the AHTJP Police's ability to arrest perpetrators of child sex trafficking?
14	From your perspective, since 2004, do you think the AHTJP Police have gotten better at investigating cases of the commercial sexual exploitation of children? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? What has IJM contributed to these improvements? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? If no, what have been the barriers to improving the AHTJP Police's ability to investigate cases of child sex trafficking?
15	From your perspective, since 2004, do you think the AHTJP Police have gotten better at treating child victims of sex trafficking appropriately? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? What has IJM contributed to these improvements? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? If no, what have been the barriers to improving the AHTJP's ability to treat child victims of sex trafficking appropriately?
16	Since 2004, have you seen improvement to the courts handling of cases of commercial sexual exploitation of children? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? What has IJM contributed to these improvements??

	Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? If no, what have been the barriers to improving the courts handling of child sex trafficking cases??
17	Since 2004, do you think IJM has helped to improve the charges brought against perpetrators of child sex trafficking? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain?
18	Since 2004, have you seen an increase in the prosecution and convictions of perpetrators of commercial sexual exploitation of children? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? If yes, what has IJM contributed to these improvements to the prosecution and convictions of perpetrators of child sex trafficking?? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? If no, what have been the barriers to improving the prosecution and conviction of child sex trafficking cases??
19	Since 2004, has your confidence in AHTJP Police ability to adequately and appropriately respond to commercial sexual exploitation of children in Cambodia increased? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, why has your confidence increased in the AHTJP Police to respond to commercial sexual exploitation in Cambodia? If no, why do you lack confidence in the AHTJP Police? What are the problems?
20	Since 2004, has your confidence in the ability of prosecutors and courts to adequately and appropriately respond to commercial sexual exploitation of children in Cambodia increased? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, why has your confidence increased in the prosecutors and courts to respond to commercial sexual exploitation in Cambodia? If no, why do you lack confidence in the prosecutors and/or courts? What are the problems?
21	Compared to 2004, do you think there is increased public demand or expectations for the police and courts to respond to commercial sexual exploitation of children in Cambodia? ☐ Yes (1)

	☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (3)
Aftercare Program Outcomes (All Interviewees)	
22	Since 2004, has your confidence increased in the ability of DoSVY to provide crisis intervention care and to refer child sex trafficking to quality local aftercare? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, why has your confidence increased in the ability of DoSVY in this area? If yes or no, do you think IJM has contributed to the improvements in the quality of crisis intervention care and referrals that DoSVY provides to child sex trafficking victims/survivors? If yes, do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? If no, why do you lack confidence in DoSVY? What are the problems?
23	Since 2004, have you also seen improvement in the capacity of the coordinated aftercare network to provide high-quality aftercare services to victims/survivors engaged in the criminal justice system? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? What do you think IJM has contributed to these improvements? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time?
24	Since 2004, have you seen improvements to the quality of local aftercare to provide individualized and comprehensive aftercare services for child sex trafficking victims/survivors engaged in the criminal justice system? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? What do you think IJM has contributed to the improvements in the quality of local aftercare? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? If no, what have been the barriers to providing quality local aftercare to child sex trafficking victims/survivors engaged in the criminal justice system?
Program Goal (All Interviewees)	
25	Since 2004, have you seen a reduction in the prevalence of commercial sexual exploitation of children age 15 years or younger in Phnom Penh/Siem Reap/Sihanoukville? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9)

	If yes, how has IJM has contributed to the reduction of commercial sexual exploitation of children age 15 years or younger? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? If no, what have been the barriers to reducing the prevalence of child sex trafficking? Do you have any data to confirm a reduction or lack of reduction in commercial sexual exploitation of children age 15 years or younger in Phnom Penh/Siem Reap/Sihanoukville?
26	Since 2004, have you also seen a reduction in the prevalence of commercial sexual exploitation of minor's age 16-17 years in Phnom Penh/Siem Reap/Sihanoukville? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, how has IJM has contributed to the reduction of commercial sexual exploitation of minor's age 16-17 years? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? If no, what have been the barriers to reducing the prevalence of child sex trafficking? Do you have any data to confirm a reduction or lack of reduction in the commercial sexual exploitation of minor's age 16-17 years in Phnom Penh/Siem Reap/Sihanoukville?
27	Compared to 2004, are there fewer entertainment establishments in Phnom Penh/Siem Reap/Sihanoukville where children are exploited for commercial sex? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, has IJM contributed to the closure and reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children are exploited for commercial sex? Do you think these improvements will be sustained over time? In no, what have been the challenges to closing and reducing the number of entertainment establishments where children are exploited for commercial sex? Do you have any data to confirm a reduction or lack of reduction in the number of entertainment establishments where children are exploited for commercial sex in Phnom Penh/Siem Reap/Sihanoukville?
Program Management (IJM Staff)	
28	When did you start working for IJM? And, in Cambodia?
29	From your perspective, how well has IJM managed and implemented the Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia?
30	What has IJM done well when it comes to managing and implementing the Program?
31	Has IJM faced any challenges or problems in terms of managing and implementing the Program? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2)

	☐ Don't know (9) If yes, what have those challenges or problems been? What steps have been taken address these challenges or problems?
32	Do you think IJM has effective results-based monitoring mechanisms in place to measure expected outcomes and impact of activities? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If no, what have been the challenges of measuring outcomes and impact of activities?
33	Has IJM faced any challenges working with government agencies to combat sex trafficking of children in Cambodia? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, what challenges has IJM faced when it comes to working with government agencies? What steps have been taken to address these challenges or problems?
34	Has IJM faced any challenges working with NGOs to ensure quality crisis intervention care and aftercare services for survivors of child sex trafficking? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, what sort of challenges has IJM faced when it comes to working with NGOs?
35	Since 2004, do you IJM have been able to effectively adapt to the change situation of commercial sexual exploitation of children? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? If no, why wasn't IJM able to effectively adapt to the changing situation of commercial sexual exploitation of children? What were the issues?
36	Since 2004 or since you joined the Project, do you feel IJM has been able to effectively adapt to changes in the methodology and priorities of the government and NGOs to address commercial sexual exploitation of children and provide them with after care? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? If no, why wasn't IJM able to effectively adapt over time? What were the issues?
37	What positive and/or negative, primary and/or secondary long-term economic, environmental, and social change(s) were produced or likely to be produced by IJM's Program? What these outcomes directly or indirectly related to IJM's Program? Where these outcomes intended or unintended?

Cambodian National Police Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Police Unit (Only Public Justice Government Entities and Other Agencies Working in this Area)	
38	Since 2004, IJM has provided trainings to AHTJP Police. Are you aware of these trainings to the AHTJP Police? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2)
39	What impact has IJM's trainings had on the AHTJP Police's abilities to identify and rescue children who are victims of commercial sexual exploitation, and to treat victims appropriately?
40	What impact has IJM's trainings had on the AHTJP Police's abilities to investigate and arrest perpetrators of commercial sexual exploitation of children?
40.1	Has IJM helped to improve evidentiary materials gathered during investigations? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain? If no, what have been the barriers?
42	What impact has IJM's trainings had on the AHTJP Police's abilities to support successful prosecution of perpetrators of child sex trafficking?
43	What impact has IJM's trainings had on the AHTJP Police's abilities to conduct victim and witness interviews and to use child friendly practices when conducting such interviews?
44	Besides trainings, are you aware of IJM staff providing AHTJP with technical expertise/support on actual case work? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, what impact has IJM's technical expertise/support had on AHTJP's ability to identify and rescue victims?
45	What impact has IJM's technical expertise/support had on AHTJP's ability to investigate, arrest perpetrators, and conduct child friendly interviewing in sex trafficking case work?
46	Has IJM been able to help the AHTJP Police close down establishments where commercial sexual exploitation occurs? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, what approach has worked? If no, why not, what have been the challenges or barriers?
47	Has the AHTJP Police faced any challenges working with IJM? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, what have those challenges been? What steps were taken to overcome the challenges?

48	In recent years, IJM has provided support to the AHTJP Police and the judicial system for AHTJP police to regain undercover investigative authority (UIA) so that they can track, investigate, and collect objective evidence in sex trafficking cases. How effective have IJM's collaborative advocacy efforts and technical support to the government been?
49	Do you think improvements made to the AHTJP Polices response to commercial sexual exploitation of children can be sustained over time? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If no, what will be the challenges to sustaining such improvements?
Judicial System Responses (Only Prosecutors and Judges/Magistrates and Other Agencies Working in this Area)	
50	Do you know about IJM's collaborative casework program to improve and increase convictions of perpetrators in criminal cases and representing victims in civil trials? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) Has the collaborative casework resulted in changes in how prosecutors convict perpetrators of child sex trafficking? Do you think these changes will be sustained in the future?
51	Since 2004, have gaps been identified in the judicial system and its ability to prosecute and convict perpetrators of child sex trafficking? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, what gaps have been identified?
51.1	Has IJM helped to identify those gaps? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know What has been done to fix those gaps in the judicial system? Has IJM helped to fix those gaps? Where has IJM helped to make the judicial system more effective? Are there gaps in the justice system that can threaten the sustainability of changes made?
52	Are there any types of child sex trafficking cases that the judicial system is still not able to effectively or successfully prosecute? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, can you explain?
53	IJM has been involved in reviewing the police and judiciary's efforts to enforce the TIPSE law over the past decade (publically resulted in their 2012 research publication), and

	supporting efforts to educate police on the TIPSE Law - what have been the benefits of their efforts?
<u>(All Interviewees)</u>	
54	Do you think that improvements made to prosecutors and courts handling of child sex trafficking cases can be sustained over time? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If no, what will be the challenges to sustaining such improvements?
<u>Aftercare (Only Aftercare and Service Providers and Other Agencies Working in this Area)</u>	
55	Are child sex trafficking victims provided with crisis care (physical protection, emotional stabilization, basic needs provided, rights/laws education) at police stations? ☐ Yes (1) ☐ No (2) ☐ Don't know (9) If yes, how has IJM helped to ensure or improve the quality of crisis care for sex trafficking victims at the police stations since 2004? If no, what have been barriers to providing crisis care to victims at police stations?
56	Does DoSVY refer child sex trafficking victims to high quality local aftercare after police operations? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, how has IJM helped to ensure that DoSVY refer child sex trafficking victims to high quality local aftercare? If no, what have been the challenges of getting DoSVY to send child sex trafficking victims to high quality local aftercare?
57	Since 2004, have you seen improvements in the DoSVY's ability to provide crisis intervention and refer victims to effective aftercare placements for child sex trafficking victims? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, how has IJM help to improve DoSVY's ability to provide crisis intervention and refer victims to effective aftercare placements for child sex trafficking victims? If no, what have been the barriers to getting DoSVY to coordinate effective aftercare placements for child sex trafficking victims?
58	Do you think that improvements made to DoSVY's ability to provide crisis intervention and refer victims to effective aftercare placements can be sustained into the future? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If no, what will be the challenge to sustaining these improvements?
59	Since 2004, what has been IJM's contribution to developing a coordinated aftercare system in Cambodia

60	Are there standards for determining when a sex trafficking victim has been rehabilitated and reached restoration and reintegration? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, what are those standards or requirements? Does your program have these standards or requirements in place? How has IJM helped to contributed to such standards or requirements?
61	Since 2004, have you seen improvements in victim outcomes? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, how have victim outcomes improved? How has IJM helped to improve victim outcomes? If no, can you explain?
62	Since 2004, have you seen a reduction in the number of child sex trafficking victims that have been re-trafficked after police rescue (meaning, are fewer child victims rescued in police operations being re-trafficked today, then in 2004)? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, can you explain? If no, what have been the barriers to reducing child sex trafficking victims risk of being re-trafficked?
63	Do you know what steps does IJM take to track survivors to ensure they receive quality after care and achieve restoration and reintegration? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, can you tell me what you know about how IJM tracks survivors?
Work with the Faith-Based Communities (Only Faith-Based Communities)	
64	In recent years, IJM has been working with local faith-based communities to mobilize church leaders and their congregations to build a deeper theology of justice and to prevent commercial sexual exploitation of children. Are you aware of IJM's work with the faith-based community? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, what have been the benefits of IJM's work with faith-based communities? What has been the impact of this work?
65	In what way do the faith-based communities carry out prevention efforts related to commercial sexual exploitation of children?

66	In what way do faith-based communities provide direct assistance to victims of commercial sexual exploitation of children? How has IJM impacted these efforts?
67	What are the benefits of IJM's collaboration with the faith-based communities?
68	Why do you think faith-based communities are important partners when it comes to combatting commercial sexual exploitation of children?
Alignment with National Plans and Strategies (All Interviewees)	
69	If you are aware of the national plans of action and strategies do you feel IJM's Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia has been aligned with the relevant national plans of action and strategies for countering trafficking in persons? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, how IJM's Program aligned with relevant national action plans and strategies? If no, in what ways are they not aligned?
70	Do you feel that IJM's Program has contributed to the development and implementation of national action plans and stakeholder plans and strategies to ensure quality local aftercare to survivors of sex trafficking? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know
Lessons Learned (All Interviewees)	
71	Finally, do you think there are best practices that have been identified in IJM's work here in Cambodia? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know If yes, can you tell me what are those best practices?
72	What lessons learned or best practices, if any, have already been adopted or replicated by other organizations?
73	I know I have asked you a lot of questions, but is there anything else you want to share with me about IJM's program that I did not ask? Or anything else you want to share with me about the performance of the police, courts, or aftercare systems? Or about the prevalence of CSEC?
74	Do you have any questions of us/me before we finish the interview?
75	Is there anyone else you recommend we should interview?

ANNEX C

INTERVIEW WITH BENEFICIARIES

My name is Dr. Robin Haarr and this is Sophea Seng. We are working together to conduct an external evaluation for IJM of their Program to Combat Sex Trafficking of Children in Cambodia. We are particularly focused on IJM's approach, results achieved, lessons learned, and challenges encountered during the implementation period from 2004 to 2014. We do not work for IJM; we have been contracted as external consultant only to conduct this evaluation. As part of the external evaluation we will be interviewing key stakeholders and beneficiaries to the program, including those in Phnom Penh, Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville. In addition, we will be interviewing representatives from IJM.

I anticipate the interview will take approximately 30 minutes. The purpose of the interview is to gather information from you about your experiences with aftercare.

Everyone we interview is guaranteed confidentiality. IJM will not know who said what. To ensure confidentiality no names will not be recorded in the interview notes; instead, everyone will be assigned an ID number and that number will be recorded in the interview notes. At no point will this interview be audio recorded. I would just like to take notes on my laptop

In the final report, quotes will be used but will be anonymous; no specific statements or comments will be attributed to a particular person in the final report. Only ID numbers assigned to respondents will be included.

Your participation in this interview is voluntary, so if you choose not be interviewed or to end the interview at any time, there will be no penalty to you; in other words, choosing not to participate in this interview will in no way impact your continued access to service. Let me say again, we do not work for IJM.

Do you have any questions before we proceed? Are you ready to proceed with the interview?

ID Number:

Location:

Date:

1. Can you tell me what type of aftercare or support you received?
2. Did you feel that your after care was well coordinated, and that you received all of the support and assistance you needed?
3. Was there any support or assistance that you needed during the recovery process that you did not receive?
4. What there any support or assistance that you needed during the reintegration process that you did not receive?
5. Do you know what role IJM played in ensuring you were provided with quality aftercare and support? Can you explain?
6. What advice would you provide to improve the aftercare and rehabilitation system?
7. Were your traffickers/exploiters arrested by the police? ____ Yes ____ No ____ Don't know
 - a. If no, why were your traffickers/exploiters not arrested?
8. Did the police use child friendly procedures or techniques that made you feel supported, safe, and protected when they interviewed or supported you at the police station?

9. Were your traffickers/exploiters actually tried, convicted and found guilty (sent to jail) by the courts? ____
Yes ____ No ____ Don't know
- a. If yes, how satisfied were you with the court's processing of your case?
 - b. How satisfied were you with the courts or judges handling of your case?
 - c. If no, why weren't your traffickers/exploiters convicted?
10. If you can remember, did the courts use child friendly procedures or techniques during your trial to make you felt supported, safe, and protected?
11. Do you know what role IJM played to help ensure your traffickers/exploiters were arrested, prosecuted, and convicted? Can you explain?
12. What advice would you provide to improve the police's support of victims of sex trafficking?
13. I'm curious what are your plans for the future?
14. Have you had any successful moments that you are happy with?

